DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 219 097 JC 820 282

AUTHOR	Averill, Lloyd J.
TITLE	Learning to Be Human: A Vision for the Liberal Arts.
PUB DATE	[81]
NOTE	324p.
EDRS PRICE	MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS
DESCRIPTORS	College Curriculum; *Core Curriculum; *Curriculum Development; Educational Objectives; Faculty Development; *General Education; *Humanistic Education; Humanities; Postsecondary Education; Self Actualization; *Values Education; *Vocational Education

ABSTRACT

In light of the pressures of historical circumstances and with a commitment to educational integrity, this work seeks to reconceive the mission of the liberal arts and sciences. Chapter I defines the key criteria of humanism and holism and offers a critique of current liberal education in terms of curriculum coherency and intellectual and personal engagement. Chapter II examines the influence exerted on liberal education by current graduation requirements and delineates a process for reforming these requirements that would respond to the issues of living humanly in a humane society. Stressing the need for common learning and the shortcomings of distribution requirements, Chapter III proposes nine graduation requirements that would integrate core and specialized learning. Chapter IV looks at the intellectual and educational justifications for "moral seriousness" in the curriculum and suggests ways to achieve this goal. Career preparation is discussed in chapter V from a humanistic perspective, and suggestions for integrating liberal and professional education are provided. Chapter VI considers approaches to humanistic teaching and strategies for working with today's students, while chapter VII offers suggestions for creating an institutional climate for change and for faculty and administrative renewal. Appendices include a series of statements about liberal education drawn from the literature. (KL)

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LEARNING TO BE HUMAN:

A VISION FOR THE LIBERAL ARTS

by

Lloyd J. Averill

JC 820 282

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This book is dedicated

with affection and respect to

Laurence N. Barrett

Gordon H. Hermanson

and

Larry L. Rose

LEARNING TO BE HUMAN:
A VISION FOR THE LIBERAL ARTS

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PREFACE

This is not a dispassionate book. There is in it the delight and the disappointment of twenty-five years spent as a teacher and administrator in four different liberal arts colleges, and as the head of one national and one regional intercollegiate organization composed of liberal arts colleges.

The disappointment is clearly there. It is specified in the first chapter which follows, and it moves contrapuntally in and under the work of reconstruction to which entire rest of the volume is devoted. But delight is the primary motivation. It is because liberal learning has given my own life point and purpose for this quarter-century, and because I have experienced its power similarly to invest other lives with a sense of their own importance, that I am both unable and unwilling to approach it disinterestedly. It is because I care deeply about the liberal arts college that I have been drawn into a kind of lover's quarrel, believing that what is good ought still to be better, and determined to see it so.

Behind my own professional career in the liberal arts college, and indispensable to the shaping of that career, are my own experiences of undergraduate learning, first at the old Central YMCA College in Chicago, then at Beloit College, and finally in the Philosophy Department of the University of Wisconsin. Each impelled my growth and altered my aspiration. Unlike many, whose graduate and professional training compromises the habits and sensibilities developed as an undergraduate, my own confirmed and deepened those developments. Graduate theological education is the only instance I know of professional training whose form is in direct continuity with and imitation of the liberal arts curriculum, including as theological study commonly does the literature, history, philosophy, sociology, and psychology of religion, religious arts, communications skills, and so on. Two other influences from these

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theological origins can be traced through the intervening 30 years to this present work. One was the discovery that there is no inherent hostility between theoretical learning and its application (theological study moved deliberately and alternately between the two), and that full human liberation requires a competence for both. The other was the discovery that commitment to humanistic values in learning (in theological study that commitment was of the essence) need not subvert the intellect nor blindly prescribe its application, but that instead it is precisely such a commitment which offers an independent posture for responsible action in the face of any insistent orthodoxy, whether overtly religious or otherwise. Both of these discoveries are elaborated into substantial themes in the chapters which follow.

Three other influences are, for me, palpable on these pages, and it gives me great pleasure to acknowledge them. Laurence N. Barrett first taught me to think educationally when we were colleagues at Kalamazoo College from 1954 to 1967, tuition for which I have been actively in his debt ever since. Gordon E. Hermanson, president of Davis and Elkins College, gave me my first major opportunity to work at the problem of the re-formation of liberal learning, and the confidence he placed in me as his Vice President and Dean of the Faculty adds measurably to my own confidence even now, as it did then. And Larry L. Rose, close friend for 15 years and closest associate from 1972 to 1979 when we were colleagues at the Kansas City Regional Council for Higher Education, has been over these years my most incisive and constructive critic, with his unique combination of bluntness and balance. To these three men the book is affectionately dedicated.

I want to acknowledge the extraordinary helpfulness of M. Kent Mayfield, longtime colleague and friend, in reading and re-reading this manuscript, in testing some of its ideas, and in making suggestions for its sharpening and strengthening. Kent Mayfield is one of the most widely-read and thoughtful educators in a wide acquaintance, and I am grateful that he has made his critical intelligence so generously available.

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Finally and most importantly, my wife, psychologist Carol Anne Averill, has not only aided, abetted, and audited the ideas which come to expression in this book; she has also shared the delights, and has been the chief mitigator of the disappointments, of my life in the liberal arts college for more than a dozen years. It was she who suggested the title for the book.

PART ONE

Recovering the Vision

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Chapter One:

DEFINITIONS AND DEFECTS

I.

> Seldom has the state of American education and especially the liberal arts curriculum seemed in such disarray and confusion as at the present moment....Seldom has the opportunity of leadership seemed more evident for any institution which can envision a coherent, pertinent, inspiring model for liberal arts education.[1]

That judgment was rendered not long ago by a faculty committee at Amherst College. Though recent, the judgment is by no means new. It was anticipated a dozen years earlier in an address by Dean William C. DeVane of Yale College, who noted the prophecies then abroad of the imminent demise of liberal learning, and with it the end, or at any rate the radical revision, of its distinctive collegiate home. "What is most needed now," said Dean DeVane,

> ...is for some of our most eminent universities and strongest colleges to take time and make a major effort to understand the situation the college is in, and from that understanding to set up models of their conception of what the college ought to be and how it must function if it is to justify its position in the total plan of the country's educational establishment.[2]

Five years later, when Morris Keeton and Conrad Hilberry published the results of their extensive study of the future of liberal arts colleges, the assessment was even more melancholy, and the call to action more urgent. Writing particularly about the private college, Keeton and Hilberry bluntly called the typical liberal arts college "obsolete," and cited what they called "its sover-

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eign isolation, its protected students, the one-track careers of its faculty, its restrictive curriculums and teaching, and its tepid purposes [which] make it unsuited to the needs of the decades ahead." If it is to have a future, they said, the liberal arts college "must struggle to surmount these defects in a context of significantly altered purposes."[3]

Now, more than a decade after the Keeton and Hilberry study, we appear to have entered upon an even more serious period of crisis, perhaps the most serious which has yet threatened liberal learning in this country. Colleges are in trouble all across the land today, but their main difficulty does not lie where it is commonly reputed: in economy and demography. It lies, rather, in their lack of a liberating vision in education, in the fact that they have not yet built "a context of significantly altered purposes," and in the absense of what the Amherst faculty called "a coherent, pertinent, inspiring model" for what liberal learning can and ought to be. Budgets and enrollments are only symptoms, the results of our failure to reconceive the mission of the liberal arts college clearly and freshly, and to interpret it persuasively.

Our students seldom comprehend the ends of liberal learning beyond equating it fuzzily with core courses and distributional requirements, and wonder openly what the use of it all may be. That is in part because faculty members pay it lip-service, while visibly preferring in actual practice their standing as academic specialists, and wonder to themselves what the use of it all may be. The uncertainty, not to say occasional despair, of students and teachers can be traced, in turn, to the visionary vacuum created by academic administrators who have neither time nor temperament to think carefully and speak clearly about ends, and who are too preoccupied with crisis-management even to wonder what the use of it all may be.

And if the colleges themselves have thus lacked an inner persuasion, it is not surprising that the public at large has gone unpersuaded. So when the economy exerted temporary pressures on the job-market, there were at least two reasons why employers turned increasingly away from liberal arts graduates. One was the long-standing, cumulative failure of educators to deal in effective _public_ terms with the vital connection between liberal learning, _at its best_, and the legitimate needs, both individual and corporate, of our increasingly complex society. The other was that liberal education has too seldom been practiced _at its best_, with that vital connection clearly in focus. Instead of demonstrating a living connectedness with human and humane purposes larger than the college, what has been called liberal education has too often been a self-serving and, through graduate replication, a self-perpetuating enterprise. Convinced of its own self-evident importance, it has regularly exhibited indifference, or cynicism, or hostility toward larger purposes. Where there is a connection with the non-college world, in the unabashedly professional departments of the curriculum, liberal learning has scarcely fared better, with teachers in those departments appearing quite content to produce the "specialists without spirit" against which Max Weber warned two generations ago.[4]

Precisely because they had been paying so little attention, the colleges were at first surprised, and then increasingly alarmed, at the market's rejection of their graduates. Willing to rise above principle for the sake of survival, many of them have hastily introduced occupational curricula which, we must say quite plainly, are the antithesis of liberal education by almost any definition. Even where this curricular adventurism is a genuine effort to recover a vitality which has quite palpably been lost, and to restore a connectedness between the college and life as it is lived, it has still been--at best--the wrong answer to the right question. We would do well to denominate this new vocationalism by its right name, "single-outcome training," in order to make quite clear how different it is, and indeed how much more limited and limiting it is, when compared to the human versatility and the range of human competences which ought to emerge out of genuine liberal learning.

Many of these hasty occupational improvisations will undoubtedly fall of their own dead weight, and may well further complicate an already complicated situation. Economist Howard Bowen is probably right in his warning that "the character of the economy and its skill requirements [cannot] be predicted for periods long enough to be pertinent to educational planning."[5] The vagaries of the market being what they inevitably are, "single-outcome training" can be transformed, with virtually no early warning, from proud new educational relevance to trained obsolescence, with the college's moral and financial investment in a new educational image, and the specialized personnel and equipment necessary to sustain it, turned to instant liability.

And there is an intrinsic as well as extrinsic reason for the mischievous potential of these occupational improvisations. Many changes are being made to enhance the supposed market-appeal of the colleges with little careful and principled thought to the educational integrity of the occupational programs themselves, or to the educational integrity of the curricular mix which is thus stirred up in the college. Unhappily, that observation is confirmed by Lewis Mayhew's study of Higher Education for Occupations. Too many programs are "inserted, not integrated," Mayhew has concluded. Colleges commonly try to mitigate the disjunction between liberal education and career-entry training by means of distributional requirements (for example, requiring general psychology for criminal justice, general sociology for engineering). But this arrangement, Mayhew notes, grows more out of a "sensed need" for such requirements than out of a carefully thought-out educational plan. The so-called general education which results is, in Mayhew's verdict, "nominally germane and substantially irrelevant." It offers terminology without insight.[7]

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Still worse, some of these occupational offerings are simply misleading, at least implicitly promising students a market outcome which they cannot deliver. Sometimes gerry-built, minimally equipped, and taught by persons of dubious standing, they are not recognized informally by practitioners or qualified for formal certification, and are thus likely to leave their graduates with job prospects little better than those of fellow students in the standard liberal arts disciplines.

This issue is examined in more detail in Chapter Five on "Career Preparation in Humanistic Perspective." Suffice it to say here that, given its doubtful long-term relation to market realities, its abrasiveness with the college's other programs and purposes, and its problematic outcome for students, the potential for mischief in this "single-outcome" adventurism is enormous.

Liberal education needs re-formation. Engaged precariously, on the one hand, in "single-outcome training," and not very clear, on the other, about those broad but reasonably precise intellectual and human skills which enhance the ability of men and women to cope, not just with a working career but with a life career, we do nothing as well as we ought. It is a thesis of this volume that, given the obligation to educational integrity and the pressure of historical circumstance, we ought to disavow the sheer market-opportunism of "single-outcome training" and get on at once with the intellectually and organizationally demanding task of reconceiving the mission of the liberal arts and sciences.

What follows is intended as a contribution to that task.

II.

As a check against unexamined assumptions or merely idiosyncratic notions, and just in order to get my own mind clearer about the issue, I have been gathering statements from a wide variety of sources about the nature of a liberal education. In personal and educational outlooks, they range from

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Patricia Cross to Sidney Hook; in institutional locations, they run from Eton College to the University of Notre Dame; and in time, they extend from John Ruskin in the England of the 1850s, through A. N. Whitehead in the Harvard of the 1920s, to Kingman Brewster in his 1976 annual report at Yale.

Not everyone in this gathering intended to frame a formal definition; some offer what might better be called a characterization. The thing, in any case, which impresses and indeed surprises me is the remarkable consensus which appears to run through this very random group. (I have placed the collection, along with a somewhat formal and extended definition of my own, in the Appendices to this volume, so that the reader can test my judgment for himself.)

The consensus, stated in the briefest terms, appears to be this: The subject of the liberal arts is human-being, or perhaps better, human-becoming (e.g., Griswold: "their aim is to make the most of a man"; Hutchins: "they are, in fact, the arts of becoming human"; Van Doren: "The prime preoccupation of the liberal arts is with the skills of being"; etc.).

The object of the liberal arts is the development of those essential human skills which constitute a full, competent, and responsible life (e.g., AAC/CGS: they help men and women "acquire the judgment and power they need for maximum human fulfillment both as individuals and as contributors to the welfare of others"; Hook: they help students develop those powers and resources "so that they can live a rich and significant personal life...[and] perform their duties as free citizens of a free society"; Whitehead: they guide the individual toward "the most complete achievement of varied activity expressing the potentialities of that living creature in the face of its actual environment"; etc.).

Put even more simply, a liberal education consists of humanism--focus on the developing selfhood of the student--and of a life-encompassing holism--

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intent to begin, or to continue, the equipment of that growing self with the repertoire of resources needed to deal effectively with the simultaneous and serial environments of a lifetime.

Because I cannot conceive of a set of purposes more demanding of discipline and imagination, or more inherently rewarding for those who participate, whether as teachers or students, or more critically important to the quality of life on this planet, I have adopted them as the starting points for my own work of reformation. And because even those who share common criteria will differ on their elaboration, I must try at the outset to say what I take them to mean.

By humanism--focus on the developing selfhood of the student--I understand that the ends of liberal education have to do with growth toward identity, integrity, clarity, competence, maturity. Its purpose is the enlargement and enhancement of the human and the humane in individuals, and through their agency the enlargement and enhancement of a human and humane social order.

This is not so amorphously unspecific--so Platonic in its ideal remoteness--as it may seem at first. On the contrary, the humanism of the college will be disturbingly particular, if we take it seriously. The process of human growth--of becoming toward identity, integrity, clarity, competence, maturity--takes place most effectively as a centered and centering activity. My growing self is, after all, becoming some-one: both the risk and the reward of selfhood are in choosing my distinctness within the human family. Furthermore, I take my identity as a self, and I am identified in my distinct selfhood by others, in the presence of my ability to do some-thing, or perhaps more properly some-things: growth in distinct selfhood requires increasing confidence in what I can do effectively, in competence to act and in resiliency to be acted back upon. And this acting toward selfhood occurs some-place: as a growing self, I occupy a

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distinct space--psychological, historical, geographical--which, whether I have fully chosen it or not, must be lived out. The space I occupy is at one and the same time shared and exclusive; constantly interacting with the life-space of other selves, yet in its total configuration unlike any other.

So the humanism of liberal learning comes, at least in part, to this: that it proposes to engage the student as a full person. It is perhaps worth emphasizing that the disjunction some educators have encouraged between learning-to-be and learning-to-do (whether that doing is theoretical or applied) is insupportable from a humanistic point of view. Liberal learning does not take place when a student is assisted in discovering what he may know or do, if that knowing and doing are divorced from his own full humanity and he is viewed as a set of specialized functions, intellectual or practical. Liberal learning does take place when a student is assisted in discovering both what he may know and do, and in a larger sense what he may be; when competence-to-perform-a-skill is understood as an aspect of the developing competence-to-be-a-self.

Even so, perhaps the acid test of a liberal education comes only in those moments in which it seems that nothing can be done. From the considerable limitation of a prison cell, Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrote, "A liberal education which will not enable us to face danger and death does not deserve the name."[7] Which may be to say, that at those moments when it is not possible to do anything, it is still possible to be something. The courage still to be when there is no longer anything one can do: that is the ultimate achievement of the free person. As such, it is the end toward which all liberal learning must aspire.

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This growth toward human-becoming is unlikely to take place except in an environment which is sensitive not only to students as persons but to the personhood of all who are participants in it. So the humanism of liberal learning has an important implication for the college as a human institution: it proposes to engage the teacher and administrator, not only as specialist but also as person--as liberally-educated person preferably, but at least as one who is mature enough to risk clarity as a man, clarity as a woman. For whatever else they may be, teaching and administration in the liberal arts college are forms of modelling behavior, not at all because teachers and administrators are exemplary in some ideal sense, but rather because they can offer clear options to maturing selfhood.

Sometimes that model will be attractive to a student, giving him at least temporarily a place to stand while he shapes his own distinctive integrity. But mature teachers and administrators will have the resiliency also to be what Joseph Adelson has called "anti-models," of whom the student says, "Whatever he is, I will not be; whatever he is for, I will be against."[8] The anti-model performs an absolutely indispensable human service as a provoker of growth, since character is formed at the intersection of the capacity to say both Yes and No. Arthur Chickering is right, I think, in urging teachers and administrators to "recognize that if we are a force at all, for some students the valence will be negative, not positive. But better that students encounter a substantial being than a calculating role player or an elusive shadow."[9]

So the humanism of the liberal arts college means that students, teachers, and administrators will be present in the college in their full particularity. I said earlier that this particularity will be disturbing, and so at times it will be. For it means that room must be deliberately cleared in the college for

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idiosyncracy. And the truth is, that though my own distinctiveness and distinctness seem to me matters of simple integrity, the peculiarities of others impress me as complicating nuisances at best. Then we need to be clear that any institution which intends a human and humane result must begin by nurturing a tolerance for the idiosyncratic. Rather than pretending that they do not exist, or attempting to force them into alien forms, a liberal arts college must find ways to acknowledge, to accommodate, indeed to capitalize upon the human differences among its students, teachers, and administrators--differences which, when befriended, can become powerful forces for humanistic learning.

Holism is the other term which distinguishes liberal learning, and it points to the range of competences students must be assisted to achieve. By holism I understand, for one thing, a rejection of unidimensional preoccupations (exclusive emphasis, for example, on training the mind, or on the technical skills needed for occupational qualification) and attention instead to the larger dimensionality of selfhood: a competence for feelings as for facts, for action as for thought, for the moral as for the mental, for fantasy as for science, for the strange as for the familiar, for the mysterious as for the patent, for love as for death, for being as for doing. If this catalogue does not exhaust the dimensions, it at least begins to identify their possibilities.

Focus on selfhood must not fall into solipsism, so a holistic liberal learning means attention to a second kind of inclusiveness, one which has been described compellingly by H. Richard Niebuhr:

> ...the self is a being which comes to knowledge of itself in the presence of other selves and...its very nature is that of a being which lives in response to other selves. The distinguishing characteristic of a self ...is that it is a being which is an object to itself, something we cannot say of bodies or even of minds as minds. Self is a reflexive word

> and points to the reflexive fact.--But how is it possible that a being can become an object to itself? Only...through dialogue with others. ...only as I take toward myself the attitude of other selves, see myself as seen, hear myself as heard, speak to myself as spoken to.[10]

So liberal learning must assist students to achieve, not only personal competences, but those interpersonal ones as well which are the counterparts of the personal.

And there is yet one other sense in which liberal learning must be holistic. It is not learning whose importance is only for its own sake in the immediacy of the learning situation itself, or only for initial post-baccalaurate job entry, or only for some later stage of development. It is, rather, learning which entails--which is organically connected with--all of the successive stages of a life career. In the liberal arts college a learning process is begun which will provide resources for and have relevance to youth as to maturity, parenthood as to community activity, leisure as to work.

In short, liberal learning is holistic in the sense that, for each student, it is life-embracing.

Just as the humanistic intent of the college is unlikely to be achieved by students apart from attention to the human character of the teaching institution itself, so we must concern ourselves with institutional holism if we expect to assist students toward their own fullness and integrity.

By institutional holism, I understand that the college itself must be marked by the wholeness--the integrity--of its purposes, by the congruity of its several parts, and by the inclusiveness of the human competences to which it offers students access.

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If individual human wholeness is generated out of a centered self, as I have already argued, then the human institution which intends to nurture and provoke that growth must have its own integrating center. I quite understand that this assertion may fly in the face of a demand, sometimes heard from students and teachers alike, for a pluralism of purposes in the college. My own experience is that pluralism readily becomes a euphemism for disintegration. Drift, unproductive conflict, and demoralization occur where there is no purposive center. The mathematician who chaired the institutional self-study in a distinguished liberal arts college said this at its conclusion:

> Our greatest weakness lies in our failure to perceive any clear and compelling sense of purpose and direction in our undertaking as a college which could unify the faculty, the students, and the administration and the many excellent programs we sponsor. This lack of purpose and direction is evidence by the widespread indifference to and lack of identification with the college on the part of students, and of faculty members as well. It is present in the paradoxical statements made by many members of the college, that we do a good job at helping students achieve a liberal education, and yet the campus is intellectually dull and unexciting. Surely something can be done about this situation in which we have many excellent and successful parts but in which the whole is somehow listless and disappointing.

Warren Bryan Martin has observed how often what passes for the purposes of the college are "determined willy-nilly, by the pressure of external circumstances or disciplinary biases, by hoary tradition or anticipatory opportunism." Then it is no wonder that students, teachers, and administrators alike regularly find themselves at loose ends. Says Martin,

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Where there is no philosophical framework, faculty and students lack an institutional standard against which to test themselves; and this is a day when faculty need such a standard because they are at the stage in life when, as Erik Erikson put it, the issue is integrity, just as students need it because they are at the stage in life where, as Edgar Friedenberg has shown, the issue is self-identity. And neither faculty nor students can decide such issues in a void."

Rather than compromising institutional integrity and effectiveness, as the partisans of a so-called pluralism are likely to insist, commitment to a purposive center is precisely one of the necessary conditions for such effectiveness and integrity. Indecision and nondescriptness are conflict-generating; but commitment to clear institutional purpose can provide a unifying sense of meaning and direction as important to those who may not wholly sympathize with it as to those who do. And if such commitment to a centering purpose comes only out of agonizing process, that agony may be preferable to a dispiriting and demoralizing normlessness.

It is not only the integrity of its purposes which marks the college's holism, but the consequent congruity of its parts. For having determined upon those purposes, everything in the college--courses and activities, regulations and relationships--must take their form, their authorization, their justification, from that purposive center. Other purposes, more limited and more specialized, may be served only secondarily and to the degree that they do not compromise the college's essential aims.

Holism has also to do with the inclusiveness of the competences which are present within the college. There is, in the liberal arts college, a place for all of the major modes of human inquiry. Human competence requires a varied repertoire of avenues into experience and of skills for dealing effectively

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with experience. To be a person is to have a world, and the shape of the person is measured by the dimensions of the world that are accessible to his or her reach. Humanness is crabbed and cramped wherever men and women are restricted in their capacity to experience: the limitations they find in the world, internalized, become the limits of the self. Humanness is expanded and enhanced wherever men and women have a widened capacity to experience, and thus to internalize reality in its multiform richness.

But it must be an integrated inclusiveness--or if that is too grand and unattainable an ideal, then it ought at least to be learning that is actively and deliberately interrelated. It is the business of the liberal arts college to leave no doubt about what art has to do with science, what feelings have to do with work, what play has to do with thought, what morality has to do with knowledge. Its task is to suggest the linkages which can aid men and women to grow that largeness of vision and resource with which to break out of the restricted and sometimes dreary compartments into which they may be thrust by occupation or other circumstance.

The conclusion of the matter seems to be this: that if, in acting out its humanism, the college must clear a place for idiosyncrasy, in acting out its holism it must clear a place for a coming together, both intellectually (in part through arrangements for general education) and interpersonally (for which "common learning," a synonym I prefer for general education, can be an effective vehicle in the complex interaction of students and teachers). As real as the discontinuities are which mark my humanness are the continuities which link me, through time and space, to a vast human kind, and a liberal education must take account of both. So the correlative of idiosyncrasy must be community; and room must be deliberately cleared in the college, among teachers, students, and administrators, for that acting together--intellectual, moral, personal--which expresses, and indeed confesses, our need of each other.

What I am evolving out of these reflections are the tests of liberal learning: Every provision for choice in the college must be measured by its potential contribution to growth toward individuation--idiosyncrasy; every requirement for uniformity in the college must be tested by its potential contribution to growth toward socialization--community.

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The liberating character of the learning which is both humanistic and holistic, then, comes to this: here, whether for the first time, or in continuity with influences already at work, the student will find freedom to become a responsible self.

III.

The lack of subtlety and resource which some colleges have displayed in dealing with the present crisis which afflicts liberal education--either defying internal and external demands for change, in the supposed defense of the liberal tradition, or hastily abandoning it -is evidence that they are locked into academically doctrinaire notions of what a liberal arts college must be. If we are to develop the kind of principled resilience which effective survival of the liberal tradition in higher education will require, it will be necessary for educators and their institutions to break out of their unexamined orthodoxies. Whatever excellences may subsequently be found in the received ways of doing things, we must deliberately distance ourselves from them for the sake of critical reconstruction--a task, ironically, which we commonly urge upon students, but which we "professional intellectuals" find uncommonly difficult to manage.

One of the most influential of those academic orthodoxies is, that what distinguishes liberal learning is a certain content; that it is synonymous with some particular curricular arrangement, most commonly one which includes a traditional and rather wide-ranging set of discrete academic disciplines, through which students are expected to pass according to some standard distributional scheme.

Three considerations point up the inadequacy of such a view. One is simply a descriptive observation: During its long history, liberal education has, in fact, embraced a wide variety of curricular contents, and has adapted itself to a series of educational fashions. Liberal studies in the medieval university

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included the trivium of grammar, logic, and rhetoric, and the quadrivium of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. In the 19th century English university, liberal education centered in historical and literary classics, while in the American college of that same period, the study of law and medicine and theology were added to classical subjects at the undergraduate level. In our own century, liberal curricula have been shaped by influences as diverse as the Great Books, on the one hand, and Deweyan preoccupation with pragmatic problem-solving, on the other. And when it has come to the distributional question, the range has been from virtually no requirements to virtually no electives.

The more important consideration is conceptual, and it arises out of the redefinition of liberal learning which was constructed in the immediately preceding section of this chapter: Underlying all of these forms and fashions, one can discern quite clearly that what, in fact, distinguishes liberal learning, and joins its historically diverse forms in a reasonably common enterprise, is not a certain content but a certain intent. "The question of what it is to be...fully human, is the question at the heart of liberal education," wrote literary scholar Wayne Booth.[12] As I have just been arguing, the liberal arts college is generically an educational strategy for enlarging and enhancing the human and the humane. To engage in a process of liberal learning is to undertake the practice of those human and humane competences which free men and women to live life rather than to be lived by it, and to grow that integrity which draws varied competences together and makes life both single and singular.

In principle, nothing which is of significance to that intent is alien to a liberal education. In practice, of course, a college must content itself with being somewhat less global, and with choosing those aspects of the humanizing process in the achievement of which it is competent to assist its students. But those choices must be made, and once made must be continually measured by, their approximation of the larger human and humane intent. It is no longer

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fashionable to cite Theodore Roszak's The Making of a Counter Culture, but he said some permanently important things there, and one of them bears on my argument just at this point:

> ...if that elusive concept "reality" has any meaning, it must be that toward which the entire human being reaches out for satisfaction, and not simply some fact-and-theory-mongering fraction of the personality. What is important, therefore, is that our lives should be as big as possible, capable of embracing the vastness of those experiences which, though yielding no articulate, demonstrable propositions, nevertheless awake in us a sense of the world's majesty.[13]

It must be the intent of a liberal arts college that its own life, and in that presence the lives of its students as well, shall be as big as possible.

A third consideration follows: While that kind of largeness will include competences which can indeed be achieved by attention to a certain content, it cannot be limited merely to cognitive achievement. Psychologist Kenneth Keniston has noted, that while no single definition of human wholeness is possible, we can at least identify some of its manifestations:

> A whole man or woman has a capacity for zest, exuberance, and passion, though this capacity may often be in abeyance. An integrated man does not cease to experience tension, anxiety, and psychic pain, but he is rarely overwhelmed by it. Though all men must at times "close" themselves to that which would be subversive to their commitments, a whole man nonetheless retains the capacity for openness, sensitivity, and responsiveness to the world around him: he can always be surprised because he remains open to that which is alien to him.
>
> Above all, human wholeness means a capacity for commitment, dedication, passionate concern, and care--a capacity for wholeheartedness and singlemindedness, for abandon without fear of self-annihilation and loss

> of identity. In psychological terms, this means that a whole man retains contact with his deepest passions at the same time that he remains responsive to his ethical sense. No one psychic potential destroys or subverts the others: his cognitive abilities remain in the service of his commitments, not vice versa; his ethical sense guides rather than tyrannizes over his basic passions; his deepest drives are the source of his strength but not the dictators of his action. We recognize whole men and women because their wholeness is manifest in their lives. what they do is "of a piece."[14]

All of which is to say that, under the humanistic definition which I am employing here, liberal learning will indeed give place to distinctive intellectual contents and skills; at the same time, it must also give place to considerations of style and value, to teaching understood as a fully human transaction, and to the varieties of learning environment, which give promise of yielding the kinds of human versatility, and the growth toward a livable wholeness of experience--a lived integrity--which must be the college's larger intent.

The despair into which some educators have fallen, these days, in the face of reducing instructional resources--where that despair arises out of an assumption that the integrity, strength, and quality of liberal learning will be threatened by such reduction--may in fact be quite unnecessary. It instances the influence of the dogma that liberal learning is identical with a certain content, so that if the content is reduced, such learning is diminished. But in fact, by the definition I am urging, educators may have far more options for flexibility, and for the effective redesign of a liberal curriculum, than they realize, and some of those options will be explored later in this volume.

In similar fashion, some educators have rushed too readily into programs of "single-outcome training" because they see no way to maintain the liberal arts in their conventional (subject-matter defined) form and still respond to the current

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demand that an undergraduate education should have some post-partum usefulness. They are right, I think, that the liberal arts as conventionally practiced have a limited usefulness; and that, as I shall be arguing, is precisely one of the marks of their illiberality. But since liberal learning, by the definition employed here, is not identical with a particular content--with the curricular form in which it is conventionally cast--there may be far more options for fashioning a genuinely useful curriculum than the hasty abandoners of liberal learning realize; and again, some of those options will be explored later in this volume.

Academic dogmas have had their way with us because we have had precious little by way of thoughtful, clear, and coherent educational vision to challenge and correct them. The humanistic vision which I shall be attempting to project in the chapters which follow can give the liberal arts college both the location it needs for its own integrity, and the elasticity it needs for responsiveness to the changing demands which are pressed upon it. Curricular dogmas about liberal learning can do neither and, indeed, are likely to strangle the college, binding it to educationally unprofitable tasks and stifling its humane impulses.

I believe that the current crisis in the liberal arts has delivered us into a moment of singular opportunity, in which the power of established dogmas has been substantially weakened by internal intellectual confusion, and by the loss of external patronage. It is, in fact, a moment of apparent paradox: at precisely the time when we seem to be most restricted, because of limitations on our resources, we are precisely most free to generate an enspiriting vision and to shape the institution to that vision.

And if we care, not only about survival but about the character and quality of what survives, we had better seize the day!

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IV.

In its actual practice in the colleges, how does liberal education rate when measured against the two-fold criterion of humanism and holism?

Any critique which generalizes across so scattered and extended, and presumably diverse, an enterprise as undergraduate education in this country will appear to risk distortion at best, or irresponsibility at worst. Nevertheless, such a critique can be useful in assisting individual practitioners and institutions to distance themselves, for the moment, from their own practice in order to make a fresh assessment of what they are doing and why they are doing it.

It can also be responsible--accurate in its assessment of predominant characteristics and trends. When Harold Hodgkinson was at the Center for Research and Development in Higher Education at Berkeley, he wrote about the "myth of uniqueness" which he said frequently distorts our institutional self-understandings. It is the plausible but insubstantial notion that one college embodies such a singular set of persons and events, of trappings and traditions, that it can neither be described in terms directly comparable to other institutions, nor learn directly from the problems and possibilities which others turn up. My own experience strongly confirms the mythical character of that notion. After direct and reasonably revealing contact with perhaps 150 colleges and universities over the last 15 years--as consultant, lecturer, staff member, and visitor--I can only report that, when I have closed my eyes and listened to the sounds around me made by teachers and administrators and students, it has been virtually impossible to tell one school from another. When away, it seemed to me that I had never left home.

What follows is not, moreover, a critique from which I can exempt myself as a practitioner of the liberal arts for more than 25 years. On the contrary, I recognize myself in its profile, and I understand sadly how--as teacher and administrator--I have made my own largely unconsidered contributions. Indeed, that awareness of my own recent history permits me to make an important acknowledgement in preface to such a critique. Where liberal education has been defective, judged by the standards of its classical intent, that has not ordinarily been the result of deliberate subversion, nor of professional misfeasance. It has more often resulted from the fact we we are not sufficiently practiced at thoughtfulness about larger issues or ends. However expert we may be in our respective specializations, nothing in our background of professional preparation for teaching or administration, and little in our experience as practitioners, has demanded of us the kind of careful and considered thought about the whole, as well as about its parts, which is necessary if academic specialists are to become educators.

So the critique which follows is not so much a set of charges as it is an invitation to a comprehensive thoughtfulness about the human enterprise upon which we are engaged in the liberal arts and sciences. When measured by the two-fold criterion of humanism and holism, these are the places at which the practice of liberal education seems commonly to come up short:

A. Liberal education commonly lacks integrative rootage in a thoughtful anthropology.

It is ironic that the one institution in our society (apart from the church) which talks most about its humanism, seldom has a clear and coherent vision of the human and humane ends which it purportedly exists to serve, and therefore has no controlling human image or images which can give organic, integral shape to its supposedly humanistic curriculum.

This is not to say that there are no anthropologies at work in the college. What M.I.T.'s Douglas McGregor has written about the field of business management can be said as accurately about the educational enterprise since, as human institutions, both are subject to the same general influences. Says McGregor, "behind every managerial [substitute "curricular"] decision or action are assumptions about human nature and human behavior."[15] This means that whether or not they are ever brought

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to self-conscious awareness and articulation, the working anthropological assumptions of a college can be extracted, for example, from official statements which describe the intended outcomes of four undergraduate years.

Consider the following example of a statement typically located somewhere near the front of a college catalog:

> During the course of study at X College, students achieve a clearer sense of self-identity, freedom for responsible action, and standards for moral choice; a broad acquaintance with the cultural heritage; the intellectual skills of independent, critical, and constructive thought and expression; and mastery of one of the disciplines in preparation for further study or for a career.

Compare such a statement with another, typically found somewhat farther back in that same catalog:

> Candidates for admission to X College must present 15 academic units of secondary-school work, and are usually expected to have a combined SAT score of 900. In order to maintain good standing, entering students must achieve a minimum grade-point average of 1.70 by the end of the first year.
>
> Candidates for the baccalaureate degree must present 120 credit-hours with a minimum cumulative grade-point average of 2.00. In addition, degree candidates must complete an approved academic major of not less than 24, nor more than 40, credit-hours, and must complete all general-education requirements (3 courses in the humanities, 2 courses in a laboratory science, 4 courses in the social sciences, and 2 courses in physical education). Minimum residence for the degree is the last 30 credit-hours of course work.
>
> Seniors with a cumulative grade-point of 3.30 to 3.59 will graduate with honor; 3.60 to 3.79 with high honor; and 3.80 and above with highest honor.

These two statements are characteristic of colleges across the country, and are too common to require caricature. Yet the anthropologies they reflect are radically incoherent and, where both are taken seriously, result in such inconsistency and dis-integral behavior that the entire enterprise is confused and compromised. What does that second paragraph imply about the educational vision, the anthropological assumptions, which move and inform X College? These things, among others: that human growth is to be measured primarily (even exclusively) by the tests of accumulation and accretion; that quantity is to be the test of human quality, and perhaps that quantity is quality; and, since human growth and learning are apparently subject to such precise mensural discrimination to the second decimal, that they are to be measured against some relatively fixed standard, in which case the learning situation must be willing to tolerate little by way of idiosyncratic forms of behavior or response, or, to put it another way, of individuality. In such a context, there appear to be neither the means nor the intent to measure growth in such distinctively human dimensions as moral acuity, culture, and critical intellect. Indeed, such terms appear to have no relevance to the scheme outlined in that second paragraph.

All of which is to say, that the distinctively human outcomes promised in paragraph one are not the outcomes measured in paragraph two. Wherever this occurs, there is a fundamental anachronism at the very center of the supposedly humanistic enterprise. What begins as a human model is transmogrified, by a process never fully intended nor chosen in the face of its actual consequences, into a mechanistic model. We may speculate on how or why this change comes about: perhaps it is an overwhelming preference for convenience over complexity; perhaps it arises out of fear of making any judgments which can be "justified" by arithmetical playback; perhaps it is academic acquiescence in the by now almost indelible assumption of our consumer society that quantity is quality. It appears, in any event, to be a part of what Theodore

Roszak once called "a grand reductive process."[16] In our quantified, and increasingly computerized, society, we seem ready to abandon what quantification or computerization will not permit us to do. So, if we discover that quantification cannot measure self-identity, moral discrimination, constructive intellect, or intellectual competence, if it cannot detect the presence of imagination or integrity or awe, then we alter our expectations--without however altering out statement of expectations, which continues to promise something humanly larger--in order to produce that which can be quantified. Thus we sacrifice complexity to our own convenience and unimaginativeness.

Then we need to understand that liberal education turns illiberal when it has no tolerance for variety and complication, since those are precisely the marks of the human in contrast to other forms of creation. Rene Dubos, the late distinguished Rockefeller University scientist, put that distinction in these words:

> Since persons differ in their endowments and aspirations, they need different kinds of opportunities and surroundings for self-expression and creation. Diversity is thus part of functionalism in the design of human settlements. Diversity may cause the world to become somewhat inefficient and even inconvenient, but in the long run it is more important than efficiency and convenience because it provides the variety of materials from which persons and civilizations emerge and continue to evolve. The inanimate world is a system running down and progressively losing its activities and varieties. In contrast, the living world evolves by widening the range of its activities and varieties.[17]

To be sure, even the most humane institution has a right to regularities and regulations, since these can create human equity and the organizational effectiveness necessary to the achievement of human purposes. But colleges must do more. As the pre-eminently humane institutions in our society, liberal arts colleges must have a commitment to complication and a tolerance for consequent inconvenience: commitment, not to a bureaucratic complication which thwarts and frustrates, but a creative complication which cares genuinely about human growth along a number of dimensions, which encourages differences as well as similarities, and which thus fulfills. There is no other way to be sure that there will be room for the human in its varying sizes and shapes, its differing predispositions and aspirations, and its range of ignorances and excellences.

Whether the problem is the unclarity or the internal inconsistencies of our educational objectives, the inappropriateness of the measures we choose to assess them, or our intolerance for humane complication, the source may be the same: in the college we typically lack a clear, consistent, internally-guiding commitment to concrete meanings of the human and the humane--meanings which could provide a basis for discrimination in the presence of specific educational choices, and a check against drift into inimical forms and practices. Gerhard Spiegler is right: "the curriculum of a liberal arts college is a complex value judgment. The liberal arts college, if it purports to inculcate values, must itself embrace values; it must commit itself."[19] Institutional engagement in the questions of the nature of the human and the humane, and institutional commitment to some answers to those questions, however provisional, are absolutely essential if there is to be any integrity between a college's profession of humanistic intent and the actual process of learning which goes on there.

All of which is to say, that anthropological nondescriptness and the Procrustean curriculum must give way to human clarity and humane complication.

B. Liberal learning is commonly an experience of intellectual and personal fragmentation.

Its structure is essential monadic and serial. With the exception of some (though by no means all) areas of mathematics, science, and languages, each unit--

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usually a course--is taught as if it were an end in itself, with little if any regard for others in the series. If occasionally a student is expect to carry skills with him from one level of specialized subject-matter to the next (i.e., from calculus to linear algebra), it is rare that he is invited, and rarer still that he is expected, to carry skills across subject-matters (e.g., from sociology to literature, or from biology to religion).

Even what passes for "general education" may be little more than a series of unrelated introductions to discrete disciplines, distributed over the spectrum of curricular divisions, and offering such a confused welter of vocabularies and concepts that even a sophisticated intellect would have difficult in drawing them into effective interrelation. Core courses which are presumably designed to aid the student in achieving some measure of intellectual integration are sometimes taught by a parade of specialists who themselves display little competence for the integrative task, leaving the problem of intellectual interplay entirely to the students, who thus lack both models and practical guidance in the art.

Intellectual fragmentation is reinforced by the structural fragmentation of emphasis upon discrete academic disciplines hardened into relatively autonomous departments, which take their warrant from a certain intellectual orthodoxy. For a century, the predominant moving and molding force in Western intellectual life has been the scientific enterprise, both in its concrete results (e.g., the broad intellectual as well as practical impact of the concept of evolution) and in its research methodology. Scientific inquiry deals with rigorously-delimited phenomena for purposes of greater precision, accuracy, prediction, and control. It is, in effect, inquiry by deliberate fragmentation. Other areas of inquiry--the humanities, the social sciences, even some aspects of the fine arts--concerned for their own credibility and respectability, and beguiled by the success of scientific inquiry, sometimes attempt to adopt a scientific model as the standard for their own scholarly

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and creative work. The discrete academic discipline and its organizational counterpart, the intellectually autonomous academic department, are the direct result of scientific influence.

Yet for all of its incredible productiveness, science deals with knowledge abstracted and thus (ironically) de-natured, with little means for dealing with contextual reality. Disciplinary fragmentation functions always at the sub-human level; in contrast, life itself is lived contextually. Conventional undergraduate courses taught in individual academic disciplines have the virtue of permitting attention to be focussed intensively where limited variables yield greater detail and precision. But such procedure, especially when it is the near-exclusive vehicle for learning, runs the risk of falsifying by abstraction. For genuinely humanistic learning, that abstraction must be balanced by a view of human activity in its explicitness, but also in its organic wholeness and interrelation at concrete moments of time.

A liberal arts college ought to be engaged, not merely with taking life apart, but in attempting to construct whole life-contexts with both particularity and richness, in the hope of enabling both the student and the teacher to move toward his own personal particularity, wholeness, and richness.

Another kind of fragmentation is created by the conventional setting for a liberal education. A residential college campus, staffed by a collection of professional intellectuals, whose primary if not exclusive locus of activity is the formal classroom, is itself a disjunctive experience. It creates not only physical but spiritual separation between the kind of living that takes place in the ordinary world, and the formal learning that takes place in the quite extra-ordinary world of the college. Commonly entailed in that disjunction is the separation of knowing, which is claimed as the central business of the college, from doing, which is thought by many professional intellectuals to represent the lower-level preoccupation of vulgar society which is temporarily renounced during the undergraduate years. And the knowing is generated out of relationships with a set of professionals who sometimes appear to be inordinately hostile to, or critical about, that quite ordinary world into which most undergraduates will eventually move. Such fragmentation bears scant promise of liberating consequence.

In fact, liberal education turns illiberal whenever it fails to confer upon men and women the competences they need for growth into full and continuing maturity. Alfred North Whitehead, one of the pre-eminent philosophical and mathematical intellects of our century, was an implacable enemy of what he called "inert ideas," that is, ideas "that are merely received into the mind without being utilised, or tested, or thrown into fresh combinations."[19] Education, in Whitehead's view, is "the art of the utilisation of knowledge,"[20] and thus he denounced as "fatal, erroneous, and dangerous" the notion that learning has as its aim the sharpening or cultivating of the mind quite without reference to the actual application of the mind's powers.[21] Education ought, rather, to be "useful."[22] So,

> The antithesis between a technical and a liberal education is fallaceous. There can be no adequate technical education which is not liberal, and no liberal education which is not technical; that is, no education which does not impart both technique and intellectual vision. In simpler language, education should turn out the pupil with something he knows well and something he can do well. This intimate union of practice and theory aids both. The intellect does not work in a vacuum. The stimulation of creative impulse requires...the quick transition to practice.[23]

Competence, on this view, is not merely a state of mind but a capacity for informed and effective action.

For a college to seize the moment of opportunity which is resident within the present crisis, it will mean willingness to entertain the possibility that it is in difficulty, not because it is a college of the liberal arts and sciences in an age which does not value liberal learning, but rather because as a community of educators it has not made explicit, first to itself and then to its students and the general public, the connection between a liberal education and adult maturity and competence.

So these are the questions we ought now to be addressing while there is still time for them to make a difference: What *does* an education in the liberal arts and sciences come to? What is its *usefulness*? What human, and not merely mental, *outcomes* does it intend? Is it at best a collocation of fragments whose human fit is elusive, or does it move toward *personal and intellectual wholeness* those who give themselves to it? What *demonstrated tastes, skills, values* can it confer which can equip its graduates for effective intellectual and ethical action in the world? What *identifiable competences* can it offer, both for a work career which includes but is larger than job entry, and for a life career which includes but is larger than work? And what explicit sense of *calling* shall animate its graduates, giving them a larger world of meaning which can inform, and even transform, daily tasks?

All of which is to say, that curricular fragmentation and intellectual "inertness" must now give way to integration within the college, and connectedness--usefulness--to life beyond the college.

C. *Liberal education is deficient as a humanistic enterprise wherever it prefers the objective consciousness to the exclusion of learning which is morally and personally serious.*

Many teachers of the liberal arts and sciences regularly exhibit symptoms of acute dis-ease whenever it is suggested that a student's capacity for facts ought to be matched by his capacity for values, that intellectual learning ought to be balanced by moral learning, and that it is the direct responsibility of teachers in the academic classroom to concern themselves with both.

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"Nonsense," retorted a philosopher from Duke, "higher education is not psychotherapy....The function of a college is to turn out people who *know* something, preferably something of importance." That philosopher sounds like a good many academics whose teaching is based on the mistaken assumption, as Kenneth Underwood put it, "that information is logically and epistemologically equivalent to wisdom."[24] So, acting on that assumption and unloading upon our students the specialized information at our command, whether in philosophy or in physics, we wonder why it does not make them wise.

There is an important sense in which moral learning may be considered chief among the liberal--that is, humanizing and humane-izing--arts, because moral action is perhaps our most distinctively human form of behavior, for which no other creature of our acquaintance possesses competence. It is rooted in choice and responsibility, twin marks of our humanness: awareness that we are offered, in every situation, a range of possible behaviors, and the imperative that, as selves-in-relation, we ought to choose those which are likely to result in the most inclusive good. So Yale philosopher John Smith insists that the ethical

> *is* the hallmark of being human....Man is the only being who can *answer for* what he thinks and does, the only being capable of knowing the value, the import, and the purpose of his actions....if, under present circumstances, there is any sense still left to the honorific expression "the dignity of man," it must lie in the all-important fact that man is the being who can be called to account for himself and his deeds.[25]

Liberal education turns illiberal wherever it fails to assist students in growth toward moral discrimination and a capacity for responsible moral action. It is illiberal because such failure stunts their humanness and confirms their incompetence.

To put the issue in slightly different terms, liberal education diminishes the human whenever it refuses to deal directly with issues which are at once intimate

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and ultimate, perhaps because it prefers the apparent safety of disinterested (that is, presumably uncommitted) modes of inquiry. Disinterestedness--willingness intellectually to take the attitude of another; to entertain a point of view at the level of its meaning, even if in the end it may be necessary to reject it at the level of its truth; acknowledgement that some things in our world are what they are, whether we would have it so or not--is an absolutely indispensable intellectual virtue. And disinterestedness does, of course, mean the temporary suspension of my own most intimate and ultimate questions and conclusions. But the operative word here is *temporary*, and the sophisticated intellect is capable of moving back and forth between disinterest and interest, between disengagement and engagement, as these two vital stances are appropriate to the issues at hand. The problem is that educators frequently encourage disinterestedness but give no place to the intimate and the ultimate. The result is a flatness which makes the student familiar with others' ideas and values and a stranger to his own.

So Michael Novak has written, that

> it is possible--it is even common--for a student to go to class after class of sociology, economics, psychology, literature, philsophy, and the rest, and hardly become aware that he is dealing with issues of life and death, of love and solitude, of inner growth and pain. He may never fully grasp the fact that education is not so much information and technique as self-confrontation and change in his own conscious life. He may sit through lectures and write examinations--and the professors may *let* him do merely that--collecting verbal "answers," without really thinking through and deciding about any new aspect of his own life in any course.[26]

There can be no genuinely humanistic learning which does not offer each person an opportinity to decide for himself what matters. Yet colleges have been content to stock the peripheries of student lives with information and ideas, while ignoring that center where meaning and conviction must reside if the periphery is to be any more than a random and disorienting welter.

All of which is to say that, for genuinely humanistic learning, moral indifference and personal disengagement must give way to moral seriousness and personal learning.

V.

In offering this three-fold critique of an education which is marked by what I have called *anthropological nondescriptness and the Procrustean curriculum*, *curricular fragmentation and intellectual "inertness*," and *moral indifference and personal disengagement*, it has not been my intent to claim that these defects taken together constitute the profile of any single college--though there may be, somewhere, a school so unresistingly feckless as to qualify on every count. More often, in any given institution some of my criticisms may not apply at all, and each of them will vary in its degree of application. My purpose has been to offer this composite in the hope of awakening individual and institutional self-recognition wherever it is appropriate, as a contribution to that renewal which is the continuing need even of the most effective among us, and as an introduction to the specific proposals for the re-formation of liberal learning which are set forth in the chapters which follow.

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PART TWO

Reconstruction

Chapter Two

HUMAN CLARITY AND HUMANE COMPLICATION

> "The curriculum as it exists in so many places has been evolved without much attention to the developmental needs of students. Perhaps the curriculum is better understood as a kind of treaty of peace among the warring departments of the university....If we want seriously to talk about the development of the student, we probably have to begin with an attack on the way we arrive at a curriculum." Nevitt R. Sanford.[1]

I.

Nevitt Sanford is right: the curriculum of the typical liberal arts college is an ad hoc construct, the product not of an integrated educational vision but of endless compromise with institutional special interests. We sometimes play at curricular change as if it were a game introduced at children's parties. Each child is given a piece of paper on which he is invited to draw a head. The paper is then folded so that the next child in the circle will not see the head on which he is now invited to draw a neck. Again the paper is folded so that the next child will not see the neck on which he is then invited to draw a body. And so the game is played out. In the end, the papers are unfolded, and any similarity between their grotesqueries and a real human being is purely coincidental.

So the ironic consequence for the supposedly humanistic institution is that there is no recognizably human profile to be found in its graduation requirements, as we saw in the typical statement of those requirements cited in the previous chapter. If there is such a profile lurking amidst those grade-point averages and hours to be accumulated, its image is very dim indeed.

Alfred North Whitehead was scarcely more complimentary in assessing the type of curriculum which prevailed earlier in this century. What he wrote more than 50 years ago has a remarkably contemporary ring. "There is only one subject-matter for education," he wrote in The Aims of Education,

> and that is Life in all of its manifestations. Instead of this single unity, we offer...Algebra, from which nothing follows; Geometry, from which nothing follows; Science, from which nothing follows; History, from which nothing follows; a Couple of Languages, never mastered; and lastly, most dreary of all, Literature, represented by the plays of Shakespeare, with philological notes and short analyses of plot and character to be in substance committed to memory. Can such a list be said to represent Life, as it is known in the midst of the living of it? The best that can be said of it is, that it is a rapid table of contents which a deity might run over in his mind while he was thinking of creating a world, and had not yet determined how to put it together.[2]

Viewed in the light of the new popularity of distributional requirements to satisfy what passes for general education, this characterization seems to me unerring and devastating.

I am convinced that Nevitt Sanford is right in the words which preface this chapter: "If we want seriously to talk about the development of the student"--and, although educators may differ on what "development" comprehends, surely what is going to happen to the student must be the test and touchstone of humanistic curricular construction--"we probably have to begin with an attack on the way we arrive at a curriculum." It is the burden of this chapter to urge that two things, especially, must be done in fashioning a more humanly productive approach to curriculum design in the liberal arts college.

First, we need to envision more carefully and concretely the human and humane

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ends the curriculum is to serve, in a form which can function both as a matrix out of which specific curricular implications and applications can be drawn, and as a continuing standard in the presence of which to test subsequent decisions and alterations as well as on-going effectiveness.

Since a college is a social organism--an institution in the full sociological meaning of that term--its identity and organizational integrity will depend on its ability to locate itself with respect to the social policies it intends to serve. Therefore, before (that is, logically, epistemologically, and sociologically before) I know what to do with a liberal arts curriculum, understood humanistically as I am trying to understand it--before I know what to make of such a curriculum--I must have some clear and clearing notions of what it means to live humanly in a humane society. Only in relation to such clarity can I make any decisions about scope and limitation, about style and content, about the beginnings and the ends of such an enterprise. Only if I have some vision of the human whole--that integrated and intentional set of human expectations to which the college aspires for every graduate--will it be possible to determine what ought to be done, except as capitulation to the politically stronger academic special-interest.

Gerhard Spiegler has insisted that it is not so much disciplinary aggrandizement which compromises our curricular decisions, as it is "the inability of educators in our culture to make value judgments and commitments through the curricular structure of the educational process."[3] But one of the reasons why value judgments and commitments are so difficult for us, and why academic special-interest so regularly prevails, is that many educators have no other developed vantage-point from which to derive their values, by means of which to understand in larger terms what and how a curriculum might mean, and no more compelling vision on which to act. It is that larger vision, and with it the possibility of more holistic and active values, which we must find ways to evoke.

The second need for a new approach to curriculum construction is realization of the critical influence the *form* of the graduation requirements exerts upon the whole of the educational enterprise within a college.

The statement of those requirements works as a very powerful symbol--perhaps *the* most powerful symbol--among us. It is consulted far more often than the statement of humanistic purposes found elsewhere in the college catalog, both by students and by teachers. It shapes all of our efforts and anticipations, both what we teach and the way we teach it, what we learn and the way we learn it. But as we saw in the preceding chapter, the terms in which that statement of requirements is customarily cast force upon our efforts a shape which has little human semblance.

All of this raises acutely the question of what happens when the measures (the graduation requirements) are not appropriate, and may indeed be antithetical, to the announced standards of the institution (its statement of educational purposes). My strong hunch is, that it is the measures rather than the standards which call the tune and determine institutional character, with standards effectively reduced to the level permitted by the measures. When, therefore, we play at raising or lowering the decimal figures which regulate probation and good standing, or spell the difference between "success" and "failure," and when we add plusses and minuses to the letter-scale by which academic performance is reported, and when we persuade ourselves that we are raising and lowering "standards" thereby, I am bound to believe that we are engaged in an exercise of self-deception. When we hold up the ideal of intellectualism in the college, and then proceed to play our numerical games, we are engaged in a crassly anti-intellectual activity. Surely intellect means more than repetition and replication; surely it is more than a set of methodological, facts-acquisitional, and recall functions. Intellect includes mental acuity, to be sure, but it includes as well imagination and playfulness, reverence and sympathy, confidence and joy.

These things can be detected, tested, and weighed by a careful professional judgment, which itself employs those larger intellectual qualities in the detecting, testing, and judging; but neither the presence of those capacities in a student, nor their use by a teacher in arriving at his professional judgment, can be reduced to a set of arithmetic approximations without absurdity. There is no doubt that life is simpler for academic bookkeepers when cumulative quantifications,, whether in a single course or in an academic career, are premitted to do their judging for them; but on the considerations I am urging, academic bookeepers will be expected to become educators, with simplification and standardization subject to the tests of larger values.

If a college intends a fully human result, it will get it only with fully human measures.

The problem with much curricular alteration is that it merely rearranges, rather than re-forms, the statement of measures (the graduation requirements), with the result that little if any alteration is required in the means (the ways in which teaching and learning are done). So it is not surprising when the educational results are virtually indistinguishable from one curricular revision to the next.

If we believe, as I am urging in these chapters, that liberal education needs re-formation in order to achieve its announced humanistic ends, that will require a change in the conventional ways teaching and learning are done. And we must expect teachers and students to suffer the inconvenience of such change only when that becomes necessary in order to meet the demands imposed by the graduation requirements, given their predisposing and pervasive influence upon us.

So the key to genuine reform is to be found in that thorough recasting of the graduation requirements which literally changes the terms of teaching and learning, predisposing it to the human and humane ends for which the liberal arts college is professedly gathered. Each element in those re-cast requirements ought to represent some valued human achievement, explicitly stated, and all elements together ought to cast a clear and effective human profile.

What follows is intended to illustrate a process which takes seriously the needs for anthropological (or social policy) clarity, and for graduation-requirement reform. I want briefly to delineate four approaches to an understanding of the human and the humane--four possible answers to the question, What does it take to live humanly in a humane society?--and to suggest at least one set of graduation requirements which might predispose in students the achievement of each of the four anthropological profiles.

Some disclaimers are in order before beginning. First, readers are not invited to accept any profile or its related graduation requirements as if either were unexceptionable in its detailed terms or in its relationship to the other. These are illustrations of a process of curricular construction, not fully-formed proposals for adoption, and readers are, rather, encouraged to fashion their own answers to the question, What does it take to live humanly in a humane society? and to fashion their own curricular implications and applications out of those answers.

Second, because the purpose here is only to illustrate, I shall make no effort at anything approaching full and complete anthropological statements, but will be concerned only to say enough to make the social-policy point reasonably clear.

Finally, there is clearly no one-to-one--no univocal or necessary--relationship between anthropology and its curricular application. There will be a variety of ways in which any given anthropological starting-point could be translated with full integrity into curricular form, making it possible, for example, to adapt to the peculiar predilections and competences which are gathered in a given college. The analogy between the curricular process to be illustrated, and a constitutional-legislative process, may be instructive. Typically a constitution does not mandate

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any particular legislative act and may be compatible with a variety of concrete legislative efforts to achieve the conditions (e.g., freedom of speech and assembly) set forth in the constitution. The constitution both sets the objectives and the climate for the legislative and broadly political process, and serves as a test for the faithfulness of that process. So with the proposed relationship between anthropology and curriculum.

II.

One approach to anthropological understanding may be denominated broadly as personal-existential, in the sense that it focusses on commonly critical (i.e., crisis-creating) points of personal existence which must find at least provisional resolution if life is to be lived humanly, with effective meaning, and with manageability.

So, for example, on these terms I need to experience the reality of who I am. Hendrick Ibsen created a powerful metaphor in that dramatic moment when Peer Gynt sits peeling an onion, expecting layer after removed layer to reveal the core, only to discover at last that it has no core. So it had been with Peer's own internal search for human substance. The emptiness Peer experienced, and which has been a preoccupying theme of modern literature ("We are the hollow men," T. S. Eliot told us, and "the world ends / Not with a bang but a whipmer") is not bathos but pathos, not an artistic fiction but a lived experience, at least momentarily, for every man and woman. If it persists, it leads to a random and rote existence at best, to immobility at worst. Assurance of my own reality will require knowing authentically what I feel and trusting what I feel (no effortless achievement these days, psychotherapists like Rollo May tell us), knowing authentically what I want and trusting what I want. No derivative existence will do, merely mimicking the feelings and desires of others and hence trying to draw my life out of their reality. Rather, I need a sense of my own autonomous reality and value, quite apart from permission by anyone else to be or to do.

At the same time, I need to experience the valued reality of other selves. I am I, a unique, unrepeatable human event; but I did not will myself into existence, nor am I sustained in it merely by my own lonely effort. On Martin Buber's terms, "I" is half of the complex reality "I-Thou," and both terms are required for the full reality of each.[4] So Peer Gynt discovered that the vagrant selfhood which had eluded him as a lonely quest was found at last in his union with Solveig. H. Richard Niebuhr tells us why this must be so:

> The distinguishing characteristic of a self...is that it is a being which is an object to itself....[which is possible] genetically and actually only as I take toward myself the attitude of other selves, see myself as seen, hear myself as heard, speak to myself as spoken to.[5]

Therefore, "To be able to say that I am I is....the acknowledgement of my existence as the counterpart of another self."[6]

I need to experience the reality of where I am, including my psychological, geographical, and historical locations. Former Yale president Kingman Brewster identifies "a sense of place" as one of the marks of a liberal education:

> a sense that no person, institution, group, or nation can escape the roots and evolution which give them cultural identity and distinctive meaning. Place is a matter of cultural as well as physical "turf" in all its racial, religious, sociological, and political aspects....Sensitivity to comparabilities and contrasts in time and space is an important product of a liberal education.[7]

Moreover, I need to experience the fact that I am in a place that matters. It is frustrating and unproductive, and quite unnecessary, to spend every conscious moment of the day wishing I were somewhere else. I need to be able to experience the full possibilities of this moment and place. I cannot permit my life to be reduced to a succession of preparations for postponed realities.

I need to experience myself as competent. Competence is experience of my own ability to control and order some of the materials of my world which I regard as important, whether those materials are physical or intellectual, aesthetic or imaginative. It is the experience of getting something done which I regard as useful, and of doing it right. Competence is knowing myself not merely as shaped but as shaper, and as such it is indispensable to autonomous selfhood. Failure to experience my own competence is to view myself as helpless, or worse as victim, the one leading to neurotic and the other to psychotic consequence.

I need access to facts, but no less I need a capacity for judgment to weigh the facts, and courage to choose among the weights. Kingman Brewster has identified "a sense of judgment" as another of the essential elements in his definition of a liberal education:

> critical judgment--an informed and objective basis for deciding with some confidence what you agree with, what you like; action judgment--a basis for deciding what will work and what won't, and, part of both, but transcending all others, moral judgment--a basis for deciding what is proper, worthy, noble.[8]

A technological culture increasingly poses a special problem for moral discrimination; for there is a popular and powerful assumption that, because a thing can be done, it ought to be done. Jacques Ellul seems to be right: "Everything which is technique is necessarily used as soon as it is available, without distinction of good or evil. This is the principle law of the age." But a humane sensibility requires a capacity for moral restraint. So I need to de-

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velop that sensibility which can help me to determine, not only those things which *ought* to be done, but also those things which *can* be done and *ought not to be*. And I need, as well, to grow the moral stamina which such unpopular espousal will require.

I need to know that I can make a difference. I need to know that I am at a fulcrum, that the world is movable, and that I can influence the outcome of things I care about.

There are many curricular implications in this personal-existential view of what it takes to live humanly in a humane society. Because the purpose of this chapter is to propose a process, and to invite others as quickly as possible into that process--my own role being that of illustrator-provocateur--the reader's own translation of anthropology into a set of undergraduate learning experiences which give promise of yielding elements in the above profile is of central importance. He/she is therefore encouraged to exercise his/her own immediate imagination and to record what that preliminary translation is, before proceeding to the commentary which follows.

My own effort to draw curricular implication from the personal-existential view will be found in more detail when I return to that model in the second half of Chapter Three, and the reader will have an opportunity there to examine a fuller statement of the rationale which is offered here only in briefest outline:

1. *Demonstrate*[*] *linguistic competence in English, at a level appropriate to the baccalaureate degree, and in a second language at a level sufficient to permit*

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[*] What is at issue in stating curricular requirements in terms of "demonstrated competences" is addressed in the chapter which follows.

easy and idiomatic reading of a daily foreign-language newspaper. Capacity for the word creates access to others (past as well as present, inter-culturally as well as intra-culturally) and hence, reflexively, to self; confers the basic competence which underlies other competences; and makes possible full participation in those smaller and larger debates which determine the direction of events that matter.

2. Write an autobiography. This is a direct effort to confront the needed sense of self and of place, of independence and of interdependence, and to clarify the values and meanings which give substance to the self in its relations.

3. Demonstrate mastery of a complex set of ideas; demonstrate competence, at a level appropriate to the baccalaureate degree, in the practice of one of the disciplines practiced in the college; and demonstrate competence in two manual skills. This range of competences--theoretical, theoretical-applied, and applied--stretches skills and satisfactions and enlarges the dimensions of effective action in the world, and of effective humanhood thereby.

4. Contribute to the design and effective completion of a series of collaborative projects; and satisfactorily complete terms of work and of cross-cultural immersion. These are, among other things, tests and explorations of interpersonal skills, understandings, and lived compromises.

5. Clarify, propose, and participate in the solution to some pressing human problem. A capacity for moral discrimination and for action which is both responsible and effective must be grown in direct engagement with persons and issues.

6. Teach a team-course. One of the final tests of humanistic undergraduate learning ought to be whether or not the student has developed the competence to teach himself, as a base for his own increasing uatonomy and freedom from the "expert"; and a useful measure of that competence can be found in his ability to teach others.

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III.

A second approach to anthropological, or social policy, understanding might be designated *social-existential*, in that it focusses on commonly critical (again, crisis-creating) points of social existence which must find at least provisional resolution if the larger life is to be lived humanely, with effective meaning and manageability.

So, for example, *we need to get control of the information revolution*. We have more facts stored up and instantly accessible than any previous generation; and while the new information science is an incredible boon to human life--for instance, in medical diagnosis and treatment--it also induces a certain bewilderment. Says George Morgan, "The individual man, feeling unable to gain a valid perspective of the world and himself, is forced to regard both as consisting of innumerable isolated parts to be relinquished, for knowledge and control, to a legion of experts."[9] Furthermore, fear of ignorance is one of the ironic and enervating effects of our knowledgeableness, since the several fields of knowledge are growing so rapidly that the ordinary practitioner lives in daily fear that he may be left behind. Ways must be found to take full advantage of newly-available information, while mitigating its effects in human detachment and disorientation.

We need to determine the proportioned role of technology in our society. "One of the major goals of technology in American," says sociologist Philip Slater,

> is to "free" us from the necessity of relating to, submitting to, depending upon, or controlling other people. Unfortunately, the more we have succeeded in doing this, the more we have felt disconnected, bored, lonely, unprotected, unnecessary, and unsafe.[10]

We need to find ways to cope with an increasingly complex and corporate social order. Traditional American notions of personal morality and of in-

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dividual action must be held in tension with the increasing need to deal with corporate morality--both economic and political--and to bring a gathered influence to bear upon corporate redoubts by organized social action where isolated individuals may have little effect.

We need cultural and spiritual resources to deal with increasing routinization and leisure. Routine and leisure alike are the most stringent tests of a person's mettle and morale, and they make the most searching demands on our human resourcefulness. If routine and leisure are not to yield an enervating boredom, they will require of us not less breadth of interest, competence, and acquaintance, but more.

We need to learn to balance physical-resource exploitation with respect for the natural environment. Sociologist Richard Means has suggested, provocatively, that "our contemporary moral crisis...goes much deeper than questions of political power and law, of urban riots and slums. It may, at least in part, reflect American society's almost utter disregard for the value of nature."[11] Professor Means makes an impressive case for the possibility that, when men and women exploit the natural world *unfeelingly*, thus destroying our capacity to wonder at it and to enter into its awesome mystery, we demean and diminish our own humanity and thus lose a part of our capacity to deal humanly with other men and women.

We need a new conscience in response to the systematic desensitization to human exploitation, oppression, suffering, and violence which goes on all about us. One of the more frightening aspects of contemporary life is the discovery that we are no longer horrified and outraged by brutality, even when we view it at first hand, so inured to it have we become through mass-media exposure, and especially through the deadly force and death which are the daily televised accompaniments of our homely activity. A new capacity for

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outrage may well be our survival factor.

We need to develop a sense of excellence in the presence of the standardizations and trivializations of a mass culture. We are in danger of losing a respect for quality, whether in the arts or in manufactured products, and of being unable to recognize it when we see it; and the result is likely to be that the standardizations of mass culture are subject to even greater trivialization because they lack the comparisons and the popular demands which could draw them upward.

Finally in this list, we need to reassert the value of subcultures. Drawing on an insight from economist Kenneth Boulding, Morris Keeton and Conrad Hilberry note that the

> technological superculture will standardize goods, ensure efficiency, and spread a certain kind of rationalist throughout the world. But it is bound to be incomplete. It cannot fulfill man's need for a full range of thought and feeling. It cannot generate the particularities of language, art, ritual, and social bond that give a culture its emotional drawing power and its aesthetic satisfaction. If people are to be deeply satisfied in a place, a community, or a way of life, it will be because of the union of this efficient superculture with an enhancing subculture. Furthermore, the superculture may well stagnate, become bureaucratic and ponderous, unless new energy and new perspectives are constantly introduced through conflict and hybridization among subcultures.[12]

There are, clearly, many curricular implications in this social-existential view of what it will take to live humanly in a humane society. Again, readers are urged to make their own translations of anthropology into curriculum before

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proceeding to my illustrations of that process below. That my own reading of the curricular possibilities in the social-existential view partakes of some of the same content as did the personal-existential approach is not surprising, since both are forms of deliberate humanistic reflection, and it is the same human person on whom that reflection is centered.

Following are the competences which, in my view, a social-existential curriculum could be designed to yield:

1. *Demonstrate competence in English, at a level appropriate to the baccalaureate degree, and in a second language, at a level sufficient to permit easy and idiomatic reading of a daily foreign-language newspaper: and demonstrate competence in the languages of computer science sufficient to perform standard data-processing operations.* Here again, capacity for the human languages creates access to others and hence, reflexively, to self; and skills in both human and computer languages confer the basic competences which underlie other competences, and make possible full participation in those issues which determine the direction of events that matter.

2. *Write an autobiography.* Sense of self and sense of place, of origins and of journeyings, of the values and meanings which give substance to the self, are of critical importance in a cultural setting where the pressures are toward facelessness and rootlessness; and the autobiography becomes a means of clarifying and of valuing ones own distinctive subculture.

3. *Demonstrate a mastery of systems theory and of organizational theory; demonstrate competence, at a level appropriate to the baccalaureate degree, in the practice of one of the disciplines practiced in the college; and demonstrate and understanding of the mutual implications of systems and organizations for the practice of the discipline.* Competence in dealing with systems and organizations can provide the instrumentation both for effective individual survival in an organizational context, and for achieving just social policies through the practice

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of the professions and other occupational specializations.

4. Contribute to the design and effective completion of a series of collaborative projects; and satisfactorily complete terms of work and of cross-cultural immersion. These are, again, tests and explorations of interpersonal skills, understandings, and lived compromises, and they provide direct acquaintance with, and respect for, other distinct subcultures.

5. Choose one of the following:

a. Clarify, propose, and participate in the solution to some pressing problem of the physical environment which has strong moral as well as political, or technical, or ecological implications.

b. Clarify, propose, and participate in the solution to some pressing problem of social policy dealing with the moral consequences of applied science and/or technology.

c. Clarify, propose, and participate in the solution to some pressing problem of human conflict-resolution.

A capacity for moral as well as intellectual and technical discrimination in the presence of some of the larger human and social issues of the time, joined with an involved discovery that there can be no such thing as neutrality in their presence, and with a direct experience both of their malleability and their intransigence, can help men and women to experience their own roles as agents of social justice, and not merely as victims of social change.

6. Demonstrate competence, at the level of an accomplished amateur, in the practice of one of the arts (visual arts, including photographic and cinematic; music; dance, architecture), including a reasonable grasp of its history and principles of criticism. There is surely no better way to develop a taste for excellence, and an experience of what constitutes excellence, than through direct involvement in the arts, which are perhaps the most visible and persistent forms ex-

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cellence has taken in human history; and in the presence of that experience and understanding, to be held to reasonable and proportionate standards in one's own practice of one of those arts.

IV.

A third anthropology may be designated the symbolic-interaction view. It answers the question, What does it take to live humanly in a humane society? by posing another question: What distinguishes the human from all other forms of created existence, and most especially from all other forms of animal life?

The answer to that latter question for the symbolic interactionist, briefly put, is that the human is distinguished by **a capacity for the word, understanding** that term in its broadest sense as **communication** by means of symbols.

What gives human beings their peculiar character is a particular kind of freedom which can be identified as self-transcendence. As I have written in another context,

> To be a self is to know myself to be a self. To be a self is to be aware of myself being a self. It is inappropriate to speak of a tree or a dog having a self, for what a tree and a dog both lack is self-awareness. A tree is not aware of its treeness nor a dog of its dogness, because neither tree nor dog, nor indeed any other creature we know except man, is able to view his existence, as it were, from the outside. To have a self, it is necessary to be aware of oneself having a self, and even to be aware of one's awareness of having a self. Human selfhood thus means self-distance, self-detachment, self-separation, self-in-conflict-with-self, self-negating-self....
>
> More than that, to be a self is to be aware of the not-self. Other forms of life may live an undifferentiated existence, unable to distinguish the part from the whole, ignorant of otherness. But to be a man is to know

the difference between I and Thou and It.[13]

How do we achieve this kind of self-knowledge? How do we develop the capacity to stand apart from ourselves, as it were, and to take a relatively detached attitude toward ourselves? Only by occupying the vantage points of others selves toward us. But I do not directly experience the attitude of another self toward my self. That attitude is expressed in sounds and gestures, and I can learn what that other's attitude is only when I know what those sounds and gestures mean. Language is the system of symbolic communication, made up of sounds, signs, and gestures, by which I am able to identify the experience of the other, and to take that experience into myself as the basis for the understanding and the modification of my own experience and behavior. By thus internalizing the experience of another person, I do not simply learn something about him; I also learn something about myself. When I am permitted to participate in the feelings of another person, the result is that I begin to identify, to clarify, and to sort out my own feelings, whether for acceptance or rejection.

George Herbert Mead, the most influential philosopher of the symbolic-interactionist view, put the matter this way:

> I know of no way in which intelligence or mind...could have arisen other than through the internalization by the individual...of the conversation of significant gestures, as made possible by the individual's taking the attitudes of others toward himself and toward what is being thought about. And if mind or thought has arisen in this way, then there...[is no] mind or thought without language; and the early stages of the development of language must have been prior to the development of mind or thought.[14]

Sociologists Peter and Brigitte Berger identify language as "the fundamental institution of society," both because it is the first institution a human being encounters, mediating as it does the child's experience with the family and with the

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world beyond the family; and

> because all other institutions...build upon the underlying regulatory pattern of language. The state, the economy and the educational system, whatever else they may be, depend upon a linguistic edifice of classification, concepts and imperatives for individuals' actions--that is, they depend on a world of meanings that was constructed by means of language and can be kept going only by language.[15]

In contrast to this view, sociobiologists have lately preferred a genetic explanation for language, denying that "social facts should be explained by other social facts."[16] and minimizing the distinctively human character of language by pointing to what they view as a similar capacity in animal primates to which we are biologically linked. "Postulating genes to account for human behaviors," explains University of California anthropologist S. L. Washburn, "allows sociobiologists to minimize the difference between the genetically determined biological base and what is learned."[17] But Washburn, while agreeing that there is a biological basis for speech, and that our basic biology sets certain limits, insists rather that our human "freedom for learning is immense, and constraints are primarily in the learned systems, not in the biology." The anthropologist offers a critique of sociobiology which includes these considerations: (1) "there is no evidence that the brain determines the particular language learned"; (2) human language-systems are far more varied than are the primate, with "hundreds of mutually unintelligible human languages in an area [Africa] in which baboons used the same system of communication"; (3) "the ease with which human languages are learned and the speed with which they change" are characteristic only of the human species; and (4) linguistic inventiveness is not found in any other species as it is in the human; "there is no comparable mechanism nor any alternative biological system, that allows almost unlimited communication and the development of new symbols when needed."[18]

Such considerations, buttressed by a good many others, permit Washburn to conclude, in support of the social-interaction view, that

> Language is the behavior that distinguishes human social behavior from the social behavior of the other primates. As the child learns the language of its group, it learns how this system of communication is used in social relations and in economic, political, and religious systems. The social systems of nonhuman primates are based on the biology of the species, observational learning, and interaction. To these the human species adds the social complexity made possible by brain, language, and technical advance....
>
> Social science might be defined as the science that studies the nature, complexity, and effectiveness of linguistically mediated behaviors. Such a definition clearly shows why human social behavior cannot be reduced to those of the other animals, even those of our closest living relatives.[19]

If a liberal education is distinguished by its intent to enhance and enlarge the human and the humane, and if what is most characteristically human can be identified fundamentally as our capacity for the word, then surely there are direct curricular implications to be found in the symbolic-interactionist view.

Again, the reader is invited to experiment with curricular extrapolations from this view, before proceeding to the suggestions which follow.

For my own part, I can imagine that a set of graduation requirements--of the ends for liberal learning--drawn from symbolic interactionism might include the following elements:

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1. Demonstrate competence in English at a level appropriate to the baccalaureate degree, including oral and written discourse, critical thinking, special vocabularies required for informed popular discourse about specialized fields, and major features of the literary tradition in English. Again as in the two preceding models, this is the human competence which underlies all other distinctively human competences.

2. Demonstrate competence in a second language, including oral and written discourse and special vocabularies required for informed popular discourse about specialized fields, sufficient to permit a demonstrated understanding of major features of the literary tradition, grasped both in the second language and in translation. Language is the carrier of cultural meanings, and access to a second language destroys cultural provincialism by multiplying the meanings to which we have access, thus expanding the available world and our humanness, which is the world internalized. And though professional linguists may object to provision for a study of literature in translation, I believe that what A. N. Whitehead wrote about Latin can be said as well of other languages:

> The total bulk of Latin literature necessary to convey the vision of Rome is much greater than the students can possibly accomplish in the original. They should read more Virgil.., more Lucretius.., more Cicero than they can read in Latin. In the study of an author the selected portions in Latin should illuminate a fuller disclosure of his whole mind, although without the force of his own words in his own language. It is, however, a grave evil if no part of an author be read in his own original words.[20]

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3. Demonstrate competence in at least two non-verbal languages, chosen from mathematics (the language of abstract symbol), music (the language of tonal symbol), and the visual arts (the language of representational symbol), in either their theoretical or applied forms, at the level of an informed amateur. Human being is **crippled,** its versatility and reach severely limited, when its capacity for communication is restricted to what might be termed the languages of conventional discourse.

4. Write an autobiography which demonstrates ability to integrate understandings of personal and social history, natural history, and the transhistorical (religion and philosophy). Language, the vehicle and enabler of our self-transcendence, is what makes human beings historical beings. To be human is to have a history--both participating in the giveness of things, and shaping their outcomes--rather than being merely subject to historical forces, as are other forms of created existence. Coming to terms with the peculiar dimensions of our own historicity is, therefore, a means of coming to terms with, and expanding the capacity of, our humanness.[21]

5. Complete a depth study, drawn either from a single academic discipline, or drawn thematically across traditional lines of inquiry, which permits the explicit focussing of the competences demonstrated in requirements 1 through 4. The depth study is the special means by which one applies the other competences, and thus becomes the agent of his own human integration--becomes a centered self rather than merely a collocation of unrelated abilities.

V.

A final model is broadly psychoanalytic, deriving its answer to the question about living humanly in a humane society from systematic thinking about the structure of human personality. What follows is a summary of Nevitt Sanford's contribution to a symposium on Personality Factors on the College Campus,[22] much of it in Sanford's own words. The reader is referred to the original essay for a more complete statement of this point of view and its educational implications.

Each individual functions as a unit, says Sanford, and it is therefore impossible to separate a single category--say, intellect--from the rest of the person. The highly developed personality is characterized by complexity (such processes as thought, feeling, will, understanding, and judgment are a repertoire of clearly differentiated responses to the diversity of life situations), and by wholeness (with the differentiated parts in touch with each other, and capable of unified action). Personality is fundamentally stable, with that stability expressing itself in consistency of action, a sense of direction, and a capacity for making good on commitments. But stability is not fixity, and consistency is not complete, thus permitting openness to experience and to continued learning. While developmental change occurs, stability means that the individual remains essentially himself.

According to psychoanalytic theory, personality is constituted of three major systems: (1) the impulse life, (2) the system of control, and (3) the system representing the internalized demands of society. The organizing principle of the personality is that all resources, abilities, and mechanisms are brought into the service of needs (e.g., to survive, grow, and maintain itself). The primary task of personality is to find ways to satisfy basic needs (the impulse life) in accord with the requirements of reality (the system of control) and with the demands of society.

Personality develops by means of expansion, differentiation, and integration, and the fundamental principle of development is that of challenge and response. The individual develops in the presence of a dissonance which requires the making of new responses, provided that the dissonance is not so strong and

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threatening that it causes reversion to earlier, more primitive reactions.

In keeping with the psychoanalytic view, that the major organizing principle of personality is that all resources, abilities, and mechanisms are brought into the service of needs, Nevitt Sanford identifies five developmental needs with which an undergraduate liberal arts college ought to be assisting its students: (1) the need to free the impulse life and encourage the creative imagination, (2) the need to overcome provincialism, (3) the need to challenge received cognitive structures, (4) the need for curiosity, discovery, and the means of change, and (5) the need to exhibit the processes of thought and feeling by which truth is discovered.

What implications for curriculum are resident within this psychoanalytic view generally, and within these needs specifically? Readers may try their own hands at answering that question, before I offer Nevitt Sanford's answers.

Accepting the traditional disciplinary resources of an undergraduate college, Sanford identifies those curricular outcomes which appear to him most relevant in assisting the personality development of its students:

1. Experience with literature and the arts, as a means of freeing the impulse life and encouraging the creative imagination. "...if [the student] discovers that anything may be done in the imagination and that everything that he has so far imagined has been done by somebody, and that those who did things can be understood, then he is bound to admit into his scheme of things a broader range of human potentialities....The thing about literature [is that] it gives to the individual something of the very thing which made the creation of that literature possible in the first place, and that is the means for transforming the impulse life in such a way that it meets the requirements of reality and of conscience--but just barely....if this kind of change in the individual is

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brought about through the study of literature, it will affect the individual's performance in all of his other courses, as indeed in his life generally."[23]

2. Experience with language, as a means of overcoming provincialism. Language study will "contribute very little to the development of the individual unless [it] leads to enough mastery so that the individual can have some grasp, some appreciation, of the culture that language expresses. If much appreciation is achieved, the individual is bound to take a different view of his own culture, and hence of himself, and once this process is set in motion the individual is not only free from a parochial outlook but finds it difficult ever to restrict himself to such an outlook again."[24]

3. Experience with philosophy, religion, and history as a means of challenging received cognitive structures. Such structures--conception of self and world; ethical principles--"undoubtedly derive from the family and the community: many have been taken over automatically and have not been derived from the subject's own thought and experiences." The point is to provide a firmer basis for cognitive structures "in the subject's own experience and thought, and hence [in] relation to other processes of the personality. One might also hope that regardless of the content of one's values and beliefs at the moment, one has available to him the means for improving his decisions in this area as time goes on."[25]

4. Experience with science as a means of satisfying curiosity and the need for discovery and access to the means of change. Science, as it is often taught, favors "the maintenance of defensive structures [and plays] into the hands of the conventional, the restricting, the suppressing functions of the personality." Many students who choose it "hope thereby to capitalize upon their prematurely organized consciences." But it does not have to be taught that way. "Science, after all, tends to upset the existing order of things. It is essentially

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daring and unconventional. Its rules, its discipline, derive from its own processes and needs, and have nothing to do with conventional morality." Science teaches us how to think, how to make discoveries, how to change the world; and proper training in scientific thinking can make an enormous difference "when it comes to dealing with practical problems or problems in human affairs."[26]

5. Experience with mathematics as a means of exhibiting the processes of thought and feeling by which truth is discovered. "The student may here learn that the maxims and theorems are not unalterable, that they do not have an objective existence but are creations of the mind that aid the pursuit of truth." In mathematics, as well, "one may learn of the close affinity between beauty and truth, how it is that an elegant solution or the demonstrated generality of a truth may be cause for joy."[27]

Lest Sanford's adoption of the traditional disciplinary organization of the curriculum lead us to assume that he is content with "business as usual," it is essential to observe some of the instructional principles which he also draws from the psychoanalytic view, and which he intends to inform the above curricular suggestions. Following is a summary of those principles:

1. "...anything that is taught in a liberal college ought to be justified on the ground that it contributes to the development of the individual."[28]

2. While course subject-matter is important, the developmental outcomes desired will bear little relation to "how much is covered" in a given course. Each course ought to be designed as an end in itself, with attention directed not to what a student "ought to know" but to those experiences which will set in motion the desired developmental outcomes.[29]

3. It is entirely possible to acquire knowledge and to learn skills with no influence at all on the individual's structure. Knowledge can easily--perhaps most easily--be assimilated to existing personality structures, including

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the most primitive ones. But if the individual can be involved in purposes which require that he utilize what he is learning, then new responses become assimilated and structure is changed.[30]

4. The order of learning ought also to be arranged on developmental grounds, with learning within a supporting community first, and independent work only afterward.[31]

5. The freshman year is most vulnerable to individual failure. Its aim ought to be "to win the student to the intellectual enterprise," and to demonstrate that an undergraduate education is designed to meet his developmental needs, rather than comprising a sequence of painful tests. To that end, freshmen should be allowed to indulge already-existing interests to the full, on the assumption that if they are significant interests they will lead naturally into the study of related subjects, and that if they are insubstantial, they will be supplanted with no less motivation.[32]

6. Vocational and professional education are inimical to full development. They restrict growth by limiting the variety of learning experiences, permit the individual to limit his self-conception, and to restrict his performance in social roles, only to that consistent within a given vocation or profession.[33]

VI.

While the four models offered above are intended, not to advocate a particular anthropological point of view, but to illustrate a common process from a number of anthropological starting points, there are some propositions about humanistic learning which seem to me to be unavoidable, regardless of the model we choose, and which ought actively to pervade every effort to design a curriculum in human form. For if the form is to be an authentically human one, it will have to display a creative complication not unlike that complexity which is characteristic of human growth wherever it occurs. Here are some of the unavoidable complications of a curriculum in human form.

1. Both freedom and constraint, election and prescription, have important places in the curriculum. Pressure, especially during the 60s and 70s, for completely open, elective arrangements in the undergraduate college, were presumably influenced by the humanism of the counter-culture, but those pressures arose out of a flawed anthropology. Humanness is marked both by radical discontinuity and by radical continuity. To be a self is to be a unique, unrepeatable human event. No one has come before me, and none will come after, quite like myself. That much the counter-culturists saw, but there is more to be seen. At the same time that I am unlike anyone else in the human family, it is a human family, which means that I also share with others a common identity, I participate in a continuing humanity, such that the latest arrivals on the human scene can mark their similarities to the earliest. If, in reading the records of ancient peoples, we find much that is strange, the remarkable thing is that so much is familar; and what is familiar is precisely that commonality which makes it possible to call us all human.

The humanistic curriculum ought, therefore, to include both self-chosen and self-shaped learning experiences, in response to the individuality of each student; and a certain common learning which reflects the college's judgment about those competences which all persons require for their fullness and effectiveness, in recognition of the fact of our shared humanhood.

2. Respect for the concept of "readiness" is essential in arrangements for effective learning. In colleges all across the country, the freshman year is traditionally nothing short of dreadful. Its dreadfulness rests partly in what can be called the "get-your-requirements-out-of-the-way-early" syndrome," advice regularly dispensed by admissions counselors, faculty advisers, and upperclassmen. I know all

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the reasons for this well-meaning but often disastrous advice, among them the need to get into "building-block" majors early, and the problem of squeezing all of the requirements for teacher certification into four years. Yet, if we had set out to design a procedure deliberately calculated to kill a student's enthusiasm and spontaneity for study, we could scarcely do better than we have done.

From the point of view of developmental readiness, electives ought to comprise a substantial (though not necessarily exclusive) part of the freshman year, for a very simple reason: a student's persistence in college is very likely to depend on early experiences of grasp and success, and of its direct connection with his own life-location; and these things will more often occur when the student is free to elect courses of study which correspond to interests he has brought with him to the college, less often when he is merely engaged in an alien conformism.

Attention to readiness will bring about a reconsideration of the kinds of courses which ought to be offered to freshmen. Edgar Friedenberg is only one of the students of culture who has commented on the high value placed on "competence" by the young. But what courses typically fall into the underclass years? Surveys of one kind or another, introductions to disciplinary areas, which touch such a bewildering variety of concepts, persons, and historical periods, that the student comes away at their end with no firm grasp on anything, and little satisfaction in any clear competence achieved thereby.

My own judgment is that, for developmental reasons, a good case can be made for reversing the conventional order of things: offer specialized (i.e., *single* figure, concept, or period) courses to underclassmen--courses which will require the student to dig and reach, intellectually, and which promise an experienced mastery of manageable content at their conclusion, having really gotten inside a significant individual or issue; offer generalized courses (surveys, synopses, disciplinary inventories that might have been called "introductory" if given earlier) to upperclassmen who, by that time, should have developed the relative sophistication in learning which successful handling of breadth and integration require.

In fact, developmental considerations ought to be taken into account in teaching design, not just for underclass courses, but for all courses. The quality of teaching and learning would be improved if teachers were to take account of Alfred North Whitehead's notion of the "rhythm" of education, which he believed corresponds to the stages through which all mental growth passes. The first stage he called "romance," in which the subject matter is vivified, its possibilities for importance and excitement glimpsed, its connections to what is already stirring in the student mind hinted at. "Precision" is the second stage, including systematic information-acquisition, ordering, and analysis; but unless this second is preceded by the first, says Whitehead it will be rote and meaningless. Finally comes "generalisation," which is similar to the Hegelian "synthesis," joining romance and precision in new patterns of significance.

Whitehad believed that education ought to be a continuous playing out of that cyclical pattern, with fresh excitements, leading to new learnings, culminating in fresh experiences of disciplined grasp wedded to deeper significations. "The fault of the older education," Whitehead wrote, "was unrhythmic concentration on a single undifferentiated subject." No less faulty, in his view, is the modern system "with its easy toleration of the analysis of knowledge into distinct subjects," which turns out to be "an equally unrhythmic collection of distracting scraps."[34]

With some students, we have only a single term in which to capture their interest and enthusiasm; rarely do we have more than two or three. Then surely we only predispose disenchantment and failure in many, when we force them into courses which are alien to any concerns they may have brought with them to college, or which leave them with little clear sense of accomplishment, or into required courses whose dullness is unassailable because they do not have to compete for student election.

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Nevitt Sanford is right: "the major aim of the freshman year ought to be to win the student to the intellectual enterprise," and "to set in motion those developmental changes," intellectual and otherwise, "in which we are interested. Each course should be conceived as an end in itself; it should be designed with first attention to developmental objectives--and to the developmental status of the freshman."[35] For effective pedagogy, there is simply no substitute for beginning where real persons are, whether freshmen or upperclassmen, though that does not mean permitting them to remain indefinitely in that location. Sanford has warned against indulging students in "their natural inclination to confirm themselves as they are,"[36] which would not be developmental at all but static, or even recidivist. Psychologist W. J. McKeachie has suggested that the college experience ought to "try to help a student become more aware of himself, and particularly to raise his aspirations for himself and his expectations of himself." Our concern, then (as Whitehead's continuing developmental cycles of learning envisioned), must be not only for initial readiness, but as well for successive levels of readiness as growth follows growth.

3. If it is essential to devise organizational arrangements which assist and support growth, it is also essential to guard against organizational arrangements which inhibit growth. The conventional college age of 17 to 21 is a time of readiness for growth, a time of natural experimentation with varying identities and outcomes. In fact, Peter Drucker has gone so far as to suggest that the four years separating age 17 from age 21 may be the true generation gap. Says Drucker, no other period in a person's life--

> except perhaps the jump from fulltime work at age 64 and eleven months to complete retirement at 65--involves greater social or psychological changes. Seventeen-year-olds are traditionally rebellious, in search of a new identity, addicted to causes, and intoxicated with ideas. But young adults from 21 to 35

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--and especially the young adult women--tend to be the most conventional group in the population.[37]

The changes which take place within the usual college years are related to an inner dynamic as well as to outward circumstances. Colleges have sometimes mistakenly claimed credit for growth in their students, when the truth is that much the same kind of change was occurring in those of similar age who were employed or engaged in other non-academic pursuits.

The problem is how to create conditions in which external arrangements reinforce the internal urgings and imperatives, and how to avoid creating organizational conditions which inhibit the natural developmental momentum by restricting, penalizing, or discouraging it. It is possible to speculate that young adults between 21 and 35 are, indeed, "the most conventional group in the population,' perhaps partly as an expression of an inner developmental phase, but also in part precisely because, whether in college or employment, they have just come through institutional experiences which typically require subordination, inculcate caution, and encourage conformism. And the women among them have been expected, by an large, to be more submissive than the men.

There is no doubt in my mind about some of the things, whether in college or in a work setting, which do inhibit growth toward a larger humanhood by repressing the natural enthusiasms and eagernesses of the post-adolescent young. One of them is being thrust willy-nilly into an activity which is almost wholly alien to personal interest and aspiration. Another is the absence or limitation of meaningful alternatives. Still another is a condition of irreversibility which will not permit a shift in emphasis or direction once a course has been set. And yet another is a system which places permanent onus on mistakes in early or uninformed decisions.

Study or work palls when one's own meanings are excluded from it. Decision-making skills wither where no significant choices are available. Daring disappears when one is invited to enter upon ruts with no turning places. And venturesomeness turns into stunted caution when splendid failures are not welcomed, much less encouraged.

4. *Curricular standardization--at its least, imposing some of the same requirements on all students; at its worst, assuming a developmental uniformity within the student community--must be forced to justify itself on the grounds of human and educational productiveness*. So must non-standardization, of course. But the tendency of the moment seems to be toward more and more standard requirements--particularly a return to the distributional-requirement approach to general education--not, I sense, for principled reasons but out of disappointment that other approaches seem not to have worked and despair over not knowing what else to do. There is a kind of historical irony in this move back toward standardization, for it comes precisely at the time when the diversity of persons in the liberal arts college is greater than it has been before. With the exception of a mere handful of highly-selective institutions, most colleges across the country are, *by their own standards*, more inclusive than they used to be. Increasingly intense competition has forced the typical liberal arts college to admit a wider spectrum of students, with relaxed "standards" at the lower end of the scale, and perhaps with larger numbers clustered near that lower end. Diversity is present not merely with respect to traditional academic preparation (verbal and mathematical skills), but also with respect to degree of interest in and commitment to standard liberal arts offerings and intellectual values.

And having admitted this diversity, the college cannot pretend it is not there, nor can it deny any of its admitted students an opportunity to explore their own peculiar predispositions and to achieve their own distinctive aspirations. When students are admitted in "good standing" but have no predisposition to what they find when they arrive, they can hardly be expected to change those predilections on instant demand. The consequence of such a mismatch is commonly seen, sometimes in a purely mechanical conformism to institutional expectations which bears no resemblance to learning, sometimes in apathy and withdrawal, sometimes in restlessness and mischief, and quantitatively expressed in an alarming attrition rate.

If a liberal arts college is to continue a more inclusive admissions policy, as most of them will have to do for reasons of sheer survival, then it will have a clear obligation to respect the varied human predispositions and aspirations of their students by providing them with some alternative futures within the institution--perhaps alternative degrees, alternative avenues to a degree, alternative styles of learning. This is the only defensible means I know of affirming the varieties of selfhood actually present within a college; and if they are there, then ways must be found to affirm them, and not merely to tolerate or to exploit them.

A project of curricular reform in which I participated a few years ago took "room for the human" as one of its major themes, offering students these "alternative futures" within the college in order to prepare them for alternative futures beyond the college:[38]

--two-year degrees for those who could not foresee a longer commitment, four-year degrees for those who could;

--"arts" degrees for those whose purposes were more expansive; "science" degrees for those whose interests were more specialized;

--different routes among which to choose in arriving at a degree, varying in the proportion of course work prescribed, in order to take account of differing autonomy, clarity, and experience;

--evaluation by letter-grade for those who preferred a closely-calibrated feed-back on performance, non-traditional evaluations for those who found conventional grades a negative motivation;

--formal-theoretical study in the classroom and on the campus, with internships, practica, and cross-cultural immersion in extra-mural environments, in order to offer experiences of both long-term and short-term relevance;

--a calendar which alternated two 12-week and two 4-week terms, to add variety in pacing for students and teachers alike; and

--a choice of life-style arrangements in college residence halls.

This list is not offered as an exemplary model, but only as an illustration of one college's effort to take account of the variety of developmental and aspirational differences among its students--differences which, when befriended, can become powerful influences for learning. I know of no way to befriend such differences except through the creative complexity of a curriculum which, while not attempting to be all things to all people, at least offers options to match the major clusters of difference which are present within the college.

VII.

My call to find an anthropological starting-point for curricular construction may elicit a knee-jerk response from some who, in living illustration of Gerhard Spiegler's comment about the difficult academics have in making value-judgments and commitments in and through the curriculum, will want to charge that I am trying to set liberal learning within the confines of some narrow social ideology. Several things can be said in response to anyone who may be inclined to that critical view:

1. The profiles which I have called "anthropological" are not narrow or ideologically denominational, either in their initial statements or in their possible curricular implications. Educators whose own personal commitments are in varying, even contrasting, ideologies can nevertheless make common educational cause around each of the four profiles; and, as I have already pointed out, even when those anthropological statements are agreed to, a broad range of options exists for translating them into curricular form. The possible exception to characterizing my anthropological starting-points as "non-ideological" is the fourth (the psychoanalytic); yet even here, Sanford's formulation is a broad one, cast in terms which have shaped the thinking even of those of us who reject its Freudian origins and elaborations.

By presenting four possible answers to the question, What does it take to live humanly in a humane society? I have been at some pains precisely to avoid any intellectual strait-jacket, preferring instead to offer a process for humanistic curricular design without attempting to prescribe its terms. The critical thing, if a college wants to understand itself humanistically, is that the educators in that college should engage in some critical and constructive thinking about the meanings of the human and the humane, and that the curriculum should be a direct and unmistakable reflection and outcome of those articulated meanings.

2. While rejecting the imputation that I would impose an ideology on the curriculum, I do insist that there must be limits to diversity within a liberal arts college. I share the judgment of Warren Bryan Martin about the current educational enterprise: that "so many different kinds of people have been gathered under one roof that the house of intellect seems to have become a circus tent." The unqualified "pluralism" (a term intended to give legitimacy to unregulated diversity through the cooptation of an approved word) which exists in some colleges is often nothing more than the dis-integration of the curricular process. Where there are no clear, specified ends in view which all disciplines and diversities are expected to serve, but only a simultaneous collocation of academic baronies, contrasting and competing, conflicting and contradictory, each gathered around its own intellectually-sectarian loyalties, there is neither humanism nor holism in the college, and the chief victim is the student.

In his study of students and the student experience, James R. Davis has observed that some in the academic community will want to argue that "the educational process 'works' because each student confronts the necessity to impose some order, some personally derived meaning, upon an intensely stimulating but unordered environment." Others, says Davis--and I am one of them--will argue, instead,

> that the collegiate experience, as presently constituted, is disorderly and wasteful. Many students are lost along the way, and many who earn a degree

fail to get an education. The dichotomy between what one learns in college and what one is expected to be able to do after graduation is surely too great. There is much that could be done to make what is taught more nearly approximate to what is learned.[40]

My appeal, in reaction against an unregulated "pluralism," is for a qualified pluralism, or better, for what Gerald Grant and David Riesman have called "a more coherent pluralism."[41] A college ought to be more than "a skillfully coordinated department store," in the view of these two educators. Their concern--and it is my concern as well, illustrated in the models offered in this chapter--is to see "whether many parts can be joined in coherent wholes. If we cannot find a way for such dialogue as a central aspect of creating intellectual communities for undergraduates, how" Grant and Riesman ask, "can we do it as a society?"[42]

3. In any event, the burden of proof is on the ideologues of an unqualified "pluralism" to show how humanistic education can be accomplished without some common understandings among those who sponsor it as to the meaning of terms such as "human" and "humane society." The nature of the person and of the interpersonal is not normatively and self-evidently given to an objective examination of either historical or scientific experience. Understandings of the human vary and vie with one another throughout a long reflective history, and there is no way to locate oneself as a humanist apart from making some clear, even if only provisional, choices among the options. And what is true of individuals is no less true of that collection of individuals we call an institution.

Some will want to insist that for an educational institution, qua institution, to make such commitments is inappropriate; that they must be left, instead, to individual teachers, administrators, and students. The more obvious thing to be said about such a view is that it would represent an institutional commitment which, like other com-

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mitments, excludes certain options while endorsing others. The less obvious thing to be said about it is that it is self-deceptive; for since the curriculum is a complex value-judgment, whether anyone would have it so or not, then to have a curriculum at all is to have institutionalized a consensus, if only seriatim on individual issues as they arise, and given that consensus a certain authority over the institution's members.

Where there is a college, there will be institutional commitments, whether explicit or merely implicit. The process proposed here assumes that the more explicit institutional commitments are, the more accessible they will be to constructive criticism; the more useful they will be in creating those shared meanings which the fullest effectiveness of any community of effort requires; the more deliberately and consistently they can be implemented in all of the activities which constitute the college; and the more readily and accurately we can tell prospective students and prospective teachers who we are and what they can expect, thereby avoiding those experiences of dissonance and disappointment which sap our morale and compromise our strength.

The curricular illustrations offered in this chapter are, admittedly, only more or less crude points of beginning, intellectually incomplete and organizational innocent. My purpose is not to pre-empt the imaginative and constructive work of concerned individuals and of campus bodies charged with responsibility for curricular matters. It is, rather, to activate that imagination. My purpose has been to put forward a proposition: If we are seriously concerned with student development, we shall have to find a new approach to curriculum construction, replacing the all-too-common ad hoc or special-interest approaches with something which is both more fundamental and more principled. And it has been my purpose to propose, further, that if we are to have a developmental curriculum genuinely marked by humanism and holism, we are likely to get it only if we begin with some reasonably clear ideas about the nature of the human and humane from which to derive our constructive work.

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If we succeed, then it may yet be possible to rise above the "disarray and confusion" deplored by the Amherst faculty, and to "envision a coherent, pertinent, inspiring model for liberal arts education" for which they have identified this as the moment of historical need and opportunity.

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NOTES

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26 _Ibid._, pp. 24-25.

27 _Ibid._, p. 26.

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29 _Ibid._, pp. 18-19.

30 _Ibid._, pp. 8, 10.

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32 _Ibid._, pp. 14, 15.

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Chapter Three

INTEGRATION AND USEFULNESS

I.

The basic, the really important, business of a liberal arts college, as it is regularly understood by students and teachers alike, is subject-matter specialization, to which may be added--with more or less tolerance and enthusiasm--"a certain amount of liberal arts."

The words in quotation marks were spoken by a teacher who participated in the discussion following an address at a major national educational meeting, and they go a considerable distance in explaining the difficulty into which the practice of the supposedly liberal arts and sciences has fallen. One clear implication of those words is that "liberal arts"--I am sure that "general education" was his real meaning--is a kind of condiment, intended to add flavor or accent to the academic entrée. Or, to draw from the same source of metaphor, general education is the filler, the extender, which may be added to the main substance in the educational mix, in varying amounts depending on intellectual taste and on the need of that main substance for more flavor or bulk.

The other quite clear implication of the quoted words is that subject-matter specialization is different from "liberal arts."

While I find this point of view quite unacceptable, I think I understand how and why it has arisen. Often in the colleges, what passes for general education (or, as I prefer, common learning) is characterized by a vagueness of intent (often by a kind of academic instinct that there "ought" to be such a thing, without quite knowing why or how it "ought" to be), and by a consequent arbitrariness of content (swinging, in pendular fashion with the prevailing academic winds, from rigidly prescribed distributional requirements, through integrated core courses, to completely open electives, and back again).

We have lacked, that is to say, any clear consensus in the college about what intellectual and applied competences liberally educated men and women ought commonly to possess, and how they might be helped toward the growing integration and integrity of those competences, as a result of two or four undergraduate years. Given our confusion about general education, whether as concept or curriculum, teachers can hardly be blamed for taking relieved refuge in the relative clarity, stability, and single-mindedness of department and discipline.

That unclarity and arbitrariness have persisted, in part, because--even more than a consensus--general education has lacked primary advocates. There is ordinarily no body of persons within the college who derive their primary professional identity from a commitment to common learning, and who therefore understand themselves as bearing a permanent responsibility for clarifying the meaning, the function, and the content of general education in the curriculum. Although we have come to take this absence of primary advocates more of less for granted, the fact is that it represents a tidal shift in understanding what it is to be a college--a shift which has its intellectual roots in the growing dominance of graduate education and the consequent paradigmatic influence of specialization and research, and its more populist roots in the economy, the job market, and the general public devaluation of anything in education which does not appear to have direct dollar-convertability. In the face of these imposing influences, many liberal arts colleges have abandoned their distinctive historical commitment to general education as the primary reason for their existence, and liberal educators have abandoned their earlier sense of common purpose in favor of narrower loyalties to academic special interest.

This condition ought to give conscientious educators (including the committed academic disciplinarians among them) serious concern, not merely for formal reasons of history or ideology, but for educationally consequential ones. This relatively recent shift in the understanding of what it is to be a college, and the resultant

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fragmentation and even carelessness which often afflicts what passes for common learning, has at least three major consequences:

First, it weakens the cumulative influence of undergraduate learning, and qualifies and compromises the integrity--the growth toward greater wholeness--of the student.

Lacking a strong and coherent general education program throughout the whole of the undergraduate years and not merely at their beginning, there is likely to be no place within the curriculum (consideration of the major included) whose primary purpose is to assist a student, in a growing way, to draw all learning experiences into a linked, personally significant, and therefore empowering pattern, upon which the student's own growth toward personal wholeness will depend. That, at its best, is what general education ought to do, and it is indispensable to the achievement of humanism and holism in the undergraduate college. Without it there are only experiences which are simultaneous and serial, some of which may instruct and foster growth, some of which will trouble or disorient or merely bore, some of which will be lost to any lasting influence because the student is unable to draw them into any kind of meaningful relation to the rest that he values in what he knows; and none of which is likely to have much cumulative effect on the student's achievement of personal wholeness and responsible power.

In his study of students and the student experience, James Davis concludes that some educators will want to argue that "the educational process 'works' because each student confronts the necessity to impose some order, some personally derived meaning, upon an intensely stimulating but unordered environment." Others, he says--and in these remarks I take my place solidly among them--will insist instead "that the collegiate experience, as presently constituted, is disorderly and wasteful. Many students are lost along the way, and many who earn a degree fail to get an education."[1] That is most likely to happen, I am persuaded, in those colleges which abandon a

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primary commitment to common learning.

The second consequence of that abandonment, and of the incoherence in the undergraduate years which results, is that the power and efficacy of the major concentration itself is trivialized and weakened.

No artists, scientist, theologian, politician, or businessman does his work in a vacuum. Each shapes, and in turn is shaped by, others. Each is engaged in a form of historical and social behavior, whose legacy and contemporary setting impose peculiar limits, just as they create special opportunities. To neglect or attempt to defy the contextual character of art, or science, or religion, or politics, or business, is to cut oneself off ignorantly from essential resources, or to vaunt onself deliberately in the arrogance of pretended self-sufficiency, and in either case to distort one's special competence and turn it to humanly unprofitable ends.

As specialization is trivialized and distorted when we fail to understand it contextually, it is also weakened when it is cut off from learnings that occur outside of the narrow concentration-and-cognate cluster. The fact is that no discipline--no area of major concentration--possesses within itself all of the competences needed for the full technical preparation of its student-specialists. Language skills, computational skills, interpersonal skills, moral reasoning and value formation, to say nothing of a certain largeness of experience and outlook, are almost universally identified by research studies, and in the witness of practicing specialists themselves, as essential to the most technically adept and successful professional specialist. These are the common learnings which a liberal arts college is presumably gathered to provide for all of its students; and every discipline ought to have the self-understanding to recognize its proper dependence upon them, and to insist, for its own self-interest, that they be conducted at the very highest level of effectiveness.

This suggests that the lack of primary advocates for a strong and effective general education, noted a few paragraphs ago, may be mitigated to some extent if

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the resident disciplines can be encouraged to re-examine themselves contextually, as they exist in the real world where specializations are practiced and not merely studied, and to fashion a curricular advocacy based on the results of that re-examination.

The third consequence of abandoning common learning, or of making it merely ancillary to specialization as the real business of the college, is that it trivializes the whole of the undergraduate experience by compromising the life-impact, the continuing influence, what in this chapter I am calling the transference, of a college education.

It ignores the tenuous relationship between what an undergraduate majors in while in college, and the occupational activities in which he or she engages during the course of a working career. Even if that pattern, disclosed by research, were to change, primary emphasis on specialization reduces the lifetime usefulness of a college education by leaving untouched such non-occupational but identity- and satisfaction-conferring roles as parent, spouse, citizen, amateur artist, family historian, ethnic advocate, churchman, social-service volunteer, and leaves unanticipated the necessity to cope with critical experiences of success and failure, of growth and death.

In those colleges or individual disciplines where emphas specialization but even more narrowly on those qualifications a graduate will need to obtain the first job, with little preparation for what may happen after that, the problem is worse, the devaluation of an education far more severe.

The conclusion to which these considerations leads is that it is in the best interest--indeed, in the self-interest--of everyone in the college to seek the clarification and implementation of common learning as the source of new invigoration and fresh importance in the entire enterprise.

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II.

The larger effectiveness of any institutional enterprise, whether educational or some other, depends in major part on an ability to avoid destructive fragmentation of its resident special interests by clarifying the central, unifying operational commitment or commitments to which each special interest owes acknowledged deference, and by finding ways to enlist constituent loyalty actively to that center. It is entirely possible for the constituent parts to understand and affirm their contributory relation to the whole, without in any way losing their sub-identities or demeaning their distinctive competences; indeed, to enlarge their individual sense of purpose and importance precisely by awareness that they participate in a surpassing and integrating excellence.

Just as the *intellectual commitment* of a liberal arts college needs clearer anthropological understandings as the explicit source of its educational and organizational *humanism*, as I urged in the preceding chapter, the *operational commitment* of the liberal arts college will need clearer understandings of common learning as the source of its educational and organizational *holism*. *General education, in my view, must become the organizing principle of the curriculum*.

Without intending to prescribe, I can at least illustrate some of the understandings of common learning which can serve that organizing purpose, and which give promise of overcoming the fragmentation and attendant ineffectiveness which the preceding sections of this chapter have outlined.

1. *Common learning refers to that set of curricular expectations which is common to all students*, and which thus comprises the curricular heart--core--of the college. The interpersonal aim of common learning is integrative, and is an attempt on the curricular level to create the community--the common learning experiences, the common areas of discourse, and the interrelationships among students and teachers of all departments, origins, and aspirations--which broadens, intensifies, and personalizes learning.

2. Common learning refers to the community of relationships and interdependencies which exist, not only among the varieties of academic men and women, but also among the varieties of subjects they study. The intellectual aim of common learning is also integrative, drawing each area of study into the presence of others so that they can work their mutual enlargement and correction. No novelist, historian, or scientist does his work in isolation from the larger work of culture. Each shapes, and in turn is shaped by, the others. Common learning is intended to give an account of these mutual shapings.

3. Common learning refers to those shared values which comprise a culture. The moral aim of common learning is integrative, in the sense that it offers a critical and constructive account of the persisting heritage of powerful ideas and ideals which give distinctive character to culture, and invites students to become the responsible agents of that culture.

4. Common learning teaches a common language--the lingua franca--of liberally educated men and women. Said George D. Stoddard of New York University,

> In liberal education we acquire a language that all persons may employ apart from "shop talk"....liberal education, while based upon the most advanced thinking and creating, is a form of intellectual currency that can be acquired to some degree by every student. And it is precisely in this way that our capacity for real human contact is served by liberal education in an age when genuine communication is increasingly threatened by the ability of the highly educated to speak only in the language of their specialty.

Common learning is thus the mark of men and women who, though they will be specialists in one field, must be informed laymen in many, thus avoiding a limitation of options in thought and action, and mitigating the tyranny of the expert who, if he is totally beyond our understanding, will be wholly beyond our control.

5. Common learning aims to confer those common competences which all persons

need for their own human fullness and effectiveness. They may include intellectual competences (analytical thinking, decision-making, increased verbal capacity, ability to deal with complex systems), historical competences (ability to deal creatively with who and where we are, how we got here and where we may be heading, why we see the world as we do), moral competences (clarity about ethical issues and alternatives, and ability to translate them into responsible moral action), and affective competences (ability to handle feelings, relationships, imagination, and aspiration, and to enhance affective expressiveness).

6. Common learning refers to a continous learning strand which links all of a student's undergraduate years. As such, it must build upon successive stages of developmental readiness, and serve as the integrating factor which draws successive learning experiences into an evolving unity.

7. Common learning is the primary communicating link between the undergraduate years and the world beyond it, providing for the practice and confirmation of skills and competences during the full course of a college career which will be the continuing resources of a life career.

Having first attempted to clarify the complex meaning of general education as the curriculum's organizing principle, it is then--and only then--appropriate to approach the distinctive role of subject-matter specialization within such organization, and as an integral element in it. There are purposes for specialization, in the context of common learning, which insure that specialization will be marked not only by integration but by its own integrity.

So, for example, academic specialization should:

1. provide a specific locus for the testing, the application, and the integration of the several competences acquired from common learning;

2. provide precision and detail to match common learning's breadth of scope;

3. provide for the refinement of such intellectual and practical skills as

analysis, comprehension, systematization, synthesis, and decisiveness, and for what Whitehead called "a sense of style," which he held to be "the last acquirement of the educated mind;"[2]

4. permit the student to establish "ownership" by virute of reasonable mastery of a distinct field of inquiry or area of activity;

5. become a vehicle for creative and responsible action in the world; and

6. prepared for advanced study, or for successive stages of a working career.

That last item belongs on the list because it promises humanly useful consequences; but in a liberal arts college marked by humanism and holism, it belons only on a list which contains the other items as well, thus disclosing specialization's larger intent.

I trust that the curricular model which follows later in the chapter will make it quite clear that I regard subject-matter specialization as integral and essential to the full experience of liberal learning. I do not view specialization as the primary business of the college, nor do I accept it as in any way separable from, or in contrast to, the liberal--which is to say, the common-learning--purposes of the college.

All of which means that there is no such thing as "a certain amount of liberal arts." It is, by its very nature, pervasive and holistic.

III.

As one of its most immediate implications, the viewed sketched out on these pages calls into serious question the distributional approach to general education--an approach which once again seems to be winning larger numbers of institutional adherents in the most recent sweep of the pendulum. Distributional general education requires a student to distribute a specified number of courses or credit hours over the several divisions of the curriculum, in order to insure his exposure to all of the major areas of inquiry--commonly arts, humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences and mathematics--and presumably therefore to acquaint the student with the methodological and stylistic differences which distinguish each.

The problems with a disciplinary distributional scheme are, in my view, disabling. It simply cannot bear the conceptual weight which is placed upon it. For one thing, the weighting and distribution of credit hours among the several divisions (determining whether the social sciences shall be assigned nine or 12 hours, the arts three or six) is almost inevitably determined by numerical (how many departments are in the division) and political considerations, rather than educational ones, with an effort at bottom to see that no one's ox is gored, at least not mortally.

More than that, the breadth such a scheme is presumed to confer is likely to be specious. Each division is made up of a somewhat arbitrary cluster of disciplines, which may or may not have very much in common, either intellectually or methodologically (does psychology belong with biology or politics, does history belong with sociology or philosophy). So, in addition to the fact that the credit hours to which each division is entitled in a student's program are minimal at best, it is possible for the student to fulfill his requirement by electing courses within the division which have absolutely nothing in common, and from which there is no cumulative or reinforced learning. As a practical result, the student is introduced to some of the conceptual language of a series of disciplines, which language he then proceeds confidently to misapply because he has insufficient technical grasp or sophistication to use it properly. Most of us have observed how one introductory course in psychology regularly produces confident analysts, and how one introductory course in religion regularly produces confident theological critics.

The inadequacy of this distributional exposure is confirmed by the fact that such courses are commonly not taught in ways which could permit them to achieve their general-educational intent. Because of the priority teachers regularly give to the discipline over common learning--a priority which is intensified in these days of intense competition for advanced departmental enrollments--such introductory courses

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are taught as recruiting devices for the disciplinary sequence, rather than as contributions to common learning; which is to say, that instead of serving an intrinsic purpose, having seriousness in their own right as the general-education designation intended, their significance is essentially extrinsic, pointing to the more important things their study will permit to happen later in the more advanced work of the discipline.

And finally, as I noted in the preceding chapter, courses supposedly intended to inculcate breadth usually fall, in the curricular sequence, in the earliest semesters of a student's career, at a time when [illegible] least able to assimilate them developmentally. "Get your distributional requirements out of the way early," is the common advice given to freshmen by upperclassmen and faculty advisors alike; and, in addition to reinforcing the developmental mislocation, it conveys a common view of distributional requirements as a nuisance to be dispatched as quickly as possible, the better to get on with what is really important.

Intellectually-integrated core courses drawn across the disciplines--Freedom and the Counter-Forces, Conflict and the Art of Coping, The Nature of Evidence, Dynamics of Change, Christianity and the Human Situation, are some recent titles--have, in my view, a better chance ot succeeding, because they are more likely to be treated intrinsically as having importance in themselves. Unhappily, core courses also commonly suffer from developmental mislocation, and are sometimes taught by a parade of disciplinary specialists who exhibit in themselves little of the intellectual integration which is the announced intent of their teaching.

A major defect of both distributional and core arrangements, and perhaps the chief reason why their broadening is specious, is that they regularly fail to confer and confirm any clear, identifiable intellectual or practical competences by means of which a student can establish ownership, and can continue to practice its broad-

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ening influence once the course has been completed. Information is, of course, supplied in great wealth and detail; but information unassimilated to concrete tasks, or tasks which lack vital connection with the student's on-going life and will therefore seem scarcely worth repeating once the course is over, have a shockingly short life. Says psychologist Nevitt Sanford,

> Students may learn a great deal...without changing their personalities in any important way. Much knowledge is quickly forgotten, and the person does not change for the forgetting any more than he changed for the learning. It is interesting to consider, too, that a great deal of knowledge and, one might say, knowledgeable modes of functioning, may be quite persistent but at the same time superficial in the sense that they are not utilized in the interests of the individual's inner needs.[3]

This problem is likely to be especially intense in those subject-matter specializations which view themselves as enterprises of the more of less "pure" intellect, whose knowing is unsullied by any hint of usefulness--apart, that is, from getting into and out of graduate school, the sonner to make an ironic living as an academic from the practice of this presumably unpractical art. Alfred North Whitehead that towering intellect in the "pure" fields of philosophy and mathematics, called this pretension by its right name, when he wrote of

> the unimportance--indeed, the evil--of barren knowledge. The importance of knowledge lies in its use, in our active mastery of it--that is to say, it lies in wisdom. It is a convention to speak of mere knowledge, apart from wisdom, as of itself imparting a peculiar dignity to its possessor. I do not share this reverence for knowledge as such. It all depends on who has the knowledge and what he does with it. That knowledge which adds greatness to character is knowledge so handled as to transform every phase of immediate experience....dulled

minds [are the possession] of those whose education has consisted in the acquirement of inert knowledge.[4]

Where a decision has been made to design a common-learning core (in contrast to dependence on a distributional scheme), the following check-list can be used to guide the process for those who find persuasive the critique offered thus far in this chapter:

1. Does each core course have intrinsic value (seriousness in its own right, without dependence on the next course in the sequence, as disciplinary building-block courses are)?

2. Have developmental factors been considered in regard to course design, the sequencing of the courses, and their positioning within the student's over-all career in the college?

3. Are the courses designed to yield certain clear, definable competences (the joining of intellectual content with skills, both mental and applied, which give promise of a "practical wisdom")?

4. Are the courses designed with appropriate attention to moral seriousness as well as to intellectual and practical rigor?

5. How are the courses in the core sequence related to each other internally (intrinsic value should not prevent integration)?

6. How are the courses in the sequence to be integrated with the rest of the student's curricular experience in the college?

7. How will the courses encourage and assist the student to integrate his/her own life experiences?

8. How will individual student progress be monitored so that the student can measure his/her own growth and competence, thus generating increasing confidence and predisposing still further growth?

There is, in my view, a third way--more ambitious and difficult than distributional schemes or core courses, and at the same time more intellectually exciting and humanly promising than either of those--to make common learning the organizational principle of the curriculum. It involves, not merely the redesign of courses, but the refashioning of educational ends, and a later major section of this chapter is devoted to that third way.

IV.

Before suggesting how the point of view thus far enunciated might be translated into curricular design and teaching style, something more must be said about the strong insistence in this and other chapters, that an undergraduate education in the liberal arts and sciences must be deliberately designed for maximum transference--maximum usefulness--to a larger and longer life beyond the college. Something more must be said about it, because that view is in striking contrast to the persuasion of a good many teachers and administrators. As a sometime philosopher and an all-the-time student of words and meanings, I have never been able to figure out what it could possibly mean to talk about "learning for its own sake," which is the way I hear some self-identified liberal arts "purists" talk about it. Learning is, after all, a human activity; and I have always assumed that it was intended to have some impact on the human learner. At the very least, then, learning must be "for the sake of the learner." Despite the arguments of the philosopher Gottfried Leibniz, that learner is not a discrete monad but a self, whose selfhood is both created and sustained in both immediate and mediate interaction with its world. So the impact and outreach--the "sake" which learning serves--spreads.

Philosophy aside, "learning for its own sake" is simply a phrase which falls unpersuasively from the lips of professional academics, who pay for their bread and diversion from the proceeds learning brings.

In contrast to this precious view harbored by some academics, I detect a popular notion abroad in the land that an education ought to be useful. It is a notion which I share enthusiastically. In my view, the crisis which now troubles

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the liberal arts college has its source in our failure to understand that an undergraduate education can be--indeed, ought to be--useful without being less liberal; that it cannot be adequately liberating if an effort is only made to free the mind (as if, in return to a discredited seventeenth century psychology, that were a faculty separable from the rest of the person) without at the same time giving the mind a vocation for the use of its freedom. We are in difficulty, not because we are colleges of the liberal arts and sciences in an age which does not value liberal learning, but rather because as educators we have not made explicit, first to ourselves and then to our students and the general public, the connection between a liberal education and adult maturity and competence.

If there is any doubt that, in order to serve humanistic ends, learning _must_ be a competence-conferring experience, that doubt ought to be dispelled by something Edgar Friedenberg wrote twenty years ago:

> In a world as empirical as ours, a youngster who does not know what he is good _at_ will not be sure what he is good _for_; he must know what he can do in order to know who he is....[He must have] skills that identify him to himself and others, and keep him from getting lost.[5]

Friedenberg's words offer us a quite plausible explanation for the failure of many a liberal arts college to achieve its humanizing intent. The college does not succeed in enhancing the student's assessment of his own value and potency as a person because it confers few if any demonstrable competences by means of which the student can experience his own growing ability to manage, to master, to cope with demanding, valuable tasks.

All over the world, young men and women are admitted to adulthood through experiences typically marked by isolation, instruction, and endurance, in order to test their ability to sustain the full rigors of life unmitigated by the protections of childhood. At its worst, American undergraduate education is an ineffectual rite of passage, the circumcision which shows that, after four years of separation

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from the world in an academic setting in which they have endured the disciplines imposed upon them, the post-adolescent young may be admitted to the dubious pleasures of an American middle-class adult. But it is a corrupt rite whenever, in contrast to the rituals we condescendingly call primitive, our own does not often enough test skills or impart lore which has much relevance to adulthood.

Endurance is a very different thing from competence, and there is no way to persuade oneself that, by the accumulations of courses, credit hours, and grade-points, one has demonstrated any organized, identifiable, permanently useful competence beyond the simple ability to count.

In his book, Friedenberg noted the peculiar importance adolescents attach to competence. It is not, when you think of it, difficult to understand why athletics are so important to so many of the young, and why musical or dramatic performance is so important to so many others. At a time when identity is elusive, it is by means of competences that one comes to be identified by others as a distinctive, valuable person; and it is by that same means that one comes to experience his own identifiable, distinctive value as a person.

And surely it ought to be clear to any post-adolescent that the vital link between healthy self-identity and the ability to perform skills and demonstrate competences is not broken once adolescence is outgrown. When a mature woman is denied the opportunity to perform tasks she knows she is fully competent to do, simply because she is a woman--or when, in mid-career, a man becomes disenchanted with his work, or loses confidence in his ability to do it, but does not know what else to do or how else to do--the result is often a massive loss of self-esteem and an experience of psychic debility. In Eric Hodgins' novel, Blandings' Way, the middle-aged crisis of advertising man Jim Blandings was located just here. Annual increase in his rewards and responsibilities attested to his employer's confidence in him.

> Yet he never began a week's work without this same thrill of alarm. So far as he could analyze what his inner being was saying to him it went like this:

> Blandings, you are an incompetent. You know nothing, you have no gifts, you have no background of solid accomlishment whatever. But you belong in the classification of lucky incompetents; that is to say, whenever you have been at your incompetent worst, people were looking the other way. This persistent, inexplicable luck has operated in your favor for more than twenty years now. It cannot endure much longer.[6]

And when, at career's end, a man is no longer permitted to perform the work he has done all his life, regardless of the competence with which he is still capable of performing it, spiritual deterioration and premature physical debility often follow.

If we agree that humanistic learning ought to be a competence-conferring experience, two plausible (because readily available) but contrasting avenues to that competence immediately suggest themselves. It is important to note them both here, because each, as it turns out, is the beguilingly wrong answer to the right question.

Some are likely to want to approach competence by placing fresh emphasis on the traditional academic skills: cognitive, facts-acquisitional, analytical, deductive, and disinterested modes of learning, pursued largely in discrete academic disciplines. But Douglas Heath's study of the impact of a Haverford education on its graduates found that "Too exclusive an academic emphasis [that is, one which is centered in the kinds of skill noted immediately above] may actually interfere with the maturing of some men." The reason, he speculates, is that those skills require "nonemotional judgments," and that taken together they reinforce "the overcontrol and suppression of impulse and emotionality." So, in his study, "high academic aptitude and success were found to be associated with interpersonal immaturity and lack of personal integration."[7] So we have a choice to make. If we believe that academic achievement recognized by grades and honors is intrinsically valuable, in spite of the fact that, as Heath's study showed, those indices "had little relationship to the men's subsequent lives,"[8] then we shall see no need to modify a standard cognitive learning style. But if we intend

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to assist students in becoming more mature and competent adults, then we shall have to give up the notion that those traditional skills are omnicompetent, and find ways instead to integrate them with other modes of learning.

Others, in contrast, are likely to want to approach competence by aggressive development not of traditional academic disciplines but of career programs, which can offer the specialized technical skills needed for career preparation, or even more narrowly for initial job-entry, as a substitute for the standard academic talents. But Heath's study of adult maturity and competence among Haverford graduates contains at least an implicit warning against the adequacy of this approach as well. At an average age of 32.5 years, those graduates had practiced in their professional fields for an average of seven years. Eighty-one percent had received advanced degrees: 20 percent were medical specialists and researchers, 20 percent were lawyers, and 33 percent were engaged in other professional fields, including business, social work, and engineering. And it is important to note, in this context, what those men reported when they reflected back upon the connection between their undergraduate experience and their subsequent personal and professional achievement: that traditional classroom and laboratory had not prepared them to deal with complex decisions, particularly when those decisions were based on incomplete information; that undergraduate study had left them unprepared to deal with the complexities of the interpersonal demands made upon them in the daily practice of their professions, or to estimate an interpersonal situation and act appropriately; and that they had not learned how to incorporate their feelings into their judgments. "The psychological Achilles heel of the majority of the men," Heath concluded, "was their estrangement from their own feelings and impulses."[9]

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If these disabilities reported by the Haverford alumni--these curricular influences which compromise adult maturity and competence--are the result of an excessive emphasis on the traditional academic skills, they are no less likely to be the result (though this is my conclusion and not Heath's) of preprofessional and professional training, with its excessive empahsis on specialized information and technique to the near exlusion of humanistic influences. One of the major criticisms of professional education, whether undergraduate or graduate, is that it regularly fails to confer those human skills without which technique is merely a blunt instrument. I shall have a great deal more to say on this subject in Chapter Five on "Career Preparation in Humanistic Perspective."

What we need is a third alternative, neither so exclusively disinterested as the traditional disciplines, nor so obsessively applied as the occupational curricula, and less insistent than either that a student give primary loyalty to a single, discrete area of study (whether traditional major or career program), to which all other areas of study are considered ancillary at best or irrelevant at worst.

The task, in other words, is to fashion a curriculum which is marked by humanism and holism.

As a contribution to such imagining, I can do no worse--and probably no better--than to describe the graduation requirements I envisage for my dream college. They are still in the working stage, and I do not invite anyone to accept them as they are in detail. They are better thought of as an extended illustration of how one might go about the kind of redesign called for immediately above.

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I have chosen this particular set of requirements for several reasons:

(1) It takes general education as its organizing principle, and sets subject-matter specialization within that integrating context.

(2) While including contents and methods which earlier I defined as "academic" (discrete disciplines, and cognitive, fasct-acquisitional, analytical, deductive, and disinterested modes of learning), this model goes well beyond those limitations to include integrated inquiry, and affective, value-laden, synoptic, inductive, and engaged modes of learning as well.

(3) The intent of this larger repertoire is to create a more direct linkage between the formal curriculum and adult maturity and competence than exclusive emphasis on the "academic" seems to permit.

(4) Therefore, each requirement in the model which follows is designed to confer a vital and useful competence which contributes to human breadth and wholeness, and which bears within itself the possibility of continued practice in a larger and longer life beyond the college.

And (5) of critical importance, all of these requirements, taken together, appear to cast an effective human profile.

V.

These are the requirements:

1. Demonstrate linguistic competence in English, at a level appropriate appropriate to the baccalaureate degree, and in a second language at a level sufficient to permit easy and idiomatic reading of a daily foreign-language newspaper.

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This is the heart of the humanistic enterprise in learning. It is our capacity for the word that makes each of us human and marks us off from the dumb world around us. The more limited our capacity for the word, the more stunted and powerless will be the self that grows out of the word. Language is a self-identifying, and at the same time self-transcending, power. Without the gift of language, it would never be possible to know myself as "I" and thus to distinguish myself from all the rest of creation. And without the gift of language, it would never be possible to bridge the distance from "I" to "Thou"--to know another self by my capacity to receive her word for me, and to be known to that other self by her capacity to receive my word for her.

Language is our primary tool for reshaping the world: every revolution teaches--requires--a new vocabulary. And when we learn a new language, we enlarge the self even more; perhaps we even grow a new self, as the philosopher Philip Phenix has insisted.

There is, therefore, no competence to which a college may admit its students which is more liberating--more critical to their fullness as persons, and to their effectiveness as responsible agents in helping to determine what the world will make of itself--than competence for the word. The reality in colleges is quite commonly otherwise, however. Businesses are now spending thousands of dollars each year in an effort to teach their managers, virtually all of them college graduates and many of them with advanced degrees, to read comprehendingly and to write clearly. Physicist-philosopher John Wilkinson's experience as an undergraduate teacher has led him to estimate, that the usable vocabulary of a college student actually shrinks from an average of 800 words on admission to something near 550 on graduation. New words are added, of

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course, partly out of the technical jargon employed in the department of the major. Wilkinson also discovered "that a very large proportion of these students had created a special, narrow life for themselves....They had become adept at skiing, skin diving, political agitation, drug-taking, or chess-playing....and it is probable that the specialized vocabulary presumably necessary to these pursuits fell through the interstices of my vocabulary testing."

"I have no objective measurements," Wilkinson concluded, "but a very strong subjective impression that ten years after graduation the vocabularies of these students are even smaller. This intuition is confirmed by analyses of the vocabularies used in the mass media. It would be fatuous indeed, therefore, to suppose that the great majority of Americans can deliberate about political or other issues for which they have no words."[10] So it would appear that the trivialization of language, which is a sign of the diminishment of the human in our time, can be traced to one of its ironic sources in the supposedly humanistic centers for undergraduate learning.

Let me emphasize something important about my first requirement for linguistic competence in English. It is to be measured, not by the language skills which are appropriate to college entry--that's the way we do it now, for the most part--but by the skills which are appropriate to college graduation. This means that, as the pre-eminent human competence in this pre-eminently humane learning environment, it is every teacher's business to help bring linguistic competence about, and not merely the business of teachers of composition and literature. And that, I must admit, presents a serious problem for the arrangement I am advocating here. For John Wilkinson believes, and my own experience confirms it, that the limitation displayed by undergraduates is too often modelled by their linguistically limited mentors. In my dream college, it will apparently be necessary to inquire into a prospective teacher's linguistic

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aptitudes as well as his scholarly qualifications.

And there is an implication as well for the teaching of language other than English, which may require a rethinking of the instructional process. The student must experience that new language, from the very beginning of his study, as the bearer of meanings, as the conveyor of culture. He must come to understand how words shape the cultural world; he must be helped to see that the largeness or littleness of that culture, and the tone and texture of it, are in its language. No one can see in his world what his language will not permit him to say. So learning a second language must become from the start an experience of an enlarging self in a new world.

2. Write an autobiography.

This is partly a disciplined and systematic effort at self-understanding, an attempt to make good on the frequently touted, but too seldom achieved, notion that an education in the liberal arts and sciences ought to result in self-clarity. The literal heart of the autobiography would be a statement of the meanings of values which are giving shape and direction to that growing self, with an effort to trace the origins of those values and to reflect on their implications for personal life-style and for responsible action in the world.

Beyond learning about the self, writing an autobiography is a promising way to learn a great deal about history, psychology, sociology, and perhaps of biology and geography as well. I believe we too commonly ignore a pedagogical principle to which Alfred North Whitehead called attention. He said that two educational commandments are, "Do not teach too many subjects," and "What you teach, teach thoroughly."[11] "To have constructed the map of a small district, to have considered its roads, its contours, its geology, its climate, its relation to other districts, the effects on the status of its inhabitants, will teach more history and geography than any knowledge of Perkin Warbeck or of Behren's Straits."[12] So the autobiography may be the microcosm by which we learn about the macrocosm.

It would be in process, this autobiography, throughout the three or four or five undergraduate years, subject both to continuing self-criticism and the criticism of an adviser, and rewritten as those criticisms might require. The student would choose one faculty member whom he trusted to serve as adviser, and the autobiographical project would be a privileged work for their eyes only.

3. Demonstrate mastery of a complex set of ideas.

It makes little difference what set of ideas is chosen, and the choice would be left to the student: Whitehead's Process and Reality, Joyce's Ulysses, the corpus of Freudian or Jungian psychoanalytic theory, Keynsian economic theory, modern cosmological theories, and so on. The point is to discover how one gets inside a system, grasps its complex relationships, appreciates its subtleties and nuances, and traces its implications and influences. And having learned those very considerable intellectual skills, the student may still be awed but need not be cowed by encounter with any complex set of ideas which he may meet, whether in college or later.

4. Demonstrate competence, at a level appropriate to the baccalaureate degree, in the practice of one of the disciplines practiced in the college.

Philosopher Whitehead declared flatly that "mankind is naturally specialist."[13] Be that as it may, there are several reasons why specialization and concentration are essential features of humanistic learning. From an educational point of view, specialization offers an experience of intimacy (really getting inside a significant form of human intellection and action), of command (having sufficient mastery of a discipline to be able to put it effectively to use), and of completeness (what psychologists call a "gestalt"). From a sociological point of view, specialization offers an important experience of belonging, of membership in a society of men and women who know in a very special way what you know, and who are able to do what, in a very special way, you are able to do. From a psychological point of view, specialization provides assurance of something you are competent to do, whether anyone pays you to do it or not. And morally, specialization provides the technical means for helping to determine what the world will make of itself.

Whether the discipline chosen for practice by the student be traditional--history, or biology, or literature--or one of the newer disciplines which are growing up at the intersections of tradition--psychohistory, ecology, urban planning, biophysics--the important thing is learning to do whatever it is that historians and psychohistorians do. It is astonishing how often, in liberal arts colleges, we seem to have forgotten the basic pedagogical principle, that what has been applied is likely to be retained. Whitehead once again:

> Whatever be the detail with which you cram your student, the chance of his meeting in after-life exactly that detail is almost infinitessimal; and if he does meet it, he will probably have forgotten what you taught him about it. The really useful training yields a comprehension of a few general principles with a thorough grounding in the way they apply to a variety of concrete details. In subsequent practice the men will have forgotten your particular details; but they will remember by an unconscious common sense how to apply principles to immediate circumstances. Your learning is useless to you till you have lost your text-books, burnt your

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lecture notes, and forgotten the minutiae which you learnt by heart for the examination.[14]

5. Contribute to the design and effective completion of a series of collaborative projects.

Undergraduate learning is commonly a lonely experience, sending the student off to complete his assignments, frequently discouraging him from working on them with other students, and creating, in many circumstances, strong elements of competition which have the effect of setting a student against his fellows. The ability to work alone, at ones own pace and with ones own resources, is of enormous value in the development of autonomous, self-motivated persons. But not even the brightest among us is omni-competent, not even self-sufficient. The ability to work alone needs to be balanced, especially in our own time, by a capacity for effective, creative collaboration. Whether they or we like it or not, in the world our students will inhabit, both in their work hours and in their voluntary activities, there will be few lonely achievers. Most things in our society get done by collaboration. But effective working-together is not a natural talent; it is, rather, an acquired skill which must be grown, like other skills, out of disciplined experience. The cost of failure to grow a capacity for collaboration may well be irrelevance.

6. Clarify, propose, and participate in the solution to some pressing human problem.

Two things are at work here. One is that the experience of humanistic learning must not be an experience of life postponed, merely preparation for something important which may possibly happen once the period of preparation is over. On the contrary, undergraduates must be allowed to experience the

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ambiguities, the agonies, and the satisfactions of real moral choice. This kind of learning can only occur where men and women feel directly the pull of competing and contending loyalties, where information must be worried into priorities, and where decisions have consequences.

The other issue is that it is not enough for us to consider the individual student as the subject only of the college's humanizing resources; the student must come to understand that he bears an obligation to become an agent in the process of humanization himself. As Notre Dame's Theodore Hesburgh has put it, "liberal education should enable a person to humanize everything that he or she touches in life, which is to say that one is enabled...to evaluate what one is or does" and to "value consciously relationships that might otherwise be banal or meaningless." Active work at the solution to some pressing human problem should become the focus for an undergraduate's own growing resources brought to bear upon the rehumanization of the social order.

7. Demonstrate interpersonal competence by satisfactory completion of terms of work and of cross-cultural immersion.

To be liberally educated is to have access to a wide range of human values and achievements, and to appreciate the similarities and the differences which both enrich and complicate the human condition. Each of us is, in his own way, a provincial--bound by a limited outlook upon the world, and ready to assume that the whole is like our part, or at least that it ought to be. A liberal arts college ought to make students and teachers alike uncomfortable with their respective provincialisms, and ought to be thrusting them into new worlds of personal and interpersonal learning. There is no competence to which a college can assist its students more humanly valuable than the ability to cope with unfamiliar life-settings. Furthermore, no liberal arts college can possess all of the resources which a genuinely liberal education requires. Even under the best of circumstances, the limited size of the faculty imposes limitations on the variety of courses, professional competences, intellectual outlooks, and life-experiences available on the campus. The quest for effective learning environments beyond the campus is the only guarantee a college can offer that its limitations will not impose upon students a smallness of spirit or outlook.

8. Demonstrate competence in two manual skills.

Whitehead wrote about the "connections between intellectual activity and the body," of the "coordination of senses and thought," of the "reciprocal influence of brain activity and material creative activity. In this reaction," he insisted, "the hands are peculiarly important."[15] So he warned educators not to forget that their students have bodies.

Craftsmanship--what I want to call "manual intelligence"--is located at the convergence of significant competences: design and execution, discipline and spontaneity, tradition and imagination, aesthetic value and utility. What was revolutionary doctrine when the Bauhaus was first established ought to be more readily affirmed now: that the development of a sound aesthetic is rooted in sound craftsmanship. For those whose preoccupation is primarily with mental (less often, unfortunately, with intellectual) matters, acquaintance with craftsmen and the practice of craftsmanship opens up important appreciations and interpersonal understandings. And in the college, where things repeatedly end but are seldom finished and results are often insubstantial, craftsmanship offers an experience of solid, identifiable accomplishment.

9. Teach a team-course.

There is no doubt that teaching is one of the most effective forms--perhaps the most effective form--of learning. Jerome Bruner relates the experience of a teacher whose attempt to explain quantum theory to his class failed, and he was asked by a student to repeat the explanation. So the teacher tried, again with something less than transparent result. So he made a third run at the explanation. And then, said the teacher, "I understood it for the first time."[16] Students ought to have opportunity for that kind of learning, for that kind of clarity. This kind of pedagogical wisdom is very old. The seventeenth-century scholar Comenius wrote:

> The saying, "He who teaches others teaches himself," is very true not only because constant repetition impresses a fact indelibly on the mind but because the process of teaching in itself gives a deeper insight into the subjects taught....The gifted Joachim Fortius used to say that...if a student wishes to make progress, he should arrange to give lessons daily in the subjects which he was studying, even if he had to hire his pupils.[17]

It seems likely that the team-course would be related to one of the earlier requirements--mastery of a complex set of ideas, or practice of one of the disciplines practiced in the college--where an appropriate degree of competence can be expected of the student-teacher. And since completeness and comprehensiveness cannot ordinarily be expected of an undergraduate, the team arrangement provides for supporting competences, either from a faculty member or from other students.

VI.

The reader will have noted, in these nine requirements, that the student is expected to "demonstrate" his competences, sometimes "at a level appropriate

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to the baccalaureate degree," and in other instances at a level unspecified. The methods of that demonstration and the specific standards for satisfactory performance (what *is* a level of English competence appropriate to those who have arrived at the baccalaureate moment?) are left undefined in this model, but they will require careful definition in any college which adopts such a model.

Such questions do not admit of objective determination. They are matters of professional judgment, on which equally informed and conscientious professionals are likely to differ. What is important is that *the methods and standards should be openly acknowledged as arbitrary*, not in the sense that they have been carelessly crafted (they can be no excuse for that), but in the sense that they might have been otherwise. They are, in any case, the methods and standards which represent the considered professional judgment of this particular academic community, students ought to be told, and reasons should be given for them.

Precisely because they are arbitrary, in this quite defensible sense, at least three conditions ought to accompany their administration: (1) the methods and the standards ought to be declared *in advance*, so that no one--teacher or student--is in any doubt at any stage of preparation about just what accountability will mean; (2) the determination of a student's satisfactory performance should always represent the *combined judgments* of at least three competent professionals, thus providing an internal check against excessive individual arbitrariness; and (3) a student should have the right of *appeal to an external examiner*--a form of academic binding-arbitration--at the student's own expense (with the last provision as a check against frivolous student use of appeal).

It seems to me that such arrangements represent a considerable advance over the customary ways in which student academic progress is determined: ex-

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aminations and their evaluations are always arbitrary, but almost never acknowledged as such; there is seldom a built-in check against arbitrary excess, and almost never a procedure for appeal; standards for evaluating student performance are too seldom announced in advance, so that accountability goes undefined except after the fact (an old story says that Oxford students are told, "There are no regulations here, and if you break any of them you will be sent down!"); and the closely-calibrated grading system (A, A-, B+, B, etc.), to which many colleges seem now to be returning on the mistaken assumption that it will automatically bring about the recovery of more demanding "academic standards," masks the arbitrariness of the system, in what I consider an unconscionable way, by pretending to a mathematical precision for each separate judgment, and then reducing all of these approximations to an arithmetic average carried at least to the second decimal.

If, as I have said elsewhere in these essays, a liberal arts college intends a fully human and humane result, I cannot escape the nagging suspicion that it will not get it with less than a fully-human measure. That means, in my view, that achievement ought to be based on careful professional judgment, since I take it that judgment is a peculiarly human form of activity. A standard dictionary definition of judgment is "the ability to judge, make a decision, or form an opinion objectively, authoritatively, and wisely; good sense; discrimination." I submit that we probably cannot do better than to put ourselves in the hands of "wisdom, good sense, and discrimination," qualitative terms whose appropriateness is first to persons, and to mechanical (quantified) processes if at all only on analogy with persons.

In an institution of humane learning, therefore, to have standards is to exercise competent, respectful, public judgment. Standards are compromised or lowered only where judgment is not competent or where its freedom to be discriminating is restricted; where it is ignored, or where it is replaced by instruments which make judgment unnecessary or impossible.

VII.

Earlier in this chapter, I asserted a need to reshape not only the ends of the learning process, but its means as well. Teaching ought to aim at long-term effect--at what I have been calling transference; but the truth is that some of the most common--and commonly unexamined--of our classroom practices frustrate the effective carryover of the learning process.

One such frustration is to be found in the materials we commonly use in classroom courses, and most particularly in those courses which are intended to serve the general education purposes of the curriculum. The materials I have in mind are of a very special kind. They are called textbooks, and they are almost never found anywhere else except in a classroom. The problem is not so much with the textbook itself, since it often supplies vital theoretical, historical, and operational information. The problem has rather to do with textbooks as the exclusive vehicles for inviting the non-specialist, particularly, to approach the subject under study. This is a problem especially for the humanities and the social sciences. In the natural sciences, the problem is one of the emphasis placed on laboratory experience, which is, if anything, more specialized and less exportable. If it is only the exceptional case that a student will encounter a textbook later in life, or find himself longing to read one, and will not ordinarily think to invite one into his home, even less is he likely to have access even to so modestly sophisticated a laboratory as the college provides for his introductory use. So, once such a general education comes to an end, for all practical purposes the study comes to an end, since its primary vehicles are those especially designed for classrooms and not for living rooms.

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A second frustration adds particularly to the first, since it is closely related to the use of materials. This second has to do with the expected outcomes which are set for a course by its instructor. Commonly the student is expected to demonstrate his grasp of course materials by the tournament of the textbook, jousting on examinations with its author and perhaps with the course instructor, and by demonstrating mastery of laboratory cookbooks. These expectations make it quite clear to the student that something of very peculiar and very limited significance is going on, since they point nowhere except inward toward the course itself.

By way of contrast, it may be useful to illustrate what I think ought to happen in some of the courses which are intended to meet general education requirements--most particularly the so-called distributional requirements. Economics, for example, is a form of behavior, and that behavior is recorded daily in the Wall Street Journal, among other places. Indeed, the Journal not only records that behavior but is a vital part of it and exerts its own influence on it. Textbooks in economics may be important for conceptual grasp and clarity, but in the end they ought to be subsidiary to daily experience with the Wall Street Journal; and the expectation set for the course ought to be, not a contest with the author of an economics textbook, but a demonstration of the student's ability to read the Journal and to discuss it with an appropriate level of critical understanding and intelligence.

It seems to me that here there is far greater promise of carry-over, far greater likelihood that the student will experience the vital connectedness between his classroom and a larger life. Surely there is a greater likelihood that the student will continue beyond college an activity he learned there, because it has been treated as a vital form of behavior and because it has conferred upon him both a familiarity and a competence which are not restricted to the classroom. The Wall Street Journal is found in living rooms, to say nothing of board rooms and the offices of professionals and of social agencies and organizations.

I propose the same kind of expectation for other distributional requirements as well. Introductory, and perhaps intermediate, courses in modern languages ought to aim to confer upon a student the ability to read a daily foreign-language newspaper with ease and idiomatic sensitivity. Courses in art history ought to require a student to demonstrate his ability to walk through the local museum (and not merely to make his way through the instructor's slide show) with an intelligent awareness of what hangs on its walls. General education courses in psychology might well aim at making the student at home with Psychology Today or Human Nature, and courses in sociology with The Public Interest or Transaction. Courses in political science might intend to equip the student to make an intelligent use of the daily op-ed pages of The New York Times, and of its Sunday review of the week; courses in the sciences with Scientific American; courses in religion with the Christian Century or Christianity and Crisis, and in philosophy with The Humanist or Daedalus. The illustrations could be multiplied. Of course there will be disagreement about the aptness--the under-sophistication or the over-sophistication--of the specific suggestions I have made. I invite you to choose your own, but remember what is at issue.

A third frustration of the effective carry-over of learning has important implications for introductory and intermediate courses, but focusses more particularly on areas of academic concentration. It has to do with teachers who teach as if their disciplines are only forms or subjects for study, when in fact those disciplines are primarily forms of behavior. I suspect that is because, as teachers, we are too often only students of the discipline ourselves, and not its practitioners.

Let me take my own field, and indeed my own teaching of a few years back, as a particularly bad example. Students in my classes were invited to learn about theology, they were seldom invited to do theology; and I went home day after day wondering why both my students and I found so little joy in the process. I think it was because, in spite of my theological training or perhaps as a result of it, I had not yet come to understand theology as a distinctive form of human activity. That is what makes it a discipline. It has a peculiar vision, takes a peculiar focus on the world, delimits its range of interest for purposes of greater detail and precision. It asks peculiar questions, employs peculiar methodologies in its seeing and asking, and proposes peculiar responses to the ranges of reality into which it thus enters.

And what is true of theology is no less true, surely, of sociology, and history, and biology, and the arts. Each is primarily a significant, persistent, humanly productive form of individual and social behavior; it is only secondarily a subject for study. Students who study theology, and teachers who encourage it, commonly do not ask for themselves, carefully and critically, the questions about meaning and value and transcendence and ultimacy which theologians ask, and which is the doing of theology. At best, they rehearse the questions some one else has asked. So Whitehead is too often right:

> What the learned world tends to offer is one second-hand scrap of information illustrating ideas derived from another second-hand scrap of information. The second-handedness of the learned world is the secret of its mediocrity....First-hand knowledge is the ultimate basis of intellectual life.[18]

And that does not mean, in the field of theology for example, merely a shift from reading what somebody else said about Luther to a reading of what Luther himself said, important as that shift is. It means, rather, moving from what Luther himself said to my own asking and testing of the questions

Luther asked. It is that first-hand asking and testing which have carry-over--they are forms of action in the world, they matter in the human equation--in a way that the study of some one else's asking and testing can never have carry-over.

Disciplines have persisted over time because that is true: as forms of action in the world, as indispensable perspectives upon both the structure and the meaning of our experience, they matter in the human equation. As forms of study, they are eminently forgettable. So restoration of a vital connectedness between the liberal curriculum and competence for a larger and longer life will mean, for many teachers and students alike, a new approach to the *practice* of the discipline.

And I want to hazard the guess, quite parenthetically, that there would be less mid-career disenchantment among college teachers (to say nothing of reducing the disenchantment of their students), and less need for the teacher to wonder whether he is engaged in a useful form of adult activity, if he were the practitioner of his discipline rather than its advanced student. The humanities and the social sciences have something to learn from the studio arts and the laboratory sciences in this regard. Perhaps it is their emphasis on the *practice* of the discipline which accounts for the greater professional *esprit* which I have sometimes observed among both students and teachers in the fine arts and the hard sciences. The morale of teachers, and the consequent effectiveness of their teaching, probably depend directly on the ability of a teacher to experience regularly for himself those forms of action in the world which are the practice of the discipline.

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VIII.

This, then, is the human shape, in curricular expectations and in teaching, which I have imagined for my dream college. I quite understand that there will be disagreement about many elements in what has been described. The important thing is to remember what is at issue in its construction. I have been trying to shape a set of requirements and conditions for liberal learning marked by integration and transference; a set of ends for a liberal education such that each requirement confers some vital, useful competence which contributes to human breadth and wholeness; that each requirement bears within itself the possibilities of continuity--of vital connectedness--with a larger and longer life beyond the college; and that all requirements, taken together, shall cast an effective human profile. And I have been arguing, as well, for those teaching arrangements which will support rather than subvert such a curriculum.

In 25 years of teaching and administration in undergraduate colleges, the most common cry of distress I have heard from students is this: "I just don't know what I'm doing here!" No wonder, with teaching styles which are not designed to have post-partum effect, and with course and graduation requirements cast in terms which offer little if any profile against which to measure genuine growth, or accomplishment, or indeed of human hope.

Humanists in education must offer something better.

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NOTES

1 James R. Davis, *Going to College: The Study of Students and the Student Experience* (Westview Press, 1977), p. 240.

2 Alfred North Whitehead, *The Aims of Education* (Free Press, 1967), p. 12.

3 Nevitt Sanford, "Implications of Personality Studies for Curriculum and Personnel Planning," in Robert L. Sutherland, *et al.*, *Personality Factors on the College Campus* (Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, University of Texas, 1962), pp. 7-8.

4 Alfred North Whitehead, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

5 Edgar Friedenberg, *The Vanishing Adolescent* (Beacon Press, 1960), p. 17.

6 Eric Hodgins, *Blandings*' Way (Simon and Schuster, 1950), pp. 24-26.

7 Douglas Heath, "Academic Predictors of Adult Maturity and Competence," *Journal of Higher Education* (November/December, 1977), p. 629, 630.

8 Ibid., p. 627.

9 Douglas Heath, "What the Enduring Effects of Higher Education Tell Us About A Liberal Education," *Journal of Higher Education* (March/April, 1976), p. 189.

10 John Wilkinson, "The Civilization of the Dialogue: An Introduction," *Center Occasional Paper*, Vol. II, No. 1 (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, December, 1965), pp. 6-7. Emphasis added.

11 Alfred North Whitehead, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 11.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 10.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 26.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 50.

16 Jerome Bruner, *The Process of Education* (Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 88-89.

17 Comenius, quoted by Jerome Bruner, "Toward a Sense of Community," *Saturday Review* (January 15, 1972), p. 62.

18 Alfred North Whitehead, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

Chapter Four

MORAL SERIOUSNESS AND PERSONAL LEARNING

I.

One of the most encouraging features of our present situation--encouraging to those concerned about a humanistic curriculum--is the apparent willingness of increasing numbers of educators, across a broad spectrum of institutional locations, to recover an explicit moral seriousness in undergraduate learning in the face of its widespread neglect.

The president of Harvard, writing in a prominent educational magazine, recently deplored the fact that, when "other sources of ethical values have declined in influence, educators....are doing very little to meet this challenge."[1] More remarkable, in view of the popularly-assumed value-neutrality of public higher education, is a statement adopted by the membership of the American Association of State Colleges and Universities. Says that statement:

> Higher education faculties must respond to the moral requirements of students. They must assume the responsibility of developing a curriculum that is value-centered; that prepares students for the moral issues that will confront them in the complex world in which they will live out their lives.[2]

Lest it be assumed that these are merely the hortatory, perhaps obligatory, pronouncements of administrators, it is worth observing that there seems to be a new urgency among faculty members with regard to the moral issues in learning. Writing in the Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors, sociologist Martin Trow of the University of California, Berkeley, has insisted that "The moral development of students lies at the heart of the private life of higher education," and that the aim of institutional policy-makers "should be the health and vitality of its private life."[3]

Three members of the University of Tennessee's College of Liberal Arts, in a formal proposal to their faculty colleagues throughout the university for value con-

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siderations in its curricula, deplored the fact that

> the diverse branches of the university are giving little reflective attention to the systematic examination of...value issues and how they relate to the specific cluster of courses that make up the distinctive curriculum of that part of the university. Even less is there much reflective engagement across divisional lines on value questions, even though, taken as a whole, the university represents a broad spectrum of implicit value affirmations....
>
> ...A mutual concern for value questions (without minimizing technical competence) can give us a sense of being about a common task, at a time when relentless splitting up of the university is the rule of the day....[4]

Yale professor of philosophy John E. Smith goes even farther. "No institution of learning," Smith has written, "can lay claim to the cultural heritage of Western man without at the same time taking responsibility for the ethical as well as the intellectual education of its students."[5] And not least in this litany of renewed concern is a recent president of the American Historical Association. No radical historian by his own account, he has recalled that for years historians believed that value-free inquiry would lead "rather automatically to sensible and judicious conclusions," but he thinks such confidence is no longer possible. "If part of an educator's responsibility is to offer some sort of positive guidance," said Stanford's Gordon Wright in his 1975 AHA presidential address, "then perhaps it is true that many of us have unthinkingly abdicated." Whatever other academics may do, Wright urged his fellow historians to work at "re-establishing history's role as one--and not the least--of what might fairly be called the moral arts."[6]

It is the purpose of this chapter to join such calls for a new moral seriousness in undergraduate learning: to explore its intellectual and educational justifications, and to propose some very specific individual and institutional measures by means of which it can be accomplished. That exploration begins, in the section immediately

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below, with what the three University of Tennessee professors called the "broad spectrum of implicit value affirmations" which are present in and under every academic community.

II.

No institution of higher education--surely no liberal arts college--can be either officially neutral or unofficially indifferent with respect to value questions without falling into self-contradiction. The reason is simple: There can be no community gathered for scholarship apart from the institutionalization of certain values. Since this is the case, colleges which do attempt, officially or informally, to deny or ignore explicit value questions are engaged in behavior which is dis-integral if not actually immoral, since it perpetrates the illusion of neutrality or indifference while actively proceeding to take sides.

Perhaps the point will be clearer if I specify some of the values on which there appears to be a considerable working consensus among professional educators in institutions both public and private, as well as among thoughtful laymen outside the colleges and universities. There is no space here to elaborate this list of values beyond what is required for clarity of statement, nor should they need elaboration if, as I believe, they represent a palpable consensus among us.

First is the value attached to truth-seeking.

Second is the value attached to ideas. John Maynard Keynes spoke for the community of scholarship when he wrote that "the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated when compared to the gradual encroachment of ideas."

Third is an affirmation about the public nature of truth. Truth is social in a double sense. It is sought by means of language and logic, metaphors and methods and meanings, which the inquirer himself does not create sui generis but which he is given out of a funded human experience of incredible range and depth. And once he thinks he has found it out, the inquirer must submit his truth to social scrutiny, not for final adjudication but as a check against his own partial vision, error, or simple waywardness.

Fourth is a conviction that truth as it is known is always partial and fragmentary, never fully or finally set forth, always subject to criticism and revision. This is not a statement of radical relativism. Even those who are prepared to affirm that truth is absolute may be quite prepared to confess that their human apprehension of it is relative to their own location in time and space; so that, although the truth they hold is about the absolute, it is never absolute truth.

Fifth is a conviction that any given truth as it is known is never self-sufficient but requires other truths for its own full truthfulness. This means that no single method of inquiry is omnicompetent, whether it be the scientific or the historical, the aesthetic or the theological or the rational. Each method is adapted to the report of certain aspects of reality deliberately limited for greater precision. Reality itself is approximated only as full account is taken of all of the reports.

Sixth is a conviction that truth is not univocal, not subject to single meaning or interpretation. Events, whether natural or historical, do not announce their own importance and are thus subject to differing interpretations. Even when there is public agreement concerning the structure of an event, we may properly expect and welcome disagreement about the significance of that event. This means that a subtle and pervasive temptation must be resisted: the temptation to claim for our interpretations the same authority we may more certainly claim for our descriptions.

Seventh is the value which is attached to empirical, evidential, and ra-

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tional procedures. This is by no means to deny the positive values of emotion, preference, will, and desire, but it is to deny their unbridled autonomy and to require that they submit to direct interrogation by experience, evidence, and consequence.

Eighth is a conviction about the virtue of disinterestedness, the willingness to suspend both belief and disbelief long enough to hear clearly what some one else is saying.

Ninth is the respect and the rights which are accorded to the work of others, so that no one is free to use the distinctive words, ideas, or forms of others without explicit acknowledgement of that derivation.

Tenth is the value which is attached to playing with ideas. I do not suggest here some frivolous activity, but rather that form of intellection in which ideas are rubbed up against each other, in which intellectual conflicts are deliberately created and drawn out, in which the concepts of one discipline are related to and tested by the concepts of another; an analytical cast of mind which can reduce an argument to its essentials and test its inner consistency and strength.

Eleventh is the value which is attached to the acquisition of certain "arts and habits," as William Cory, Master of Eton, called them a hundred years ago. You go to a great school, said Cory, "for the habit of attention, for the art of expression, for the art of assuming at a moment's notice a new intellectual posture, for the art of entering quickly into another person's thoughts, for the habit of submitting to censure and refutation, for the art of indicating assent or dissent in graduated terms, for the habit of regarding minute points of accuracy, for the habit of working out what is possible in a given time...."

Twelfth is the value which is attached to intellectual competence. Competence is arrived at, not by the imposition of an arbitrary intellectual authority, but in the presence of that digging and demonstrating, that analyzing and clarifying, that hearing and responding, which create the situations and confer the skills which free men and women not only to seek their own answers but to formulate their own questions.

Undergirding, overarching, and interpenetrating all of these is what I take to be the root value of higher education: selves in all their relations. That is what liberal learning, at least, is all about.

II.

This catalog of values professed by a large body of practitioners in higher education--how consistently profession is translated into practice being a separate question--is not, of course, exhaustive, but it is extensive enough to make my point; namely, that a community of scholarship is a value-construct.

I have also listed these values we hold in common because it seems to me that they lead to certain consequences for the nature of the educational enterprise about which there is far less agreement, but which impress me nevertheless as the logical and necessary implicates of the consensus. One such implicate is that higher education, under whatever sponsorship, is by the very nature of this consensus a moral enterprise. There will be some who will object to putting the matter thus, on the ground that the values I have listed are intellectual rather than moral. They may prefer to identify them as intellectual because moral seems unhappily judgmental, perhaps meddlesome, even capricious, whereas intellectual seems to remove the onus and confer a certain objectivity and respectability. The attempt to distinguish between intellectual and moral values strikes me as specious for at least three reasons: (1) The so-called intellectual values designate certain preferred be-

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haviors. As such they require judgments of desirable and undesirable, good and bad, right and wrong, and they provide a basis within the scholarly community for conferring approval and disapproval. (2) It is not clear on what ground one could argue that preferred intellectual behaviors differ in kind from other preferred behaviors--how intellectual honesty differs from any other kind of truth-telling, how intellectual intimidation differs from other forms of aggression, or how excessive intellectual pride differs from other forms of disproportionate self-importance. To assume that intellectual values refer only to a kind of remote, Platonic "realm of ideas" is to ignore the indissoluble link between idea and act, and the equally important but less often noted link between act and idea. (3) The distinction is specious, moreover, because the values I have listed are not a mere accidental collocation of ideas, nor a simple social contract which might as easily have been otherwise. Rather, taken together the elements of the consensus represent a self-consistent, albeit incomplete, body of conviction about the nature of reality which, though not capricious, is indeed arbitrary in the sense that it is subject to objection by those who hold different convictions about reality. It is an estimate of reality just as morality, with its value discriminations and priorities, is always an estimate of reality.

All of which is to say that the value consensus meets the standard tests of a moral philosophy. It is also to say, therefore, that one of the tests of the integrity of a community of scholarship is the quality of its moral seriousness.

One of the places where this is seen most quickly and crucially--this is my second implicate--is in curriculum and classroom. I have already cited, in Chapter One, the comment of a philosopher, who insisted that the exclusive function of higher education is "to turn out people who know something, preferably something of importance." His was a disdainful comment, intended to rebut the view that "the function of a college is to help its pupils formulate the problems they face,"--a view the philosopher held to be "just false." But he could scarcely have thought very carefully about where "turning out people who know something of importance" would inevitably lead the process of teaching and learning. For if the aim of the curriculum is not simply that students shall know something, but that they shall know something important, that can be accomplished only if we are prepared to deal courageously and candidly with our commitments, both the teachers' and the students'; for importance implies the fashioning of our diverse experiences and understandings into personal priorities. If we are to aim through curricular arrangement not merely at facts but at reality, that can be done only if we are prepared to deal courageously and candidly with our world-views, both the teachers' and the students'; for reality implies the fashioning of discrete and disparate facts into some intelligible and meaningful whole. If we are to aim through course credits not simply at knowledge but at wisdom, that can be accomplished only if we are prepared to deal courageously and candidly with our judgments, both the teachers' and the students'; for wisdom implies the fashioning of a descriptive knowledge into that discriminate weighting of experience which distinguishes between "higher" and "lower," between "is" and "ought."

No one has stated more clearly and persuasively than Gerhard Spiegler the case for the assertion, that its quality of moral seriousness tests the integrity of a community of scholarship. "There was a time," Spiegler wrote,

> when the capacity to learn was greater than the knowledge available, but that has passed. Today it is necessary to select from the treasury of culture that which is permitted to function in liberal arts educa-

> tion. Ideally the *best* of human culture should be preserved. *Practically this means that in a selective process, human knowledge is synthetically organized on the basis of judgments concerning what is needed for the conduct of human life and the health of man*. The liberal arts ideal demands that *concrete decisions concerning values* be made. The curriculum of a liberal arts college is a complex value judgment. The liberal arts college, if it purports to inculcate values must itself embrace values; it must commit itself.
>
> It is at this point that the so-called crisis of liberal education comes to a head. Fundamentally it is not specialization which is responsible for the critical situation, it is the inability of educators in our culture to make value judgments and commitments through the curricular structure of the educational process.... [Emphasis added.]

But fear of making such judgments--or failure to recognize that we are, in fact, making them, perhaps because the consensus which supports them is so entrenched and unexamined that they seem less like judgments than like the reflections of received truth--does not excuse us from full responsibility for what is thus perpetrated by default. What is important is that we come to recognize that there is simply no alternative to the process Spiegler describes, and that our only responsible course is to determine that the process shall become increasingly deliberate and deliberative.

A third implicate probes further into the relation between knowledge and moral seriousness. The noted churchman Harry Emerson Fosdick once said that, when a certain lawyer consulted Jesus, he came in with *a theoretical problem on his mind*--but he went out with *a moral problem on his hands*.* Something like that ought to result from an education in the liberal arts and sciences, because there is an inescapable moral link between theoretical knowledge and its uses.

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* "What must I do to inherit eternal life?" was the lawyer's question. Jesus' response was the parable of the good Samaritan, with its concluding imperative, "Go and do likewise!" (Cf. Luke 10:25-37)

Knowledge, as we have increasing reason to know, is power. There is only one thing more explosive than the increase in our knowledgeableness in recent decades, and that is the explosive natural and social possibilities of the power that knowledge confers--knowledge that can alter the structure of the basic materials of the physical universe, as well as of the genetic materials which determine the forms of organic life; which can imitate the life-creative process in the laboratory, and alter personality by chemical means; which can shape tastes and desires by psychosocial manipulation and, by subtle and sophisticated marketing techniques applied to a popular pornography, can perpetrate sexual fraud on an entire generation. Any power which is not subject to moral influence is a capricious and dangerous instrument. So, apart from an explicit moral sense which cultivates individual self-restraint, and which acts as a social check on the structures of power which individuals inhabit, powerful men and women serve inhumane ends as readily as humane ones. Any educational system which trains future scientists and makers of social and political policy, and which fails to give them any historical wisdom and explicit moral guidance which can sensitize them to the responsibilities of their power, must share the culpability when knowledge turns, not into wisdom but into meanness, or even into madness.

And it must share the culpability, as well, when--out of moral emptiness or obtuseness--knowledge and culture are put to the service of the banal, the grotesque, the obscene. If we were to search our recent history for a place where culture (refined knowledge), technology (applied knowledge), and productivity (efficient knowledge), were present in exemplary form, we could scarcely do better than to choose Auschwitz! There can be no question of the awful productiveness of its technology of death, nor of its devotion to high culture. The niece of Gustav Mahler led an inmate orchestra which played the classics in restorative concerts for camp personnel who came weary from their daily work of brutalism.

Auschwitz is, of course, a perverse exemplar--and for that reason a powerfully instructive one--where culture, technology, and productivity were demonic because they were made to serve unspeakable ends. Literary critic George Steiner has drawn its shattering lesson in terms which ought to haunt those of us who teach in the colleges, and especially those among us who might prefer to believe that knowledge and culture will exercise an inherently benign effect on their possessors without any help from us. Says Steiner, "We know now that a man can read Goethe or Rilke in the evening, that he can play Bach or Schubert, and go to his day's work at Auschwitz in the morning."

Then what difference ought that knowing to make in the colleges? To say, either overtly by open profession and deliberation, or covertly by efforts at neutrality or practiced diffidence--that we do not care about the ends to which is put the learning of which we are trustees--that we are indifferent to the career of power and perversity--would be to commit such an act of nihilism as to renounce our identity as a humane community.

A fourth implicate has to do, not simply with a limitation on what we do with what we know, but with a limitation as well on what can be known with some degree of certainty. If restraint is a moral category with regard to the way we use knowledge, it is also a moral category with regard to the claims we make for its ultimate reach. An age of science and technology, justifiably proud of its accomplishments, gives us an appreciation for the astonishing scope of human knowledge. But what we know will be sadly deficient if it does not include a profound sense of the limitations of all knowledge. No educated person can hold a properly proportioned view of knowledge who does not know that mystery is a genuine and inescapable dimension of existence. Ignorance and mystery are not the same things. Ignorance points to the temporarily unknown; mystery points to the eternally hidden. Both are in us and around us. When I do not know how to cure the virus which saps my energy, that is ignorance; but when I do not know how to make sense out of my inexorable journey toward death, that is mystery. When I do not know the distance to the farthest galaxy, that is ignorance; but when I do not know why this world exists, and not some other, that is mystery.

Bertrand Russell, surely no conventional pietist, warned against what he called "cosmic impiety": the presumptuous view that all truth will eventually come under man's command and control. The "intoxication of power" to which such a view leads is "the greatest danger of our time," said Russell, and any intellectual activity which, "however unintentionally, contributes to it is increasing the danger of vast social disaster."[9] Max Otto, proud atheist though he was in religion and scientific humanist in philosophy, could nevertheless insist that "whether we admit it or not there is always an unexplored beyond, always mystery."

> Most of us believe that life must be nailed down along all its edges lest some act or thought or dream tear loose the fabric of values woven by tradition, and civilization, fluttering in the wind of impulse, is little by little torn to shreds. It seems to me better to admit that in things which matter most we are compelled to leave something at loose ends.[10]

In the liberal arts curriculum, it is the humanities which bear witness to the eternally unfinished work of the human intellect and spirit, as scientist

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S. E. Luria and psychologist Zella Luria point out in an insightful paper on "The Soluble and the Insoluble." The sciences and parts of the social sciences are problem-solving disciplines and assume that the problems they work with have rational solutions, say the Lurias. Physics is the classical model for the sciences, as economics is for the attempt to deal scientifically with social problems. But there is a limit to the usefulness of the quantifications of physics and economics: they may be applied where they are inappropriate, or they may lead to discarding essential features of experience because they are not quantifiable. Indeed, "the category of humaneness...does not lend itself to numerical analyses. One may succeed, perhaps, in estimating the efficiency of the death penalty in inhibiting crime. But how can one measure what the death penalty does to the morality of a nation?"

> Where the usefulness of quantification ends, where problem-solving meets its boundary, there the domain of the humanities begins. If science is the art of the soluble.., the humanities might well be called the art of the insoluble....From the time we emerge from childhood, we are aware that [dignity and freedom and justice] are areas of personal judgment, areas for choice and not for final solutions, for search and not for final explanation. We seek clarity, lucidity, but no ultimate answers. Even philosophy searches, not for final answers but for insights into those mental processes that pose for the human mind its schematic framework and its boundary conditions. Essentially, the study of the humanities is the bolstering of our own inner search for meaning by using the illuminations that poets, philosophers, writers, historians have projected upon the problems of the human condition. "

A final implicate emerges when education is understood in terms of humanism

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and holism; that is, when it is liberal learning we are aiming at. Whatever else that may mean, it means a refusal to fracture the humanity of the learner--a refusal to break off a piece of his humanness, which we then process through the assembly line of a supposedly humanizing educational experience, without bothering to be concerned about how he will fit that processed fragment into a total self once the process is completed. It means a refusal to treat the learner as a disemboddied intellect or a set of mental and physical reflexes to be programmed for the efficient performance of certain mental skills. It means taking the learner seriously as a person striving for meaning and integrity, whose questions about the moral cannot be isolated from his effective exploitation of the mental, and whose confusions about the meaning of experience qualify his grasp of the structure of experience.

Intellectual competence itself is not a value-free achievement. There is a vital link between competence and conscience, as former President John Sloan Dickey of Dartmouth insisted some years ago. Competence, in my own view, must include more than the possession of a comprehensive stock of information, both factual and theoretical, with sufficient powers of recall. Competence means the ability to cope with one's experience, intellectual or otherwise. The opposite of competence is demoralization, in which the disordered character of existence renders one powerless to think or act effectively. To be thus demoralized is not necessarily to lack information or to be without skills; it is, rather, to live in a world which makes no sense, which has no center of meaning or source of value which can order and organize disparate parts into a meaningful pattern. So it is de-moralization--that is, the absence or loss of an explicit sense of meaning and source of value--which creates demoralized men and women, whose inability to order and organize their experience makes them incompetent.

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So, in a learning environment marked by humanism and holism, ideas must take account of their implicit values, and mind must take account of its morale.

III.

How can an undergraduate college become a place of moral seriousness in learning? Not, let it be said at once, by becoming a place of moral prescription. The problem is much too subtle and much too complex for that. The arbitrary imposition of authority, whether mental or moral, can create conditioned reflexes or a mindless conformism, but it is powerless to bring about responsible action. The moral course is not prescribed; it is chosen.

The college which intends to engage its students in serious moral learning will have to give attention, first, to learning at the *pre-moral* level of experience.[2]

There are three aspects of the pre-moral which I want to discuss here, the first of which I will call *existential*, because it deals with the universal conditions of human existence. Moral questions are, after all, peculiarly human questions; it makes no sense at all to talk about the morality of the beast, or the tree, or the crystal. The question, Who am I? which only persons have the power to ask, is existentially prior to the question, What shall I do? That moral question cannot even be framed, let alone answered, if the meaning of what it is to be human is evaded. So the starting points of our moral awareness are to be found, in Michael Novak's words, in

> man's experience of his fragility, of his transitoriness, of his tininess; his consciousness of his uniqueness on the earth, of his endless and restless questioning; his personal choices whose motives and consequences he cannot fully know; his vast ability to be proud and to fail, to be isolated and to love, to be--and yet not to be--the master of his own destiny.

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It is in the experience of life lived, ambiguously, at these intersections that the demand for consequential choices arises and the power to make them is given. Yet, ironically academic men and women--teachers of the sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities--appear to be singularly ill at ease in the presence of such issues, reluctant to draw them to explicit awareness, to probe them, to use academic skills in demystifying them, and thus to offer students some larger measure of control over them. Such behavior on the part of teachers is ironic, because the peculiarly human experiences evoked by Novak's words are, in a fundamental sense, the subject-matter of biology and astronomy, of economics and psychology and history, to say nothing of philosophy, literature, and the arts. Yet a student may seldom hear anything said, for example in a biology or history or philosophy classroom, which speaks to his own location between hope and despair, between freedom and fate, between principle and compromise, between intimation and emptiness.

Yale's William Muehl has written what impresses me as a striking parable of our academic abstraction. "Some time ago," says Professor Muehl,

> I saw a painting which was entitled "The Brokenness of Man." It was a splendidly abstract thing, a complex of lights and shadows, jagged angles, and broken lines. I wanted to stand and look at it for a long time, take it home and hang it on my wall and invite my friends in to see it while we sipped coffee and nibbled crackers and cheese. I contemplated the deep discussions which it might stimulate and heard myself saying often that it really takes an artist to catch the truth about things.
>
> But then I remembered a photograph that I had seen shortly before. It had been taken by Weegee, the cameraman who specialized in recording the seamy side of New York City. And it showed a drunk lying unconscious in a Harlem doorway. He had a three-day growth of beard on his face, a

shock of unkempt hair, vomit all over his chest, snot running from his nose, a bottle clutched in the crook of his elbow. This was a broken man. And I did not linger in front of that portrait. Nor did I long to take it home and hang it on my wall and have my friends in to look at it as we sipped coffee and nibbled crackers and cheese. This was a broken man. And all I wanted was to get away from him as rapidly as possible.[14]

Take love, for example. There is no more basic, no more primordial, no more distinctively human, characteristic than love. Yet where, in the typical college of arts and sciences, would one go to learn about love, in order to get a firmer grasp not only on one's own selfhood but on one of history's major forces? To psychology, we might think. Then perhaps the experience of UCLA psychologist Leo Buscaglia will be instructive. He writes,

> Students with whom I was relating were, more than ever, concerned with life, living, sex, growth, responsibility, death, hope, the future. It was obvious that the only subject which encompassed, and was at the core of all these concerns and more, was love.[15]

So Professor Buscaglia decided to offer what he called "Love Class." His decision was not resisted by his colleagues, so long as he taught the class on his own time, over and above his official teaching load, and so long as it was not offered for academic credit; which is to say, so long as the "Love Course" was denied the standard sanctions of academic respectability. Still, eyebrows were raised by colleagues who could not imagine love as a serious offering in the university curriculum, with one professor even going so far as to suggest that both the subject and its instructor were "irrelevant." "Others asked mockingly and with a wild leer, if the class had a lab requirement and was I going to be the primary investigator," Buscaglia reports.[16]

Buscaglia's experience is not unique, and appears to extend to the Social Sciences broadly. When Nelson Foote taught sociology at the University of Chicago, he prepared a paper, simply titled "Love," for the annual synposium of the University's Committee on Human Development. Foote wrote at its beginning:

> The title of this paper has provoked comment from friends and acquaintances ever since it was publicly announced. If those comments are classified according to the attitudes they express, they appear to fall into four rough categories: cynical, joking, sentimental, and matter-of-fact. Comments falling into the fourth category were least frequent, totaling three cases out of perhaps twenty. Of these three persons, two pointed out to me that love is not considered a proper subject for academic discourse: one claimed that the title would draw only a group of moralistic or sentimental listeners, lacking in scientific motive; the other claimed that the regular academics would be scornful unless I devised a more pompous and wordy title. The third merely made the cryptic remark that it takes courage to speak on this subject. This paper is aimed at drawing scientific attention to a matter-of-fact attitude toward love. Serious matter-of-factness toward love is a minority point of view even among professed social scientists. Indeed, one gains some introductory illumination of the subject from recognizing that the first three categories are far more representative of the common approach to love.[17]

We may speculate on the consequences for student growth and development when, of all persons in the academy, social scientists ignore love; when, through cynicism, jest, or mawkishness they reveal their own unresolved ambivalences to it; and when, as a result, they contribute to love's obfuscation. And we may speculate, further, on the degree to which moral incompetence among the young is confirmed by their failure to find reliable academic illumination on so fundamental a moral resource as love.

Teachers who want to contribute to the moral development of their students--or more precisely for this present discussion, to the pre-moral ground without which morality is rootless--can do so, not by abandoning their subject-matters, but precisely by pressing more deeply into them; by deliberately, carefully, and regularly drawing out the universal human elements--love and conflict, hope and death, pride and vulnerability, power and mortality--which are in and under the subject-matter, and by providing repeated occasions for students to make the connection between subject-matter at its depth and their own depths as persons.

It is this kind of teaching that Archibald MacLeish described when he wrote about Robert Penn Warren's lecture on "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner":

> What happens [in Warren's lecture] is that the relation between the poem and the world of life in which the poem exists is discovered--discovered by a stroke as brief and brilliant as the blast of the light which sometimes ties the earth and sky together. Every man, says Mr. Warren quietly, kills his own albatross...and there, with those words, the bird, the scene, the poem all come true--come real. The metaphysical talk about symbols and symbolism which usually fogs discussion of "The Rime"...chokes on its own inanity and what is left is meaning, the only kind of meaning that truly means, personal meaning, immediate meaning.... The murder of the bird becomes the murder of which we also are guilty, all of us; the destruction of life, the denial of love. The horror of thirst and windlessness, motionlessness, becomes the horror of stagnation we too have sensed when our rejection of love, of life, has

> stilled the winds of vision that should drive us. The salvation by wonder and pity becomes a salvation we could recognize if it came.... This myth of the poetic imagination...has become a myth of itself which I--student, teacher, man, woman, whoever--am called on to live as life....It has been accomplished not by squeezing the pips of the text but by a perception which has one foot in the text and the other in the world so that the two, text and world, are made to march together.[18]

Nor is this kind of teaching possible only for humanistic studies, like literature. In his presidential address to the American Economic Association, entitled "Economics as a Moral Science," Kenneth Boulding called on economists to take formal account of the ways in which benevolence and malevolence shape economic behavior and the system of exchange which economists study. The standard economic model assumes selfishness, said Boulding; that is, it assumes

> the independence of individual preference functions, such that it makes no difference to me whether I perceive you as either better off or worse off. Anything less descriptive of the human condition could hardly be imagined. The plain fact is that our lives are dominated by precisely this interdependence of utility functions....Selfishness, or indifference to the welfare of others, is a knife edge between benevolence on the one side and malevolence on the other. It is something that is very rare. We may feel indifferent towards those whom we do not know, with whom we have no relationships of any kind, but toward those with whom we have relationships, even the frigid relationship of exchange, we are apt to be either benevolent or malevolent. We either rejoice when they rejoice, or we rejoice when they mourn.[19]

Understanding economics on these fully human terms might make that science less dismal, alike for those who attempt to teach it and for those who try to learn it.

And the 17th century mathematician and scientist, Blaise Pascal, has long since helped us to understand something of the peculiarly human impact of scientific contemplation:

> Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature; but he is a thinking reed. The entire universe need not arm itself to crush him. A vapour, a drop of water suffices to kill him. But if the universe were to crush him, man would still be more noble than that which killed him, because he knows that he dies and the advantage which the universe has over him; the universe knows nothing of this.[20]

In order to assure the deliberation, care, and regularity with which teaching seeks to plumb this dimension of depth in academic subject-matter, I suggest that teachers set out in advance, among their learning objectives for a course and in addition to the subject-matter mastery they will demand, a specification of those existential connections with the subject-matter which they will expect students to make.

Parenthetically, in addition to its contribution to pre-moral development, I can think of few things which will serve more to energize the learning situation than to build into it this existential dimension.

A second critically important way in which a college can contribute to the pre-moral grounding of its students is relational, providing learning experiences within which they can confirm and enhance their interpersonal skills. There is a significant sense in which the opposite of "moral" is not "immoral" but, rather, "solipsist," or in a more accessible term, "privatist." That is, moral action can take place only where the idea of responsi-

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bility makes sense; and responsibility requires that one person understand his existence to be entailed in a quite explicit and reflexive way in the existence of an other--indeed, in a whole range of others. Moral action will be attenuated, limited only to special circumstance at best, where there is no fully-developed capacity for significant interrelationship.

That requirement for moral action reveals a peculiar problem in our own time, when technology is making dependence upon direct personal relationships less and less necessary; when social mobility and segmentation permit relatively few sustained relationships to intrude upon our privacy; where television has made us increasingly comfortable with a spectator role, whether the event be sports or politics, and where it has de-sensitized us to the excruciatingly personal affects of violence; and where the size and complexity of, and our distance from, corporate and political decision-making which directly affects our own lives, gives us a repeated experience of frustration and powerlessness which drive us even further into withdrawal.

Under such conditions, it is scarcely to be wondered at that the times reflect a moral obtuseness, confusion, and indifference. Such consequence is seen in those tragic and relatively common situations where an observer feels no obligation to intervene in an attack on another person, not merely because the observer fears for his own safety but because of his own experienced detachment from the scene. It is reflected in low voter turnouts for issues of social interest (for example, public school matters which are not tied to taxes), and high voter turnouts for issues of self-interest (most often tax referenda). And it is illustrated in the multi-million dollar loss which manufacturers and retailers experience every year through petty thievery on the part of employees. Every night the unauthorized take-home of supplies, equipment, goods, and products is enormous. If you were to challenge a de-

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parting worker to justify his appropriation of company property, he would probably reply with an honest question: "Who's going to get hurt?" The question is precisely indicative of the problem. When an employee asks, "Who's going to get hurt?" it means that the institution has for him no face, that he experiences it not in terms of persons but only of impersonal assets. And when, even in our relationships with individuals, we are able to play fast and loose with what another man has and is, that is because our interaction with that other man is not personal at all. He is for us simply an object among a world of impersonal objects. So, whether it is an institution or an individual, there is no sense of moral responsibility because there is no sense of personal relation.

At the extreme, persons who exhibit this dysfunction are called sociopaths, defined by one psychiatric manual as individuals who

> are incapable of significant loyalty to individuals, groups, or social values. They are grossly selfish, callous, irresponsible, impulsive, and unable to feel guilt or to learn from experience and punishment. Frustration tolerance is low. They tend to blame others or offer plausible rationalizations for their behavior.

Expecially in the light of the pressure of our times toward the impersonal, colleges which fail to confirm and enhance the relational capacities of their students and thereby fail to predispose their competence for moral behavior, simply increase the drift toward sociopathology.

Relational skills cannot be left merely to casual collocations in dormitories and in campus activities, or to the mutually-confirming immaturities of student peers; rather they must be built into the formal learning objectives and arrangements of the humanistic college. Here too, teachers--and administrators as well--have a significant, indeed an essential, role to play, out-

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side of the classroom as well as within it. In his important work on Education and Identity, Arthur Chickering has noted how "accessible adults, open enough to be fully known, can have substantial impact" on students.

> [In close relationship with campus adults] the actions and reactions learned during childhood and habitual with parents or other authorities can be reexamined, alternative behaviors can be tested. New modes of relationship with persons in authority and with institutional expressions of authority can be developed. Movement from dependency or rebellious independence toward relationships of mutual respect and regard can occur. Areas of interdependency can be recognized. Space for an autonomous existence can be carved out of a larger context. By demonstrating varied lifestyles and value orientations, such adults can also help foster development of purpose and integrity.[21]

The earlier studies on which Chickering's recommendations were formed are confirmed by more recent research on out-of-class relationships between students and faculty. A study of eight widely varying institutions, conducted by the Center for Research and Development in Higher Education at the University of California, Berkeley, concluded that there is "substantial evidence that faculty can play an acknowledged and important role in the undergraduate experience--at least in those cases where the relationship between a teacher and his students goes beyond the typical classroom setting and becomes an interpersonal one."[22] One particular finding of that study has special significance for this section of my comment. What the study calls "high-interacting students," that is, those who frequently interacted with teachers outside of the classroom,

> appeared to experience themselves as more "together." They seemed to have a greater sense than the low-interactors of who they were and where they

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were going, both personally and vocationally. They felt they had a firmer sense of identity, and that they had increased more in their self-awareness, in their ability to form close relationships, and in their commitment both to a life style and to a vocation.[23]

Both Chickering's report and the Berkeley study suggest that significant relational experience, which I am here calling pre-moral, has moral behavior on the part of the student as its consequence. Chickering points to respect and regard, interdependency, value orientation, and integrity; the Berkeley study speaks, in its own way, of integrity (the students experienced themselves as more "together"), and points to commitment with respect to life style and vocation. In all of these, the moral competence of the student is enhanced.

Predictably, some faculty members will object to being accessible to their students outside of the classroom, and will refuse to be "open enough to be fully known" by them, to use Chickering's phrase. A woman undergraduate wrote the following in a letter to her father:

> [The college president] said in convo the other day he thought teachers should have more interest in the student as an individual. I had just come from history class where the prof had said, "I only want to deal with your minds and intelligence. I am not concerned at all with anything else. I don't believe in togetherness. I want to keep a distance between me and my students." He honestly said that! not implied it. I just about fell on the floor. A typical history teacher? Yep! He contaminates us with his personality but wants none of us."

Then we should also note, and not just incidentally, what the effect is on teachers themselves when they engage in regular out-of-class contact with students. The Berkeley study reports that more such contact, and thus greater acquaintance with and understanding of students, appears to make teachers trust

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them more, whereas teachers with little out-of-class contact with students knew less about their educational achievements and were mistrustful of them. Perhaps most interesting of all, the study concludes that high-interacting faculty were more personally and professionally self-confident than their low-interacting colleagues.[24]

In any case, it seems to me that as a teacher I must make a fundamental decision: Is my commitment limited to a particular locus of activity, such as the formal classroom and laboratory, and to those limited forms of activity which are permitted by that locus; or is my commitment to the creation of those environments within which significant humanistic learning can take place? In fact, I think the choice can be put even more sharply: Is my commitment to teaching, which makes me the subject, or is my commitment to learning, which makes the student the subject? The fundamental humanistic character of the college will be determined by that choice.

A third way in which a college ought to contribute to the pre-moral grounding of its students I will call religious, intending to use that controversial term in its deepest, most generic and universal sense; and intending to insist, as a consequence, that this religious dimension of the pre-moral must be of concern even in the most avowedly secular of settings for liberal learning. That is, a humanistic college ought to be a place in which men and women experience, moment by moment, the trustworthiness of the life process.

The profounder meaning of faith, unattached to any formal religious profession, is located precisely in such experience. In his seminal and widely influential treatise on moral philosophy, H. Richard Niebuhr defines faith as "the attitude of the self in its existence toward all existences that surround it, as beings to be relied upon or suspected."[25] The question of trust or distrust as basic life-orientation is the root question of our human existence.

If it is the basic element in religion ("The inscrutable power by which we are is either for us or against us"[26]), it is also the precondition of human socialization ("the basic element in the development of personality"[27]), as well as the precondition for science ("reliance...on the constancy of the processes observed in nature and...on the fellowmen who report their observations'[28]).

Indeed, "Faith as trust or distrust accompanies all our encounters with others and qualifies all our responses....The response in trust or distrust to the radical act of the self's and its world's creation qualifies all particular interpretations of finite actions upon the self and therefore all its reactions."[29]

It seems clear to me, that persons whose outlook upon their experience arises out of a fundamental distrust will find it difficult to entertain the possibility of moral behavior, which is, at a minimum, a willingness to break out of preoccupation with one's own good and to participate in the production of increasingly larger goods. Rather, such persons will be intent upon self-protection, either through isolation from or preemptive assault upon a hostile world. If, then, a college is to predispose its students to moral growth, every aspect of the life of the institution--its academic and social policies and the way they are administered, its classroom and dormitory procedures and the climate they create, the relational impacts on students of teachers, administrators, and staff--must be continually tested by whether they help or hinder men and women to confirm or disconfirm, to support or compromise, faith in the trustworthiness of life.

IV.

In each of these pre-moral dimensions--the existential, the relational, and the religious--we are dealing with what I called in Chapter One the coincidence of intimacy and ultimacy. That is, each of those dimensions is at

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once proximate and timeless, personal and universal, idiosyncratic and common. Just as they touch each of us distinctively, they also identify us as members of a common genus. All of which makes some academics profoundly uneasy. Their standing assumption, says Michael Novak,

> is that ultimate questions [and, he could justifiably have added, intimate ones] are in principle unanswerable, and hence not worth asking seriously.... [Professors assume] that ultimate questions are nonintellectual, personal, and if matters of supreme importance and self-commitment, nevertheless not matters for passionate academic dispute. The university, on principle, concentrates on statistics, historical facts, historical intellectual positions, logic modeled on the discourse of the physical sciences, and ample documentation.[30]

That description is unexceptionable. The traditional disciplines have depended upon cognitive rationality as their almost exclusive mode of knowing, largely in imitation of the physical sciences and in an understandable desire to share the public authority which attaches to scientific findings. But if Novak's words are unexceptionable at the level of description, I take sharp exception from them at the level of prescription.[31] It takes nothing away from the scientific method--nothing, at least, to which it holds proper intellectual claim--to insist that its near-exclusive hold on the process of learning in colleges and universities--especially in institutions of the liberal arts and sciences is regrettable. It is so because there are other ranges of reality to be explored which have their own modal requirements, and because there are other kinds of learning which are necessary to fully competent persons, as to fully competent social orders.

Idiosyncratic learning is one, and it is needed to balance the emphasis on public knowledge which is at the heart of the scientific method. Idiosyncratic

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learning means the ability to have confidence in important aspects of what I know, feel, mean, and value, whether or not those things find ready confirmation in the knowing, feeling, meaning, and valuing of others. By treating scientific knowledge as if it were the single model to which all others ought to aspire, we have generated out of the academy an ironic, peculiarly anti-intellectual result: a mass-mind, which is suspicious of its own authenticity until it has been confirmed by--and perhaps lost in--a larger statistical sample. So, typically, I may be unable even to discern my own interests, let alone to trust them, until they are objectified for me by the Strong Vocational Interest Blank. I may not even know what I feel, to say nothing of an ability to trust and act on my feelings, until they are displayed for me in the Edwards Personality Inventory. This kind of misplaced scientism diminishes the human, and in the colleges we ought not consent to it.

I take it to be the aim of humanistic psychology to assist men and women in experiencing themselves as distinct, unique centers of consciousness, with a sense of their own autonomous value apart from permission from anyone else to be or to do. That is a critically important ingredient in human wholeness, to which humane institutions dare not be indifferent. If we do not have other resources of disciplined reflection and imagination to assist us, then we ought to seek the help of humanistic psychology in expanding the modes of learning which can be made available within the college.

To be sure, the vulgarization of which humanistic psychology has been the victim sometimes confuses integrity with loneliness, and exploits the tyranny of the ego, which is no less destructive than any other form of tyranny. Still I agree with Sam Keen: attention to the full dimensionality of the human means that, while we "hunt down the general, the universal, the abstract, and the public facts of the external world," we must also attend in higher education to "the particular, the concrete, the idiosyncratic, and the sensuous facts which [form] the substance of [our] private existence...." I would like to be a faculty member in Keen's "Department of Wonder, Wisdom, and Serendipitous Knowledge."[32]

A complement to the idiosyncratic, and a further necessary expansion of the modes of learning in a liberal arts college beyond the cognitive-scientific, is metaphysical learning. I use this term, not to designate that formal school of philosophic inquiry which treats the nature and structure of being (a school which, not coincidentally, has in recent decades been driven out of our faculties of philosophy by a "positive" school of linguistic analysis, whose aim has been to give philosophy the same facticity as science); though there is no doubt in my mind about the intellectual usefulness of formal training in metaphysical inquiry. I use the term, rather, in the more generic sense employed by the late Harvard intellectual historian Crane Brinton. "To be provocative," Brinton wrote,

> I shall say that all normal people are metaphysicians; all have some desire to locate themselves in a "system," a "universe," a "process" transcending at least the immediate give-and-take between the individual and his environment; for all normal people the conscious lack or frustration of some such understanding will result in a kind of metaphysical anxiety.... Everyone, then, has a metaphysics--or if you prefer simpler terms, everyone has a view of life as part of his way of life....Metaphysics is a human drive or appetite, and to ask men to do without metaphysics is as pointless as to ask them to do without sex relations....as some who repress sex actually divert it into unprofitable channels, so do those who repress metaphysics.[33]

The teacher-scholar is no exception to Brinton's generalization, though many of them appear not to know quite how to handle their "view of life" in the classroom; and in their uncertainty and discomfort, they may withhold it, hide it, even deny it in the presence of students and perhaps of colleagues as well. Harold Taylor has had some hard words for academics who, in effect, thus offer their students only a syllabus and not themselves; who deal in fact, but not in truth in a deeper sense than facts, even when they are systematically ordered, can disclose. "They tell what is known about given subjects in orderly succession of points," said Taylor, but they "are not advocates or believers in truths they have created." In fact, such academics are not teachers at all, Taylor insisted; they are, rather, "entrepreneurs of the curriculum," professionals in the worst sense of the word.

Economist E. F. Schumacher insisted,[34] rightly I believe, that academic men and women who deny the need, and indeed even the legitimacy, of metaphysics are themselves often ruled by certain nineteenth-century metaphysical speculation about the nature of the human and physical universe--they hold what Brinton called a "view of life"--which has become the largely unacknowledged presupposition of much of their intellectual work, including of course their teaching. Such speculation includes evolution (especially in its social application), competitive struggle, materialism (influenced especially but not exclusively by Marxist metaphysics), the determinism of the unconscious, relativism, and positivism. What these six have in common--in addition to their metaphysical, non-empirical character--and what thus makes them a cohesive faith, is a reductionistic outlook, which consistently diminishes the significance (that is, the meaning) of what appear to be higher forms to lower, more elemental or primitive, sources or processes. This is the metaphysics of the devaluation of meaning, or what someone has called the faith of nothing-but-ism.

The point of my criticism here, let it be clear, is not the presence of this metaphysical influence in the work of academic men and women (though I do not find the faith of reductionism at all acceptable); it is that the specu-

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lative, pre-suppositional nature of these doctrines is not acknowledged, and indeed is often vigorously denied, and hence that they are not available for open examination, for dialogue with other faith-stances, for honest advocacy and debate. They fail, that is, to serve an educative purpose either for the teachers who hold them, or for the students they teach. In his introduction to The Shaping of the Modern Mind, Crane Brinton described his own objectives for recounting the intellectual history of the modern period in terms which could as easily define objectives of an undergraduate experience in liberal learning:

> I have tried to present the origins and development of our varying and conflicting modern Western views of life in such a way that my readers may first see more clearly, work out more completely, a view of life satisfactory to themselves, and second, learn by understanding those of others to live better with them.[35]

That, so it seems to me, ought to be the intent of the classroom teacher: to acknowledge openly and matter-of-factly his own metaphysical commitments--his own view of life--and to deal respectfully with those other views which are present, both in the subject-matter at hand and among his students in that classroom; first, as a contribution to the clarity each student needs for the growth and increasing strength of his own meanings, and second, as a model of the respect for varying views of life which is required of citizens in a multanimous society.[36]

We get some clue to the kind of learning, the kind of campus climate, which can result from willingness on the part of teachers to deal quite explicitly with metaphysical issues, if we look at a study of Wheaton College of Illinois. The study, conducted by Morris Keeton of Antioch and Conrad Hilberry of Kalamazoo, was part of a two-year, Carnegie-funded project on the future of the liberal arts college. Here is Keeton's summary:

> One of our reasons for studying Wheaton College...was to inquire how its intense evangelical Protestant commitment interacts with its academic aspirations. In some respects we found inquiry restricted. Radical speakers are not often given audience on the campus, the literature magazine does submit to a kind of censorship, and some scientists are embarrassed and perhaps hampered in their work by the trustees' insistence on a simple and explicit doctrine of creation. But far more important, we felt, was the impetus that religious conviction gives to students' learning. The brighter students, at any rate, read philosophy, psychology, anthropology, and theology with a passion that we have seldom encountered at secular schools. These are not simply studies. They are arguments that will confirm or challenge beliefs students build their lives on.
>
> Colleges may be so rigidly doctrinaire that they shut off learning, but this danger has been over-emphasized, with the result that some schools eschew convictions that might fire controversy and discovery among students on the campus.[37]

I am still waiting for a liberal arts college to dare the experiment of commiting itself to metaphysical seriousness without the doctrinal conformity Wheaton requires. While I suspect that the result might be intellectually hectic, I also suspect that the level of excitement generated by investing intellectual inquiry with a significance at once intimate and ultimate would have a profound and permanent effect on students, far beyond any depth or persistence which appears to result from our conventional arrangements.

If that were to happen, then it is clear that teachers would have to become more self-conscious professionally--in the best sense of that term--about themselves as centers of meaning and value than they have customarily been. I find it particularly interesting, in the midst of this discussion of metaphysical seriousness in the college, and of the concern for moral seriousness which precipitated it, to note that educational researcher and philosopher Warren Bryan Martin has recently issued a call to teachers to develop a capacity to assess their own lives "religiously," and to do so precisely in the interest of increasing their professionalism.[38] Martin, himself no conventional religionist, makes it clear that he is not necessarily talking about religion in its common institutional forms; rather, his call represents "a claim for the importance of 'oughtness'....for the importance of why, not only how....for the primacy of the search for meaning."[39]

The "religious" teacher-scholar, in Martin's view, has resources for humanistic teaching which others do not possess. He knows, for example, that the subject-matter competence of his students is never enough, because "most decisions in judicial cases are ethical decisions put in legal terms," because "two-thirds of the decisions made by doctors are more in the realm of ethics and morality than in the realm of science and technology," and because much the same thing can be said of most other areas of activity engaged in by educated men and women. He knows about the connection between standards and values--"values defined as standards held with conviction"--and of the importance of standards in a time of permissiveness. He has a sense of history--more precisely, an understanding of tragedy--which includes the intractability of the past and the inscrutability of the future. He has learned to live with mystery and awe, and thus to break out of the "single vision" of a narrow scientism and to live with the "multiple vision" exemplified by a William Blake. He knows that "factual knowledge profits the personality only when it is turned to personal knowledge." And in a related understanding, he knows that the test of true professionalism is its devotion to human service, with job become vocation. So, for an authentic professional, authority

> is technical competence combined with human sensibilities. It means knowing a subject, a skill, quite well, and also knowing how to apply it to the interests of others....The professional needed today will demonstrate his or her authority in service that may be specialized but never contrived.[40]

Teaching understood, thus, "religiously" as a calling (and not merely as a position to be occupied, i.e., an occupation), whose service is defined by a commitment to humane learning, impresses me as the imperative need of liberal education wherever it is practiced: in institutions that are non-sectarian and church-related, independent and tax-supported, whether liberal arts colleges or community colleges. That kind of teaching ought to be the mark of our distinctness among all other forms of learning.

V.

What can be done explicitly--not, now, at the level of the pre-moral, but in full and direct confrontation with the issues themselves--to create within a college the conditions for moral learning?

It is easy to be misunderstood on the point. The intellectual trend of our times has been toward an ethical neutralism. I recall vividly the comment of a historian-colleague, to the effect that he would trust no history of the Reformation written either by a Protestant or a Roman Catholic. Indeed, so passionately have some intellectuals attempted to maintain an avowed detachment, that they have reacted with peculiar animus toward any colleague who might dare an ethical question, to say nothing of venturing an ethical opinion,

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in intellectual discourse. The moral irony of this--that such passion, and even a reasonably dispassionate detachment, are both overt and authentic ethical positions; that is, they represent preferences held with conviction--seems to have escaped its practitioners. It did not occur to my colleague, that what a non-Protestant or non-Roman Catholic historian brings to the history of the Reformation is not an absence of value, but only a difference of value, and that he would have to struggle as hard to make his non-religiously formed judgments (perhaps even his irreligious judgments) reliable as would the religionists.

If detachment and passionate denial are intended to protect students against any effort at ethical constraint by teachers and administrators, then the motivation is admirable even though, in my view, its method is misconceived. If, on the other hand, detachment and passionate denial are intended, more basically, as an effort to avoid even having any ethical influence on students, then the motivation is naive or nerveless, and in either case its consequences are likely to be mischievous. Influence is the teacher's stock-in-trade. If influence is absent, then nothing can be taught, and nothing will be learned. The question for teaching is not whether there shall be influence, but rather what kind of influence it shall be.

So the question with which I began this section--What can be done explicitly to create within a college the conditions for moral learning?--can only be answered adequately once it is understood that some kind of learning about moral choices and styles will go on in the college, whether administrators and teachers plan for it or not. What sometimes happens is that students adopt a cynicism about, or even hostility to, ethical considerations. That may be, in part, because a professional disinterestedness--chosen as a deliberate pedagogical stance by teachers who are, in other respects, persons of moral principle--looks on its surface very much like a personal indifference, whose source is moral insensitivity and obtuseness. The confusion of the two is assured by the fact that permitting students to see beneath the professional stance would dissolve its pedagogical purpose.

The question for a college, therefore, is not whether there shall be moral learning, but rather what kind of moral learning there shall be. I believe that the most educationally appropriate role for a college in the explicit moral growth of its students can be outlined in these six objectives:

--*to achieve a growing clarity* about moral issues, implications, and alternatives;

--*to sharpen judgment* through practice in tracing the consequences of varying moral choices;

--*to enrich experience* by active participation in situations where significant moral choices must be made and consequences lived with;

--*to accept responsibility*, not because it is an obligation but because it is a fact ("we *are* the responsible doers of whatever we do"[41]);

--*to develop a stabilizing body of conviction* as the outgrowth of clarity, judgment, experience, and responsibility; and

--*to find the courage to act consistently on conviction* through membership in personal-support groups.

It remains, in this chapter, to suggest in outline form some of the specific ways in which these objectives for moral learning can be realized.

In the classroom. A general education sequence can be designed to yield the objectives identified above. Concerned academics can build them systematically into any undergraduate major, whether a traditional disciplinary concentration or a topically-organized depth study, with no loss of academic content and rigor. In fact, such objectives can increase the usefulness of the major as a personally, as well as intellectually, integrating experience, and can heighten the student's sense of an importance in the major area of study reaching well beyond classroom and college. An imaginative teacher may find it possible to adopt all six of these objectives in a single course; several of them are clearly relevant to virtually every offering in the curriculum.

Here, specifically, are some of the things a teacher can do in standard classroom and laboratory settings to increase the moral learning of students:

1. Make it a standard practice to draw explicit attention to the moral motivations, implications, and consequences which are resident within the subject-matter under study, and expect students to practice the skills of analysis, reflection, and articulation by means of which they can learn increasingly to identify that moral content for themselves. Demonstration by the student of his ability to identify such content should be one of the standard ways of determining his satisfactory performance in the course.

2. Utilizing the subject-matter at hand, give students practice under criticism in making their own provisional moral choices, in clarifying the bases of those choices, and in tracing their likely consequences. This is particularly important in professional and pre-professional courses (e.g., business, education, nursing, journalism, etc.) where students ought to be faced with the ethical dilemmas and demands of professional practice.

3. Be sure that students are increasingly competent to deal with "divergent" problems as well as with "convergent" ones.[42] There is a tendency in undergraduate courses to deal almost exclusively with the latter; that is, with problems which have commonly agreed upon answers which can be transmitted to the student by text and lecture, and which the student can reflect back again on examination. In contrast, divergent problems do not have commonly agreed upon answers; they are too large, or too complex, or too deeply rooted

in human or cosmic mystery, to admit of consensus. Answers must, indeed, be fashioned, since divergent problems constitute the most critical and important issues, alike for an academic discipline as for a society; and it is in struggling with and answering the divergent problems of their lives that men and women display most clearly the distinctive cast of their own intellect, character, and culture.

The graduates in Douglas Heath's sample attested that one of the places where their Haverford education had failed them was in their ability to make decisions in the presence of inadequate information. Though he did not use the term, Heath concluded from his study that teaching at Haverford is excessively convergent.[43] Whenever a decision must be made, for which the information at hand (that is, the convergent data) is insufficient, we must extrapolate that decision from our organized core of values, which is the only reliable base we have from which to move off into the relatively uncertain or unknown. Two things are therefore required for mature competence in handling divergent problems: one is that we have such a core, and the other is that we be practiced at its extrapolation. The academic classroom strikes me as an ideal setting for such development: its subject-matter presents a range of highly significant divergent issues; the classroom itself can offer a safe environment for experimenting with varying, even incompatible, value options and for practicing their translation into concrete decision; and the presence of the teacher provides a constructive and reinforcing criticism which can turn into learning what might otherwise be mere arbitrary or random process.

4. Deal openly with your own commitments, particularly in relation to the subject-matter under study, thus providing students with a model of mature moral seriousness. To the extent that teaching is properly defined as "truth

mediated by personality," we cannot avoid a personal as well as a professional role for the teacher in providing for the moral learning of his students, as for any other kind of learning. There is, of course, a standing disagreement within the academic community over the degree to which a teacher may properly expose personal preferences and predilections in the classroom. It has always seemed to me that a teacher has an obligation to make his point of view clear to students precisely in the interest of greater objectivity in teaching. If it is important that I attempt to control my own biases and to make adjustment for them in the presentation of others' ideas, it is at least equally important that those I teach should be aware of my biases in order to make their own adjustments for them. The teacher who deliberately tries to lead students to the uncritical adoption of his own point of view is certainly not a fit teacher; but I have serious reservation as well about the qualifications of the teacher who is frightened lest anyone should adopt his point of view and who seeks systematically to exclude it from his teaching. In the learning process, it may be quite important for some students to adopt the teacher's point of view *provisionally*. It gives a student at least a temporary place to stand, and having such a place may be the only hope of his moving on to a position more distinctively his own.

5. *Do not make extravagant claims for the "objectivity"--that is, for the value-free, moral innocence--of scholarly, and even of scientific, activity*. Kenneth Boulding has some important things to say about the "myth" that the physical and biological sciences are engaged simply in "discovering knowledge about an objectively unchangeable world." Though that view may once have been plausible, it is less and less so.

> The learning process of science is now running into two serious difficulties. The first might be called the generalized Heisenberg principle.

> When we are trying to obtain knowledge about a system by changing its inputs and outputs of information, these inputs and outputs will change the system itself, and under some circumstances they may change it radically....
>
> The second difficulty is that as science develops it no longer merely investigates the world; it creates the world which it is investigating....[for example, as biology studies] the evolutionary process by actively engaging in it, and changing its course.

The social sciences, in Boulding's view, need a similar demythologization:

> ...one can defend the proposition that [in the social sciences] most of what we can really know is what we create ourselves and that prediction in social systems can be achieved only by setting up consciously created systems which will make the predictions come true. Knowledge of random systems can only be obtained by destroying them, that is, by taking the randomness out of them.

For Boulding, the moral in these observations is not far to seek:

> We cannot escape the proposition that as science moves from pure knowledge toward control, that is, toward creating what it knows, what it creates becomes a problem of ethical choice....When...knowledge changes the world the question of the content of the common values, both of the subculture which is producing knowledge and of the total society in which that subculture is embedded, becomes of acute importance. Under these circumstances the concept of a value-free science is absurd, for the whole future of science may well rest in our ability to resolve the ethical conflicts which the growth of knowledge is now creating.[44]

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If we fail to give undergraduates this kind of scientific and moral wisdom, we ill equip them to play an informed and constructive role either as citizens or as scientists.

6. *Invest subject-matter with a quality of urgency and immediacy, as something which matters in what Whitehead called "an insistent present*." One of the essential ingredients in growth toward moral maturity is a developing sense of personal responsibility; and nothing mitigates and compromises that development in students more than the notion (commonly held by teachers and students alike), that an undergraduate education is primarily "preparation for later on." In Will Oursler's novel, *New York, New York*, one character spoke for many a college student: "'*Someday* I may do something terribly important,' Jackie told him solemnly. 'That's what I'm working on now. Thinking I've got to think it all out, so I won't make a mistake." Students who go through four years of college wondering when life will begin, very soon become business and professional men and women wondering when life will begin. There is a character in one of Sartre's stories who illustrates the tragedy--the irresponsibility, if you will--of life postponed. A professor who is not really a man because he has never chosen in a concrete moment to be a man, he is therefore nothing; and when he comes to the full realization of his nothingness, he says, "I have led a toothless life. I have never bitten into anything. I was waiting. I was saving myself for later on, and I have just noticed that my teeth are gone." It is a disservice to students, and a barrier to their growth in responsibleness, when we fail to make it clear to them that there are important things to be done which matter *now*, important problems to be solved *now*, important commitments to be made *now*. It happens that there is also an important pedagogical principle at stake here: "The only use of a knowledge of the past is to equip us for the present," wrote Alfred North Whitehead. "No

more deadly harm can be done to young minds than by depreciation of the present. The present contains all that there is. It is holy ground; for it is the past, and it is the future."[45] Humanistic teaching and learning ought to offer the exhilaration of a *present* obligation, and not merely the promise of some distant, future accomplishment.

7. *Make it possible for the classroom to become a real community, within which men and women learn how to take chances; where they are assured of support and encouragement both when they share the majority's view, and when they choose to differ; where majorities are required to be respectful and not merely whelming, and where minorities are expected to be responsible and not merely defiant*.

In other organized learning activities. Colleges typically offer a variety of organized learning activities in addition to the standard classroom and laboratory. Two of these in particular can have a substantial influence on the quality of moral seriousness on the campus:

8. *Where a college provides a platform for forthright advocates of a wide variety of points of view, such advocacy helps to create an informed understanding of the conflict of ideas in our time; strengthens the continuity between the campus and other worlds of commitment; generates broad moral discourse on the campus across the lines of specialization which commonly isolate academic men and women; enlarges the availability to students of what William James called "living options," and challenges the options offered elsewhere in the college--especially in the classroom--to greater aliveness; and increases the student's contact with convictional persons*.

Something more needs to be said on that final point. No one is born with convictions. We learn what it means to hold a conviction in the presence of convictional persons, not necessarily at all by adopting their points of view, but rather by imitating their behavior. I can trace my own convictional development quite clearly to certain persons in my past and present history, not because I now share their convictional content (those contents were, in many cases, at odds with each other), but rather because from them I learned a convictional style. Without at all giving classroom teachers a good conscience about their customary reticence when it comes to personal disclosure, we ought at the same time to be sure that undergraduates have regular contact on the campus with persons from outside academic life, who can supplement the convictional models available within the campus itself.

9. The increasingly common practice of undergraduate colleges in offering students a variety of learning environments away from the campus, as complements to the standard classroom and laboratory, is rich with promise for morally serious learning. That variety often includes cross-cultural immersion; internships, practicums, and supervised field-education related to academic specializations; cooperative education, whether discipline-oriented or not; and human service activities. The promise of moral growth which is resident in each of these is most likely to be achieved, not when that process is left wholly to chance, but when those who sponsor and supervise extra-mural education take an active role in helping students, first to anticipate, then to interpret, and finally to assess the moral quality of these learning experiences. What I wrote in the preceding chapter is also to the point here: that undergraduates ought to be allowed to experience the ambiguities, the agonies, and the satisfactions of real moral choice. This kind of learning can only occur where men and women feel directly the pull of competing and contending loyalties, where information must be worried into priorities, and where decisions have consequences. In such circumstances particularly, clarity,

judgment, experience, responsibility, conviction, and courage can begin in a student to take on a living unity.

In the college at large. It is not simply by the influence of formal learning activities, whether in standard classroom and laboratory, or in non-conventional learning environments, that moral seriousness can be affected, but by the influence as well of the college as a corporate presence, as a society, if you will. In concluding this discussion of moral seriousness and personal learning, therefore, I want to offer three suggestions for corporate affirmation:

10. *Moral seriousness is aided by the clear statement of those distinctive values around which a college is gathered and which give it corporate identity*. There are at least three reasons why we have sometimes lost our nerve at the point of attempting to clarify and to articulate the overarching intellectual and ethical commitments of the institution. One is fear that commitment may be inimical to academic effectiveness and integrity. Second is concern lest commitment be divisive within the college community. And third is a simple desire to avoid the agony and desperately hard work that go with any carefully thought out and worked through consensus on principle, whether educational or any other. Then perhaps we can best approach this issue by trying to see what happen to effectiveness, integrity, and community when clear institutional commitments are absent.

One of the consequences of nondescriptness was pointed out by John Gardner a decade ago, when he observed how increasingly difficult it is to identify the modern college and university. As "industry and government, with their huge research and education programs, come to look more and more like universities," and as"universities with their worldly interests come to look more and more like the rest of society," Gardner held that it becomes harder and harder to tell just "what is university and what is non-university." Gardner's observation alarmed economist Walter Adams, of Michigan State, and English professor Adrian Jaffe, formerly of the University of Michigan. There is only one way to maintain a clear distinction between university and non-university, Adams and Jaffe insisted: "[Educational] institutions, no less than individuals, require a clear sense of identity, and a commitment to a belief system which can serve as a blue-print for relating to their environment."[46] Effectiveness is compromised, for individuals as for institutions, when there is no clear sense of identity by means of which to mark off one's own incorporated reality from an impinging world.

A second consequence of nondescriptness lies in the contradictions it regularly creates. Those contradictions are described by a teacher of literature in one of our distinguished private colleges, who, after participating in an institutional self-study, wrote this:

> There is danger in becoming so prescriptive that an institution becomes a mere propagandizer, and no longer an institution engaged in the task of inquiry. Yet the opposite has its limitations too. How "open" can a college be without becoming aimless and sterile?...It seems to me that an institution would have a difficult time promoting a general "sense of commitment" [in its students] if by its institutional actions it did not demonstrate a commitment to something more specific than "a sense of commitment." If it is imperative for an institution of learning to be examining every phase of life and thought, and thus even re-examining periodically the aims and values which prompt their decisions, it is equally imperative that it clarify and present openly the aims and values to which it is currently committed.

A third consequence of nondescriptness is that it robs the college of a vitality which comes from a continuing dialogue about larger meanings. Warren Bryan Martin has reported that research findings

> support what the history of education suggests, namely, that the vitality of an educational philosophy develops in direct proportion to the meanings it offers and the challenges it faces. The best educational environment is one in which there are both those who say, "We have answers," and those who say, "We have questions." Commitment benefits by criticism, for thus commitment is exercised. Criticism needs commitment; it works only in the context of real alternatives. And creativity needs both. It begins in criticism, yet at the same time, its own validation depends on comparison. Colleges and universities, like persons, can thrive on the tensions of comparisons and change if meaning can be assigned to their struggles. Men, like their muscles, go flabby in a tensionless state; but men, unlike body tissue, need meaning as well as movement for social well-being. Thus, our interest is in academic programs with distinctions that matter. Differences that make no difference, William James used to argue, are not differences.[47]

If Martin's research findings are correct, then instead of compromising academic effectiveness and integrity, institutional commitment is precisely one of the necessary conditions for such effectiveness and integrity. Rather than being divisive, it provides a unifying sense of direction and purpose as important to those who may not sympathize with it as those who do. And if such commitment comes only out of agonizing struggle, that agony may be preferable to a disspiriting and demoralizing normlessness.

And what--this ought to be the fundamental consideration--is likely to be the effect on student development of our reluctance, and especially of our unwillingness or failure, to engage the intellectually and morally demanding task

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of working at clear institutional value-commitments? Again, Warren Bryan Martin has answered that question persuasively for me:

> In most universities today the value consensus at the institutional center and the near anarchy with regard to norms and models everywhere else leave the student either with no definite standard against which to test himself or only the value presuppositions of various departments--unexamined within many departments and often conflicting among departments--out of which to devise some sort of total configurational awareness. The result is an identity crisis for the institution and a disintegrative learning experience for the students.[48]

In attempting to get a handle on an admittedly difficult task, I suggest starting with the 12 propositions with which I began this chapter. I believe there is, as I asserted at the outset, "a considerable working consensus among professional educators in institutions public and private" gathered around those propositions. The problem is that it is a "working" consensus, in the sense that the propositions inform the practical, day-to-day discrete activities of individual teachers and academic administrators; it is not, for the most part, a conscious consensus--and therefore lacks both visibility and power--because, as professional colleagues, we have not commonly engaged in organized, serious, and systematic conversation about it.

If my perception of the existence of this practical consensus is accurate, it ought to be possible to reach open and reasonably common agreement about most of those propositions with relative ease. Having done so will provide an indispensable base for a college: it will begin the habit of such conversation among colleagues; the experienced ability to work through to agreement will legitimize the process and demonstrate that it is manageable; and the substantive agreements themselves will form a common ground for moving on to engage the more distinctive commitments in that college's own peculiar approach to, and understanding of, the purposes of undergraduate learning.

11. It is essential that a college demonstrate institutional integrity--and thereby to sanction and encourage the integral behavior of its students--by being sure that regulations are consistent with announced standards, and by further assurance that--in the light of standards and regulations--persons are dealt with consistently, fairly, and with a right to have reasons given when decisions go against them. Nothing is more de-moralizing and inimical to the development in students of consistency and integrity of behavior than the experienced dissonance of institutional promises and performances, or the protected carelessness and arbitrariness of teachers and administrators. Catalog pronouncements about "respect for the individual" are mocked wherever students receive inattentive, careless, even rude treatment in administrative offices, and whenever they are the objects of haughty, authoritarian, even contemptuous behavior on the part of teachers. Experiences such as these are powerfully educative, but of course in a twisted and dysfunctional way. Every college needs regular and reliable means for getting inside of what Douglas Heath calls "the phenomenology of the student experience" in that place--formal and informal sensing devices to feel out the dissonances in the interest of achieving a greater integrity of institutional character.

More subtle, but no less disintegral, dissonances are often located in a common confusion about the relationship between standards and regulations. Those two are not the same thing, since regulations are conventions which are valid only when they give sanction and effect to standards. One of the reasons why college regulations, whether academic or social, are often educationally ineffective and win the contempt of students, is that the college has made no effort to clarify what standards--what clear educational principles--its regulations are intended to commend. The truth is likely to be that some of its regulations are merely intended to make things easier for teachers and administrators, or represent unacknowledged taste legislation, and could not be justified on principled grounds in any event.

When I had newly moved into the academic dean's office a few years back, a student came to me to complain about a regulation which had been adopted by the faculty in the spring before my coming. The regulation, which had to do with the somewhat more liberal treatment of D grades brought in by transfer students, was made effective with those students transferring into the college that fall but was not made retroactive to those currently enrolled who had transferred in at an earlier date. He wanted to know why; and so, the more I thought about it, did I. At the first meeting of the faculty's Educational Policies Committee, where the new regulation had originated, I asked what was educationally at issue in making the provision non-retroactive. The immediate response was that, if the new rule were made to apply to all transfer students already in the college, the registrar's office would be swamped with requests for transcript re-evaluation. "I am afraid you haven't understood my question," I told the committee. "What is educationally at issue in making the regulation non-retroactive? I take it that the purpose of regulations is to give effect to educationally desirable standards, rather than to serve the convenience of teachers and administrators." There was, of course, nothing educationally at issue in the non-retroactivity; it was, rather, a bald instance of faculty-sanctioned administrative arbitrariness, and I am pleased to say that the matter was altered at the next faculty meeting.

Until overwhelming experience persuades us otherwise, we do well to proceed on the principle that whatever is educationally desirable is instructionally and administratively feasible.

In a morally serious college, we must be sure that equity for persons and concern for the integrity of the learning process always take precedence over the convenience of teachers and administrators or considerations of institutional prerogative.

12. Finally, a college needs occasions, ritual and symbolic, in which to present and re-present, to enact and re-enact, the central values which invest it with peculiar significance, unity, and power. In a significant essay on the meaning of public ceremonial, Edward Shils and Michael Young have noted a permanent truth about the human condition:

> Life in a community is not only necessary to man for the genetic development of his human qualities. Society is necessary to man as an object of his higher evaluations and attachments, and without it man's human qualities could not find expression. The polis or community is not just a group of concrete and particular persons; it is, more fundamentally, a group of persons acquiring their significance by their conformity with standards and rules from which they derive their dignity....
>
> ...there is a recurrent need in men to reaffirm the rightness of the moral rules by which they live or feel they ought to live.[49]

And in further specification, they cite the view of French sociologist Emile Durkheim. "There can be no society," Durkheim wrote,

> which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which make its unity and its personality. Now this moral remaking cannot be achieved except by means of reunions, assemblies and meetings where the individuals, being closely united to one another, reaffirm in common their common sentiments; hence come ceremonies which do not differ from regular religious ceremonies, either in their object, the results which they produce, or

the processes employed to attain these results.[50]

The effect of such ceremonial events, according to Shils and Young, is not only to instruct but also to renew and empower:

> Connection with the symbols of morality or proximity to them...reinforces the strength which the individual can muster from his own resources to keep the moral law uppermost. It re-establishes the preponderance of positive devotion to the moral rules to enter into contract with them in their purest form. Contact with them in their most sacred form--as principles, or when symbolized in ritual activities, or when preached in moving sermons or speeches--renews their potency and makes the individual feel that he is in 'good relations' with the sacred, as well as safe from his own sacrilegious tendencies.[51]

All of which appears, on the face of it, to be bad news for colleges, in view of what Shils and Young describe as "the rationalistic bias of educated persons in the present century, particularly those of radical or liberal persuasion," which bias produces "abhorrence towards manifestations of popular devotion to any institution which cannot recommend itself to secular utilitarianism."[52] Evidence for the accuracy of their observation is to be found in the steady decline, and in some places the virtual disappearance, of college ceremonial which began in the immediate post-WW II period. It is also negative evidence for the accuracy of their insistence on the unifying effect of public ritual, that this decline coincides with the gradual intellectual and ethical disintegration of educational communities, culminating in nearly a decade of disruption beginning in the early 1960s, from which we are still struggling to recover.

However that may be, I cannot escape the conviction that we shall not succeed in a commitment to full moral seriousness in the college--and indeed, that we shall not experience our gathered wholeness--until we find ways, new or renewed, to celebrate its commitments in centered acts of drama and declaration. It is not fully clear to me how this is to be done: and indeed, the peculiar history, character, and collective predilection of each institution must be taken account of in the doing of it. What is clear to me is that the reintroduction of academic ritual merely for its own sake will not work. Meaningless ceremony and banal rhetoric deserve the contempt they get.

If there is to be genuine celebration, I suspect it can come about only in a common rediscovery--for some, discovery for the first time--of those historically, intellectually, morally transcendent purposes which bring us together and hold us together, and which have the power, once we acknowledge them, of investing the work of student, teacher, and administrator with a largeness and a depth we have not often experienced.

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NOTES

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PART THREE

A Test Case

Chapter Five

CAREER PREPARATION IN HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE

I.

The major educational and imaginal test--and the major social-policy test, as well--which liberal arts colleges are facing in the present decade is whether or not they will be able to fashion curricular programs which offer men and women humanistic preparation for the worlds of job and work.

Failure to find ways in which the liberal and the useful can be combined with intellectual and practical power will create a vacuum, into which those will be able to push who, urged along by popular prejudice and job-market logic, are content to serve narrow uses devoid of humanistic influence.

Should that happen to any general degree, the damage to the liberal tradition in American higher education would be all but irreversible, with lasting and deleterious effects on the professional competence of generations of American men and women.

~~At the moment, the signs are not propitious.~~ In many places an imaginal vacuum already exists, into which the careerists have pushed, too often with specious consequence. For example:

Career programs are commonly created out of courses which are already being taught in the college, but with no effort to redesign those existing courses in order to insure their maximum contribution to career competences. Psychological insight and a reasonable psychological sophistication are surely desirable, even essential, traits in a law-enforcement officer; but it is highly unlikely that such insight and sophistication will result from requiring the criminal-justice major to take a standard course in General Psychology, especially if the course is taught from a physiological and experimental point of view, and in any event is primarily intended by the Psychology Department to serve as the first course in the sequence for psychology majors.

Many career programs are properly characterized as "single-outcome training," a term I introduced in the first chapter of this book. That is, they are concentrated upon the narrow career end, to the virtual exclusion of larger human ends without which the career itself will be impoverished; and often concentrated even more narrowly upon job-entry, to the virtual exclusion of the larger competences needed for job advancement or for occupational change, without which job-entry is a dead-end.

In a period of history when the average worker changes careers four times, it is simply fraudulent to claim that programs which offer "single-outcome training" represent career preparation in any defensible sense.

Career programs sometimes promise, at least implicitly, more than they can deliver. If not clearly told otherwise, students make the assumption that if they major in a career program--for example, in social work, or the health sciences, or dance or art therapy--in a regionally-accredited liberal arts college, they will of course be qualified upon graduation for entry-level professional employment, or for admission to recognized graduate programs in those specialized fields. Why else, they might understandably reason, would their college offer them such programs? They may discover too late that, in spite of the college's regional accreditation, degrees or majors are of dubious value, whether for employment or advanced study, from programs that have been hastily constructed, are not taught by fully-qualified professionals, and have failed to win accreditation by the specialized agencies (for example, the Council on Social Work Education) which have been set up for quality-control by the professions themselves.

Even if it were desirable to shape the liberal arts curriculum by projected manpower needs, many experts have been warning us that the effort is perilous. Speaking at a major national conference on higher education, Willard Wirtz, board chairman of the National Manpower Institute and former Secretary of Labor, had this to

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say:

> It has become increasingly clear that even a perfect matching of preparation and identifiable employment opportunities would leave a serious gap. The sterner truth has emerged: There is not today and will not be as long as we stay on our present course enough employment to absorb all the young people whose training was based on the prospect of a certain kind of employment.[1]

Indeed, the effort to match educational policy to manpower projections, and curriculum to the marketplace, is almost sure to result in disappointment, according to Howard Bowen, a distinguished economist who has recently been focussing his attention on policy issues in higher education. Says Bowen,

> Despite the current fad of futurism, an estimate of the detailed specifications of the economy over several decades is clearly beyond reach. Future skill requirements are quite indefinite: They depend on whether the nation is at war or peace; exploring space, oceans, and the earth's interior; concentrating on domestic problems, such as the environment, the city, and early childhood education; emphasizing private consumption of material goods or personal services. They also depend on whether unforeseen technological changes give rise to new occupations or eliminate old ones; whether the country decides to reap more of its riches in the form of leisure and less in products; whether leisure is devoted to contemplative and artistic pursuits rather than conventional recreation and entertainment; whether production methods change to deemphasize assembly lines and repetitive operations and emphasize more creativity and meaning in work.

Furthermore, says Bowen, the character of future manpower needs is not simply an outside influence which will shape the educational enterprise willy-nilly; rather the character of those needs will be shaped by what the colleges and universities do.

Manpower requirements depend on what the country wants to do. Indeed,

> what the country wants to do or can do will be affected by the kind of manpower available--by the way people have been educated, by the values they cherish, by the tasks they think worth accomplishing....[2]

So, rather than accepting our victimization by social circumstance--rather than yielding to that current curricular fadishness which finds in proliferated career programs the answer to a public demand for "useful" learning--we need to find the courage and the intelligence to take a more assertive and activist role in the interplay between the college and the culture, toward the end of predisposing the growth and extension within the larger social order of those humanistic values with which the liberal professions have traditionally been identified--values to which the liberal arts college has peculiar access and which give it its peculiar animation.

Given the humanistic-educational legitimacy of a college's concern to produce useful learning--a legitimacy which I have sought at some length to demonstrate elsewhere in this volume--and given as well the brief critique of some existing undergraduate career programs which this present section of comment has offered, it is now possible to suggest some approaches a college might take in addressing the legitimate career needs of its students, with concern for the integrity of its own liberal arts character, and equally with regard for the larger human interests of its students and the larger social values of work.

II.

Preparation of men and women for the professions is, in fact, one of the most venerable purposes for which the college of liberal arts and sciences has existed, however much the embattled "purists" among its ranks may now prefer to think otherwise.

Philosopher Alburey Castell has written that, in tracing the liberal tradition from Plato and Aristotle into the present, one must conclude that "its essential job, the task which has renewed its hold on existence, has been to provide a relevant edu-

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cation for what I think may be referred to as the professional and managerial classes of each generation."[3] The 1701 Connecticut legislation which led to the founding of Yale College specified an institution "wherein Youth may be instructed in the Arts and Sciences who thorough [sic] the blessings of Almighty God may be fitted for Publick employment both in Church and in Civil State." So Frederick Rudolph, in his history of the American undergradatue curriculum, identifies it as the original purpose of the colonial colleges "to qualify a governing elite for carrying forward the society that had created the colleges in the first place as guarantees of their own permanence."[4]

In the earlier years of American education, only three professions were recognized as "learned," requiring formal study: ministry, medicine, and law. Other occupations were entered through apprenticeship or on-the-job training. But it was precisely the role of the newer colleges--Cornell was a leading exemplar--to break with that older tradition and to incorporate into their curricula preparation for occupations which were, with the advent of new applied knowledge, on their way to becoming professions. In effect, the newer colleges and universities virtually "certified" the emergent professions, says Frederick Rudolph, with the schools used as "environments in which was determined who the professionals would be and how they would be trained."[5] With some visible exceptions, the American college in our own century perpetuates what Cornell began, with curricula which range from pre-professional, where academic traditionalists are still in control, to those which offer a first professional degree in places where the control of traditionalists has been compromised or displaced.

In an earlier period of our social history, this alliance between the liberal arts colleges and the so-called liberal professions made a great deal of sense. When general practice was the predominant mode of professional activity, practitioners had to deal in relatively holistic terms with the needs of client or patient, and the versatility promised by the humane curriculum seemed the ideal preparation for and comple-

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ment to more specialized professional education. But in more recent times, that state of things has altered dramatically, both in the professions generally and in the colleges specifically. Specialization, based on intellectual and technical advances, has now come to be valued above general practice as the most highly regarded, and the most highly rewarded, mode of professional activity. In consequence, many professionals have only a very limited and specialized contact with patient or client, in contrast to the holism of general practice, with some professionals, whose work is substantially mediated by paper or by machines, scarcely ever having face-to-face contact with patient or client.

Under these circumstances, practicing professionals and the educators of professionals have become more and more impatient with anything which distracts the professional-in-preparation from single-minded concentration on subject-matter specialization; and as this emphasis has increased, attention to the humane dimensions both of professional preparation and of practice has declined precipitously. Humane learning, once the hallmark and indispensable base of the supposedly learned and humane professions, has now become a dispensable luxury.

The colleges themselves, scarcely immune to developments within the larger social history, have mirrored this phenomenon. Their own professionals--the teaching faculty--have exhibited the same growing predilection, giving their loyalties less and less to the student approached as a whole person, or to the college's holistic purposes for learning; more and more to their own narrowly-specialized role in the training of that student, to the department of the discipline, and to disciplinary aggrandizement within the overall curriculum. Indeed, the colleges have done more than mirror the phenomenon; for, by virtue of their central place within the system which produces professionals, they have actively confirmed and perpetuated it.

It might be assumed that increasing technical knowledge would result in more effective professional practice, but more recently thoughtful professionals and professional educators have come to doubt it. At the conclusion of an eight-year study, Dr. John Rhoads of the Duke University School of Medicine found that those medical students who ranked highest in their science courses (usually considered the litmus of medical-student quality) received lower than average ratings in their clinical work. Says Dr. Rhoads, "their performance with patients was subtly disturbing because they appeared to be uninterested in patients as people."[6] And in this, of course, they were simply mirroring the dominant ethos of their formal training. Dr. Paul Sanazaro has pointed out that medical school graduates "have a focus that doesn't really orient them to the problems of practice," because "they have not had the opportunity to view medical illness and its consequences in the individual families the way it occurs in practice."[7] And commenting on the experience of pediatricians, which he believes is common to other specialists as well, Dr. George Harrell notes, "They are only spending a third of their time in practice with the types of problems that they thought, even as post-graduate students, they would be dealing with."[8] As a result of the preoccupation with medicine understood as a science, says social ethicist Kenneth Underwood, "Physicians have not been prepared to deal with families, with nonspecific disturbances, with the social consequences of illness, and with all the other factors of practice which cannot be easily objectified [i.e., dealt with in a strict scientific manner]."[9]

Yet, an inability on the part of the physician to understand his patient--and indeed to understand himself as physician--in terms which are larger than this immediate and isolated encounter with a set of peculiar symptomatic conditions, may actually be disabling, perhaps even fatal. For, says Evan Patishall of Hershey Medical School,

> The values of society permeate medicine....And in fact these [rather than considerations of microbiology or pathology] may be the most important factors in his making a decision about what questions to ask the patient, about what he should do with a particular patient.[10]

Conventional medical education to the contrary notwithstanding, the practice of medicine is seldom a neat science. Says medical school dean George Harrell:

> The doctor must take the data he collects on an individual patient from a variety of methods and try to apply them in a variable system. This leads to criteria of action that no one with any conceivable stretch of the imagination could accept as scientific. The application of data to the study of the individual patient is no science and never will be. In the inherent nature of things, medicine is an art.
>
> [Both the medical student and the medical educator must develop] an increasing awareness...of the variety of ways of knowing and acting in his own work and life.[11]

The American Medical Association's Citizens Commission on Graduate Medical Education agreed:

> What is needed--and what the medical schools and teaching hospitals must try to develop--is a body of information and general principles concerning man as a whole and man in society that will provide an intellectual framework into which the lessons of practical experience can be fitted. This background will be partly biological, but partly it will be social and humanistic, for it will deal with man as a total, complex, integrated, social being.[12]

What is true of medicine appears to be true as well in the newer professional field of business management, where technical information and skills have been emphasized, especially in undergraduate programs, to the near-exclusion of other competences effective managers need. The executive director of management training for a nation-wide industry recently complained that the "courses found in the average business degree program bear almost no resemblance to the cources which should go into career preparation for business." While he had some criticism for the absence of certain applied courses in the typical undergraduate business curriculum--sales, and retail management, among them--that was not his main criticism. Rather, he said,

> the greatest weakness is the almost total lack of courses related to the subject of the management of people. When one looks at the average business transcript, one wonders who or what the student thought he was going to manage. At least 50% of anyone's success in business depends on his skills in the human aspects of management. This should be at least 50% of the curriculum requirement. Here is where the colleges and universities have such a great opportunity to bring into the business curriculum the insights and knowledge of the behavioral sciences. Yet, it is not uncommon to see a listing of required business courses which do not contain one single course in this area.[13]

The view of this management trainer of the need for human skills to match the manager's technical grasp is confirmed by a psychiatric consultant, whose consulting firm is retained by at least 100 major American corporations. Dr. Stuart Rosenthal of the Levinson Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts, reports that "many executives who are technically competent fail in their jobs because they don't possess 'people skills,'" including the ability to get along with people, "and to motivate subordinates in a humanistic, caring way." In Rosenthal's experience, personal and interpersonal understandings and skills "are the major determinants of whether executives succeed or fail in their jobs."[14]

And there is reason to believe that Andrew Hacker's indictment of professional education in the law is close to the mark. Like doctors and corporate managers, lawyers must develop those larger human qualities most needed for success *after* they enter practice, if at all, since their specialized training neither values those qualities nor provides for their development. For example, says Hacker,

> lawyers are frequently called on to negotiate on behalf of clients: anything from a divorce to a tax assessment, a simple commercial lease to a complex corporate merger. Here the skills are personal, and few law schools try to teach them. They suspect it can't be done; and even if it could, faculty members are disinclined to take the time.[15]

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The purpose of this recital is not merely to point an accusing finger at the graduate-professional establishment in higher education. Rather, there is a moral in these pages which liberal arts educators will ignore at their own peril; it is that, if practicing professionals now commonly lack integrated humanistic understandings, skills, and values, that is not only because their graduate professional education failed to provide them; it is because the liberal arts colleges, from which candidates for professional education overwhelmingly come, also failed to provide them. This is all the more ironic, in view of the fact that the undergraduate liberal arts college has traditionally identified itself, and in its pronouncements continues to identify itself, principally as the locus for just such learning. So what Andrew Hacker has recently called "the shame of professional schools" is our shame too: both they and we "are out of touch with the ordinary conditions of our national life." Says Hacker: to begin, in the education of professionals,

> with mathematical models and biochemical research, or even "legal reasoning," obscures the basic fact that any professional practice is a very human calling. We are turning out professionals who tend to look on people as something of a bother. Not surprisingly, more than a few patients, clients, and customers are beginning to rebel. And time is on their side. With an oversupply of professionals, some [professionals] may forget what they were taught in school and begin to ask how they may be of service.[16]

Given the testimony of recent experience and reflection on what it takes to be a competent professional, on which I have been commenting in this section, I believe the times have created for us a moment of opportunity. Pressed as we are to make liberal learning useful--to give explicit attention to the occupational careers of our students--we now have a chance to design an undergraduate program which will touch professionals-in-preparation at the point of their most critical need: the need for those understandings and skills which will admit them to a professional practice

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which, because it is a fully human calling, is the only fully useful calling--however much it may also require a certain technical competence. Nothing can be more relevant to the needs of our society, or the career effectiveness of our graduates.

In responding to this moment of opportunity, we will be helping to restore to the American professions--and to our own wayward profession among them--a traditional mark they have lately lost: that humanity without which all of their incredible specialized knowledgeableness is at best a blunt instrument, at worst a bludgeon.

And we will be helping to restore, as well, an integrity to liberal education which we are presently in danger of losing, whether th[illegible] comes through retreat into supposedly "purist" notions of "learning for its own [illegible] or by capitulation to inadequate images of its usefulness through retreat into "single-outcome training." For as we have seen, humanism and holism form the two-fold criterion by which the authenticity of liberal learning is to be tested; and on that criterion, either of those alternatives falls of its own dead weight.

In the sections which follow, I shall be suggesting ways to approach the design of a career-relevant program, based on the principles of humanistic curriculum construction identified in the preceding chapters: anthropological distinctness, competences built on a model of adult maturity, and growth toward moral responsibleness.

III.

To the first-order anthropological question, What does it take to live humanly in a humane society? a variety of answers is possible, but one answer strikes me as essential--indeed, as inescapable. That answer is work.

Thomas F. Green of Syracuse University has made an important contribution to understanding the fundamental human (i.e., anthropological) meaning of work. In Green's view, work "is basically the way that people seek to redeem their lives from futility."[17] As further summarized by Arthur Wirth, Green holds that

> A job is what most people do to make a living in the corporate society. If the

> living is made by labor alone, it includes doing tasks that fail to provide a sense of completion or fulfillment. The labor is separate from the personal purposes of the laborer, and it involves low engagement of the self. Its goal is merely income for consumption.
>
> Work, on the other hand, is that productive activity which enriches or sustains life, and in which the worker's purposes and meanings are involved....The quest for work is related to the human quest for potency in which the person may explore his potential, test his limits, be in touch with his powers, and discover his human dignity and worth.[18]

Yet surely work is more, even, than that; for taking Wirth's characterization as an adequate statement, work appears privatized ("his potential...his limits...his powers...his human dignity and worth"), self-absorbed and self-directed. But it is a myth that I can fabricate my own meaning, rough-hewn out of the random materials life hands me, forged out of my determination to have it so. As long as life does not move massively against me, I can persuade myself that I have succeeded in shaping it to my design and can despise those who have not the will to do likewise. But good times are not the acid test. The crucial question is whether my self-made significance can withstand those times when life does not support my personal preferences or nurture my plans, when it does not hold me up but threatens to strike me down. And the answer is that no significance is any stronger than its source. If what I fabricate partakes of my strengths, it also participates in my weaknesses, is subject to my limitations, and is susceptible to my vulnerabilities. If I am not to be defeated when trouble comes, there must be resources for the maintenance of meaning larger than myself--resources whose very largness transcends any situation which threatens to undo me.[19]

Work, I want to insist, is self-transcending in two senses: it is located in a willing alliance of the self with meanings and tasks which are larger than the self; and that very location lifts the self above its otherwise self-limited achievements,

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capacities, and potencies, and invests it with even greater dignity and worth.

Understood on these terms, work is synonymous with what was meant classically by vocation (the Latin vocatio = calling), a term which is usually associated with religious commitment, and is sometimes limited, quite inappropriately, to the professional ministry. The larger and more generic meaning of vocation has to do with what it means to be a responsible self (in religious terms, selfhood which is responsive and responsible under the acknowledged sovereignty of God; in secular terms, responsive and responsible selfhood in the presence of whatever is acknowledged as ultimately worthful). Viktor Frankl was talking about vocation, or work, in this larger sense, I think, when he insisted that we ought not ask what we may expect of life, but that life is asking what it may expect of us.[20]

Work, or vocation, is the place of intersection between my own growing moral commitments and special powers, on the one hand, and the needs and possibilities of the world, on the other. Work emerges, at that intersection, out of my commitment to help determine just what the world will make of itself.

In clarifying further the nature of work, as it relates to two lesser dimensions of our experience, which are dependent upon it for their fullest significance and effectiveness, Green writes:

> Work really is a human necessity....even for leisure; for leisure, in the classic sense, exists when work discloses a self that is satisfying. Such a conception of leisure has no relation to free time whatever. The key to it is competence, and the place where competence is displayed is work.[21]

And drawing "a sharp distinction between work and job," he observes that

> There is an enormous difference between the person who understands his career as a succession of jobs and a person who understands the succession of jobs he has held as all contributing to the accomplishment of some work. Only the latter can be said to have a career in any strict sense of the term.[22]

That last sentence may be too harsh a judgment. Blessed is the man or woman for whom there is no division between work and job. Yet many these days have chosen to take a relatively distraction-free job which provides an adequate income, precisely in order to be free to pursue some important work from which they could not earn a living. That, it seems to me, may be a career of high significance. Shall we say that Charles Ives, the distinguished American composer, "had no career in any strict sense of the term" merely because he earned his living from selling insurance?

In Walker Percy's marvelous novel, The Moviegoer, Binx Bolling's job is stocks and bonds, but it is a more or less indifferent occupation. "It is true," he said,

> that my family was somewhat disappointed in my choice of a profession. Once I thought of going into law or medicine or even pure science. I even dreamed of doing something great. But there is much to be said for giving up such great ambitions and living the most ordinary life imaginable...selling stocks and bonds and mutual funds.[23]

What sustains Binx, gives his life point and purpose, is not his job but his work, though he does not use that word. He calls it his "search." "To become aware of the possibility of the search is to be onto something," he says. "Not to be onto something is to be in despair."[24]

Surely T. F. Green is right, that "more people need to find a work to perform as well as a job to do."[25] Our task, as educators in the liberating arts and sciences, is to see that every woman and man who leaves the college, after one year or four, is "onto something" which can free them, in Binx Bolling's words, from the despair of being "sunk in the everydayness of their own lives;"[26] or in Green's words, which can "redeem their lives from futility." Literary critic Alfred Kazin intended something similar when he called for "new loyalties...which can free men's hearts from their compulsive pessimism." Our task is to expose students to such loyalties, and to hope for a contagion.

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The mid-career disenchantment of professionals, which is a feature of our current period of social history, and the dramatic occupational changes which have marked these last two decades particularly, are not merely the outward manifestations of some private, inner developmental phase of the sort popularly described in Gail Sheehy's Passages: Predictable Crises of Adult Life.[27] Disenchantment and change are evidence as well of a social fact: that concentration on salary and social mobility are not enough, and that in recent years men and women have not often enough found "work through roles validated within the employment structure," as T. F. Green might assess it. Professional disenchantment also points to a significant change which has occurred particularly in the character of the professions themselves, which were traditionally viewed more as work than as job, largely because they were associated with altruistic and service motivations, represented responses to permanent human and social needs, subsisted primarily in direct human relationships, and exhibited special ethical sensitivities and satisfactions. But increasingly materialistic motivations for entering the professions, and the increasing impersonality of their practice in the face of technological specialization, and their emergence as powerful corporate entities bent on promoting and preserving their own self-interest, have transformed professional work into professional job, with traditional significance and satisfaction displaced by the push and shove of the common marketplace. Such circumstances demand an educational response.

Surely no one can deny that, in legitimate concern for the careers of its students, the first task of a liberal arts college is to assist them in finding work, whatever else it may do to help them in finding jobs. And if we are to help them find work, then the courses they take, and the learning environments to which they are admitted, will have to be deliberately designed, not merely with subject-matter mastery, or the impartation of occupational information and skills, as their exclusive end, but to assist them in clarifying who they are, what and whom they care about, what they have a talent to do, what kind of a world it is into which they have been thrust, and where and how that being and caring and doing can change the world in the direction of their aspiration for it.

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So the centerpiece of a humanistic approach to career preparation is the institutionalization, in curriculum and in co-curriculum, of a concern for work, in which job-preparation may be a constituent but nevertheless subordinate element.

And the key to finding work, says Thomas F. Green, is in the experience of one's own competence; for

> the place where competence is displayed is work. The demonstration of competence is the experience of worth; for being competent is being good at something, for something, and to someone.[28]

That view is supported by Edgar Friedenberg, one of the most astute observers of our contemporary culture, in an aphorism cited in an earlier chapter. Ever since I first came upon it nearly two decades ago, I have considered that its eighteen words contain more educational wisdom than most of us achieve in entire volumes. In our kind of culture, Friedenberg said, a person "who does not know what he is good at will not be sure what he is good for."[29]

To make work the centerpiece of a humanistic strategy for undergraduate career preparation will mean coming clear on the competences to which we intend to admit our students: clarifying them first to ourselves, and then delivering that clarity to our students. The fundamental issue, to repeat it for emphasis, has to do not with job but with work; and if we concern ourselves with job preparation at all, then only in the context of work. The task is not that of providing students with those provisional skills which will permit immediate, successful entry into the job market, but more broadly and significantly that of creating a predisposing learning environment within which students may grow those human and humane competences needed for an effective life-career which is more pervasive than a sequence of jobs. The question, as I insisted in an earlier chapter, is whether or not liberal learning is to be exportable, transferable, negotiable out of the special environment of an undergraduate college into the simultaneous and serial environments of a lifetime.

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Douglas Heath concluded, from his study of the effect of a Haverford education on the subsequent adult maturity and competence of its graduates, that though the college years did appear to further their maturing, the criteria for academic success employed by the faculty measured something else.[30] It is an implication of Heath's study, which I want to urge in the most explicit terms, that the maturity and competence of students is likely to be a largely adventitious results of an undergraduate education until that goal becomes the conscious and controlling purpose around which the curriculum is organized, for the choice of course designs and instructional methodologies, for the determination of degree requirements, for the selection of those measures by which student achievement is to be judged, and for the design of the transcript by means of which student competences are represented to the world.

I have already offered in Chapter Three a model, with detailed rationale, of a curriculum which takes work (in the larger purposive sense in which that term is used here), competence, and adult maturity as its controlling purposes.* And in fact,

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*Here, in briefest outline, is that model: (1) demonstrate linguistic competence in English at a level appropriate to the baccalaureate degree, and in a second language at a level sufficient to permit easy and idiomatic reading of a daily newspaper; (2) write an autobiography; (3) demonstrate mastery of a complex set of ideas; (4) demonstrate competence, at a level appropriate to the baccalaureate degree, in the practice of one of the disciplines practied in the college; (5) contribute to the design and effective completion of a series of collaborative projects; (6) clarify, propose, and participate in the solution to some pressing human problem; (7) demonstrate interpersonal competence by successful completion of terms of work and of cross-cultural immersion; (8) demonstrate competence in two manual skills; and (9) demonstrate effective pedagogical skills by teaching a team-course.

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all of the models in Chapter Two, though less detailed in rationale, are built around those same purposes, and should be consulted as further instances of the kind of curricular variety such purposes permit.**

It is my conviction that students who have achieved and demonstrated the competences called for in those models will not only have found work--a vocation, in the sense of meaning, motivation, and practical potency for their lives--but will also be more than ordinarily attractive for employment, bringing both to the first job and to the entire job-sequence an unusual level of specifiable versatility and maturity--both

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**Here, for example, is the model I called "social-existential": (1) demonstrate competence in English, at a level appropriate to the baccalaureate degree, and in a second language, at a level sufficient to permit easy and idiomatic reading of a daily newspaper; and demonstrate competence in the languages of computer science sufficient to perform standard data-processing operations; (2) write an autobiography; (3) demonstrate mastery of systems theory and of organizational theory; demonstrate competence, at a level appropriate to the baccalaureat degree, in one of the disciplines practiced in the college; and demonstrate an understanding of the mutual implications of systems and organizations for the practice of the discipline; (4) contribute to the design and effective completion of a series of collaborative projects; and satisfactorily complete terms of work and of cross-cultural immersion; (5) choose one of the following: (a) clarify, propose, and participate in the solution to some pressing problem of the physical environment which has strong moral as well as political, technical, or ecological implications; (b) clarify, propose, and participate in the solution to some pressing problem of social policy dealing with the moral consequences of applied science and/or technology; (c) clarify, propose, and participate in the solution to some pressing problem of human conflict-resolution; (6) demonstrate competence, at the level of an accomplished amateur, in the practice of one of the arts (visual arts, including photographic and cinematic; music; dance, architecture), including a reasonable grasp of its history and principles of criticism.

intellectual and applied--to complement technical grasp; and an unusual level of teachableness--the ability to enter quickly and comprehendingly into new learning--for those instances where an employer may offer special in-house training for specialized assignment.

No undergraduate education can be adequately liberating if an effort is made only to free the mind (as if that were a faculty separable from the rest of the person) without giving the mind a vocation for the use of its new freedom. Such learnning experiences as are here being described, and their resultant human resources, can have a peculiarly liberating result; for unlike job-directed training, which makes me a slave to the market, work-infused learning can confer a sense of autonomous reality and value, quite apart from permission from anyone else to be or to do, and can offer important and rewarding tasks to be performed, whether anyone pays me for that performance or not.

All of which provides assurance that, even at those times when I may be out of a job, I am never out of work.

In this way, my life can be validated continuously by commitments which transcend the job, freeing me to an important degree from the intermittent tyranny of validation only by roles permitted by the employment structure. While preparation for job makes me subject to futility, preparation for work is, indeed, the way in which my life can be redeemed from futility.

IV.

The work-infused models, drawn from Chapters Two and Three, to which attention has just been called, already exhibit the integration (an inner unity and integrity which derives from their human shape) and the transference (direct and life-long relevance both to work and to job) which together form the second principle of humanistic curriculum construction. In this section of comment, I want to try to demonstrate that

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it is possible to create an even more explicit linkage--transference--between liberal education and the liberal and learned professions (remembering that in their original form those professions were vocations, not merely occupations), without compromising the liberal any more than the useful.

In doing so, it will be important at the outset to seek some standard for defining a profession, given the confusion and unclarity which result in our own time from the application of the term "professional" to every conceivable kind of activity, from automobile mechanics to window washing.* Although equally thoughtful people may differ on details,[32] and although any college which seriously intends to address the issue will want to construct its own list, my own study and reflection on the matter yields the following list of the characteristics of a profession:

1. It is grounded in a coherent body of theory (one of the marks which permits a profession to be called "learned").

2. It has a coherent body of technical lore grounded in its theory.

3. Its activities are practical (applied, rather than theoretical or "pure").

4. Its activities subsist largely in personal relationships; that is, in direct service to persons.

5. It possesses a vast amount of power, because

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*Verne Stadtman classifies theology, medicine, law, and education as the "old" professions, along with nursing, dentistry, and pharmacy as "older health-related professions," and optometry, public health, hospital administration, physical therapy, and occupational therapy as "recent health-related spin-offs." The "new" professions are agriculture, engineering, business administration, architecture, criminology, librarianship, social welfare, home economics, and journalism, with forestry, veterinary medicine, and landscape architecture (environmental design) as their more recent spin-offs. The list is as useful as any for a starting point and, like others, has in it a certain unavoidable arbitrariness and incompleteness.[31]

(a) it controls one or another of those permanent, socially endemic institutions required for the protection, nurture, enrichment, or sustenance of human life and morale;

(b) it typically deals with persons, or with social situations, in moments of unusual need or vulnerability;

(c) it has near-exclusive possession of vital intervention-techniques and resources required in the presence of that need and vulnerability;

(d) for all of the above reasons, it is accorded, and sometimes claims for itself, a peculiar authority;

(e) both its power and authority are enhanced by strong internal organization; and,

(f) it is largely self-regulating.

6. It claims to be an ethically-sensitive activity, and has articulated ethical standards.

7. It has a strong sense of civic responsibility.

Given these characteristics, plus related considerations which have been part of the discussion of this chapter, it is now possible to approach the human profile--the integration--on which curricular reconstruction is to be based, by asking the question, What does it take to be a competent professional today? Only by asking that question will it be possible to rise above the pressure of special interests within the present curriculum to consider afresh what we ought to do. It will be appropriate here to recall a paragraph from Chapter Two, and to fashion a slight paraphrase of it which maintains its central point while applying it to our present concern:

When in curricular construction we begin by asking, What courses ought we to teach? or even, What should we require of students? the weight and authority of established arrangements almost inevitably locks us into the politics of present curricular possibility. If, rather, we begin by asking, What kinds of professionals do we want to

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equip our students to become? What kinds of human services to we want to equip them to provide? What kind of social order do we want to empower them to shape? and then, What are the competences to which we, as an existing institution, can assist them for this achievement? we are more likely to open a range of possibilities at which we would never have arrived by asking the second-order questions first.

Based on the foregoing considerations, the following are the generic competences which, in my own view, are required for professional effectiveness:*

1. Competence in the skills of human communication, including:

(a) active hearing and seeing;

(b) practice in communication at the level of feelings as well as at the level of ideas;

(c) effective use of the written and spoken word;

(d) reading which is quick, comprehending, and intentional; and

(e) integration of these skills for effective teaching.

2. Competence in the skills of critical intelligence, including:

(a) skills of understanding, interpretation, and criticism; and

(b) practice in normative inquiry, and in making judgments based on normative conclusions.

3. Competent mastery of the theoretical groundings of the profession, sufficient for informed, critical, and constructive practice.

4. Competent practice of the technical lore which is founded in the theory, with sensitivity to the appropriate and responsible use of that technique in the light of other competences noted herein.

5. Competent organizational skills, including:

(a) the exercise of leadership, and response to leadership;

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*A rationale and further elaboration of some of the elements in this profile--especially 1(e), 2, and 9--will be found in part V of this chapter, which follows.

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(b) use of creative conflict, and resolution or management of non-creative conflict;

(c) a practical knowledge of how human systems work; and

(d) skills for effective collaboration.

6. Competence in goal-setting and decision-making skills, including:

(a) the ability to interpret budgets and balance-sheets and to use them for planning and decision-making;

(b) skill in the use of information sciences; and

(c) practice in making decisions with inadequate information, on issues which have personal and social, in contrast to merely intellectual, consequences.

7. Competent understanding of the nature of human nature, and of the humane society, including:

(a) demonstrated ability to cope with unfamiliar life-settings;

(b) demonstrated tolerance for ambiguity and for the differentia arising out of ethnic, class, racial, religious, and sexual identities; and

(c) familiarity with the human dynamics which move within such realities as love and conflict, pleasure and suffering, creativity and death, power and vulnerability, altruism and arrogance, value and indifference, intimacy and ultimacy, mystery and boredom, terror and ecstasy, justice and exploitation, aspiration and limitation, passion and diffidence, tragedy and exaltation.

8. Competence as a responsible moral agent, including:

(a) the ability to engage in ethical reasoning;

(b) special understanding of power and responsibility as moral categories;

(c) growing identification of a core of personal and social values;

(d) demonstrated integrity and courage in acting consistently in the light of those values; and

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(e) special sensitivity to the moral dimensions (responsibility, vulnerability, ambiguity) of professional practice.

9. Competent grasp of professional institutions, including:

(a) the nature, history, role, and influence of the professions in Western society; and

(b) a practical understanding of the ways the various professions work, adequate to practice as an effective member of a working inter-professional team.

10. Competent self-understanding, both as a person and as a professional, including:

(a) a unified view of the chosen profession;

(b) awareness of the motivations which are at work in the choice of a profession; and

(c) a growing sense of the profession as a calling, whose privilege in the first instance is service.

That list, in my view, is an admirable working source from which to derive a set of graduation requirements for an undergraduate liberal arts college, with full integrity within its traditional liberating intent, with the full utilization of its range of intellectual and applied resources, and with direct, specifiable relevance to the prospective professional vocations of its students. The requirements so drawn would have to be adjusted in their components, depending on whether the resulting program is to be pre-professional (intended to prepare students for subsequent graduate education in law, medicine, theology, and the like), or professional (leading to a first professional degree, as in business administration, teaching, social work, public administration, and so on).

And since classroom instruction cannot be expected to yield all of the competences specified in the model, or will not yield them adequately by itself, these additional provisions for significant learning will be required:

1. Field placements, internships, practica, work arrangements, inter-ethnic and

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inter-cultural immersion (a) to further interpersonal growth and human understanding; (b) to provide a realistic test of career interests and capabilities and, as a result of that test, to create on return to the classroom a stronger sense of educational purpose; (c) to provide an understanding of the interaction between theory and practice; and (d) to learn such operational skills as may be appropriate at the undergraduate level of pre-professional or professional growth.

2. On-campus residencies by recognized and experienced professionals for brief periods of time, from a day to a week or more (a) to provide students with on-going contact with practicing professionals in order to maintain a sense of the reality of the profession; (b) to develop a continuing relationship of encouragement and support for students in preparation for the several professional fields; (c) to provide teachers with on-going contact with practicing professionals so that they, too, may keep in touch with the realities of professional practice and have continuing access to the theory-practice nexus; and (d) to supplement the competences of resident teaching faculty with the competences of the visitors, who may be invited to offer lectures, workshops, and seminars.

3. A substantial program of career planning and placement (a) to create an articulated awareness throughout the campus of the larger issue of work, or vocation, as the necessary context for satisfactory job considerations; (b) to provide information on careers and on job-markets, and especially to offer advising on career choice, on the relation of undergraduate study to career interests, and on the relationship between specific academic programs and the job market; (c) to provide assistance with the strategies of job search, such as résumé and interview preparation; and (d) to maintain an active placement office for immediate graduates and for alumni.

I quite understand, as with the models offered in Chapters Three and Four, that there will be principled differences of opinion as to the details of the professional profile offered above--its incompleteness or omissions, its excessively omnibus character or its individual controversial inclusions. The important thing is not to take the profile as it is, but to remember what is at issue in it: willingness to fashion an undergraduate program, not on the basis of abstract principle, on the one hand, nor on mere disciplinary compromise and accommodation, on the other, but in the presence of a clear model of what a professional is and does, and in that light, to identify those human and humane competences effective practicing professionals must possess.

V.

One of the greatest needs of practicing professionals is for an increase in their moral competence--their ability to deal openly, empathically, and thoughtfully with issues which touch the quality of life of patient or client, dealing with judgments of "better" or "worse," with "desirable" or "undesirable," which go well beyond technical assessment and remedy, whether medical, legal, or other.

Asked to describe some of the ethical issues she met in her own medical practice during a typical day, one physician listed these: deciding whether a couple of children should be removed from their parents by the court and placed for adoption; deciding about the involuntary commitment of a borderline psychotic; deciding whether an unmarried girl, in the second month of pregnancy, should have a therapeutic abortion because of doubt that her personality structure is stable enough to sustain the child; deciding whether a brain-damaged patient should be hospitalized, knowing that only about two per cent of the time he will face stress situations which may have socially damaging consequences, and that to place him in an institution full-time is really punishment for something that is not his fault.[33]

Asked the same question, a pediatrician gave these answers: what to do about parents who refused to permit needed surgery for their child because of religious convictions against blood transfusion; what to do about parents who want to take a dying child home from the hospital so he can spend his last days happily with his family ("I get the feeling that these parents have somehow worked through the grief process more than I have as a physician," so that "I'm probably wanting to keep him here, partly out

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of my own reaction and my own guilt, not because of the welfare of the patient"); what to do about concern for wrenching a child from his family, because the child needs to be sent into another climate as treatment for a serious allergic condition.[34]

And we are well aware, through recent debates in both popular and scholarly media, of the decisions doctors, lawyers, legislators, and other professionals must make, both about when life begins and when it ends--decisions which have quite as much to do with values as with molecular biology or case law.

What formal preparation do doctors, in particular, have to prepare them to reach so deeply into the problematic? Medical-education researcher Paul Sanazaro has acknowledged that relatively little is done during the medical school years to prepare for the value-laden choices which are a daily constituent of medical practice. Many medical schools offer no instruction in ethics whatever; and among those that do, Dr. Sanazaro reported that the content often resmbles the twelve "ethical problems" identified by the publication *Medical Economics*: "Scaled Up Fees, Night Calls, Practice-Building, Medical Mistakes, Recall Systems (sending out a card periodically to remind the patient that it is time for a checkup), Cash Collections (demanding fees paid in advance, Emergency Care (If you're afraid you're going to be sued, should you stop?..) Combined Billing, and finally, Should You Tell the Truth?" This same kind of focus for the "ethical" attention of physicians was reflected, said Dr. Sanazaro, in the "Principles of Professional Conduct" promulgated by a medical society to which he once belonged, including such "principles" as "Compensation, Gratuitous Services, Patents for Surgical or Diagnostic Instruments, Secret Remedies, Safeguarding the Profession, When Several Physicians Are Called, Emergency Obstetrics, etc."[35]

Under such circumstance, it is hardly surprising that, in one medical school study, no change was found from freshman to senior year in attitudes having to do with "compassion, with understanding the rights of patients, with accepting responsibility in dealing with patients' problems...."[36] Another study showed that, after four years, medical school students were more cynical than students in nursing or in law, that there was no change over the four years in attitudes of altruism or philanthropy, but that there was "a definite increase in the economic or pragmatic orientation."[37]

Responsibility for this narrowness and neglect must be traced back into the established outlook of American medical practice; must be located in the peculiar view the medical profession has taken of the doctor-patient relationship. Social ethicist William F. May has pointed out that the Code of Medical Ethics, first adopted by the American Medical Association in 1847, founded the duties of the patient on what he had received from the doctor. The Code speaks of "The members of the medical profession, upon whom is enjoined the performance of so many important and arduous duties toward the community, and who are required to make so many sacrifices of comfort, ease, and health, for the welfare of those who avail themselves of their services," and adds: "The benefits accruing to the public, directly and indirectly, from the active and unwearied beneficence of the profession, are so numerous and important, that physicians are justly entitled to the utmost consideration and respect from the community."

But when the Code defines the duties the physician owes to the patient and to the public, observes Dr. May, there is "no corresponding section of the code of 1847 (or 1957) which founds the doctor's obligations on those gifts and services he has received from the community." Rather, says May,

> we are presented with the picture of a relatively self-sufficient monad, who, out of the nobility and generosity of his disposition and the gratuitously accepted conscience of his profession, has taken upon himself the noble life of service. The false posture in all this cries out in one of the opening sections of the 1847 code. Physicians "should study, also, in their deportment so as to unite tenderness with firmness, and condescension with authority, so as to inspire the minds of their patients with gratitude, respect, and confidence."

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...The A.M.A. thought of the patient and public as indebted to the profession for its services but the profession has accepted its duties to the patients and public out of noble conscience rather than a reciprocal sense of indebtedness.

Put another way, the medical profession imitates God not so much because it exercises power of life and death over others, but because it does not really think itself beholden, even partially, to anyone for those duties to patients which it lays upon itself. Like God, the profession draws its life from itself alone. Its action is wholly gratuitous.[38]

The point in all this is not to pillory the medical profession, as if it had a monopoly on moral obtuseness. While its singular impact on human well-being, coupled with the even more singular claims it arrogates, make it a legitimate and necessary object of critical scrutiny, other major professions would scarcely fare better from a similar scrutiny. Indeed, the moral deficiencies of the legal profession, including its members on the bench, are clearly more blatant, whether or not in greater proportion, and are given sometimes lurid documentation almost daily in the press.

While many legal practitioners view the law as a process for determining justice and truth, there is a contrasting view, widely influential within the profession, that judicial procedure has little if anything to do with those twin virtues. This contrasting view holds, rather, that "the object of a trial is not the ascertainment of truth but the resolution of a controversy by the principled application of the rules of the game," as one former Federal District Court judge described it. And as in any game, even those played by strict rules, the object is not to achieve some balance of interests for the contesting parties, some reasonable approximation of just relationships. The object is to win. The adversary system, which is at the heart of our judicial process, requires loyalty to the client; and when the law is viewed as a contest, the aim of which is to win, that loyalty is easily given precedence over all other loyalties, including truth and justice.

For any lawyer who holds this view, the temptation to function as a "gun for hire"

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may be overwhelming. In an article entitled "A Lawyer's Guilty Secrets," which appeared in a national news magazine--an article remarkable for its self-disclosing candor--criminal lawyer Seymour Wishman confessed that, during his career, he has represented hundreds of accused clients;

> and not only have most of them been guilty, many have been guilty of atrocities. ...It is a fundamental principle of our system of justice that every criminal defendant is entitled to a lawyer, but too much of what I've done in the courtroom is beyond justifying by that abstract principle. I've humiliated pathetic victims of crimes by making liars out of them to gain the acquittal of criminals; I've struggled to win for clients who would go out and commit new outrages.... All the lawyer's emotions and skills are deployed for one purpose--winning....A belief in the justness of the cause...carries its own rewards, but rescuing anyone...can arouse the same messianic illusions in the lawyer's head whether the client is a hero or villain.[39]

Social ethicist William F. May has drawn what seems to me the inescapable conclusion from all this:

> The profession [of law] is impoverished morally when it defines itself exclusively by 1) the technical resources it has to offer 2) to the highest bidder 3) for the sole purpose of winning a match 4) within an ordered forensic game the justification for which is 5) the ritual resolution of a controversy.[40]

And what must be said of that area of professional practice which is the primary concern of these chapters, namely higher education? I have left my harshest comment for last, for it is my judgment that the source of the deficiencies in moral sensitivity which are observed in the professions (the human predisposition our fathers called Original Sin apart) must be traced, not merely or even primarily to the graduate professional schools of medicine and law and business administration and the rest, but to the colleges and universities, whose ethos has been the primary influence in shaping the character of graduate professional education.

In indicting the colleges and universities for moral obtuseness, I am not referring simply to arbitrariness, arrogance, and authoritarianism on the part of teachers, to which they are readily and regularly tempted by the absolute autonomy they demand in the classroom, under the principled guise of academic freedom. (Lawyers have no exclusive patent on professional egoism.) Nor am I referring merely to the fact that teachers' professional organizations (whether the AAUP or a local faculty association) speak loudly about salaries and teaching loads, but have virtually nothing to say about standards for effective teaching, and do virtually nothing to assure proper teaching standards through self-regulation, preferring to default by leaving such matters to administrators, thereby making professional effectiveness an adversary issue. (Medical practitioners have no exclusive patent on professional self-aggrandizement. Indeed, doctors, who are frequently criticized by academic types for their self-protection, do far more to discipline medical colleagues for failure to maintain standards than do the academics, who seem constitutionally incapable of engaging in any kind of formal peer-assessment.)

Egregious as these things are, they are not the worst of it. For the last three or four decades, the prevailing intellectual ethos in college and university has been marked by an effort to achieve ethical neutrality in every area of inquiry. Two influences have been at work here. One is positivism, derived from philosophy and applied popularly and uncritically throughout the humanities and the social sciences. In positivism, ethical statements are dismissed as merely "emotive," having no factual content, literally non-sense because not objectively verifiable as right or wrong, and therefore meaningless. The other, so closely allied that the two are virtually one, is scientism, which holds that the only reliable method for achieving significant knowledge is the method of the natural sciences, which should be adopted and adapted as quickly as possible by all other areas of intellectual activity, including the humanities and the social sciences. Since science can only tell us what values men and women do, in fact, hold, and can make no judgments of "better" or "worse" within that descriptive account, ethical considerations are outside the realm of approved intellectual activity, according to this view.

The result of positivism and scientism alike, therefore, is to deny any validity to moral reasoning (indeed, to see the term itself as contradictory), and to seek its elimination from teaching and scholarship.

And what is the practical effect of that elimination? Rutgers University philosopher Emmanuel Mesthene tells us:

> Actions in the world will still be based on decisions concerning better or worse, of course, since the necessity for choice is a condition of action. But those decisions may then have no warrant but whim, emotional moment, or personal predilection; there will no longer be a premium on learning how to make them, objectively, rigorously, and on the ground of the best available evidence....
>
> But the ability to make a meaningful life and, by extension, a just polity is an acquired skill; it is not a universal gift, fully developed at birth. Indeed, it is the most difficult skill of all to acquire, and its essence is the trained ability to make grounded judgments of better or worse.

The professions in America have been given their distinctive character and validation primarily by the institutions of higher learning in which their members are prepared for practice. By coincidence of history, the older professions (law, medicine, ministry, education) were just coming to new definition and new self-consciousness, and the newer (e.g., social work, busness and public administration, engineering) were just coming to full standing as professions, at precisely the time when positivism and scientism were in imperial ascendancy in those matrix institutions. So it is not surprising that technical reason and applied technical skills, which scientism and positivism could approve, became the controlling influences, at the expense of more

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humanistic influences, including that which is most distinctively human, the capacity for moral reason and applied moral skills.

If the disastrous divorce between the technical and the ethical in the professions is to be overcome, college and university must recover some of the traditional marks of the higher learning which were lost during the now-waning positivist-scientist period. Here I happily draw on some recommendations made by Indiana University's William F. May, partly because I find them persuasive in and of themselves, and partly because I find in them a confirmation of my own urgings in Chapter Five on "Moral Seriousness and Personal Learning," but here applied to our present concern with pre-professional and professional education.

First, says May, there must be a reconsideration and recovery of the academy's traditional "vocation...[for] the training and cultivation of critical intelligence." In contrast to the operational or technical intelligence which higher education sought to inculcate during the positivist period, critical intelligence

> includes making judgments as to worth and value in the spheres of politics, arts, economics, religion, philosophy, morals. Operational intelligence tells one how to get from here to there; critical intelligence raises questions as to whether the there is worth getting to....It recognizes that the work of the intellect includes the task of normative as well as descriptive inquiry. This is precisely the activity of the intellect called for in professional life....[41]

The humanities have a peculiar role in the development of a critical intelligence, though that role has been seriously eroded by the humanist's fashionable preference for descriptive scholarship in the hope of sharing thereby something of the authority and prestige accorded to the scientist. And so have the social sciences an important critical role;

> insofar as they do not increasingly define themselves by their method but by their subject matter--the social constructs of mankind--they should include

> not only descriptivists but those engaged in normative inquiry on policy issues.[42]

The point is that out of a disciplined and critical exchange, colleges and universities can become important sources for "posing alternatives for society at large and the professions in particular." [43]

Second, May calls upon institutions of higher learning to recover "their ancient and continuing responsibility for the cultivation of the civic self."[44] In recent years there has been too much educational narcissism, privatizing learning and justifying it on the basis of individual gain (for example, basing the value of a college degree on its holder's increased earning power). Institutions suffer, and people get hurt, when "the social covenant is weak and the professional thinks of himself as an entrepreneur alone, uninvested with a public trust."[45] Cultivation of the civic self must be connected with the cultivation of a critical intellect. "Professional skills, finely honed in the descriptive disciplines of the university, can end up guns for hire."[46] Value questions should not be treated reductionistically or preciously as matters of private preference alone. They are, rather, matters for disciplined discourse.

> To engage in critical inquiry is itself a social act that throws one out into the community of inquirers, that makes a person accountable and responsible for his judgments and decisions, that assumes these judgments to be interpretable in civil discourse. Critical inquiry is part of the public life of the mind, an indispensable ingredient to a professional life that has more than technical services to offer for private gain.[47]

There is another reason for a renewed emphasis on cultivating the civic self--one not mentioned by May but given persuasive statement by another social ethicist, Kenneth Underwood. In the past, our approach to social issues, to social change, has been essentially individualistic and moralistic. Because we have tended to think that social problems arise in the first place because of the undesirable behavior of individuals, that social pathology is simply a matter of sundered relationships, that meaninglessness in our lives has primarily to do with persons rather than with structures, our social action has commonly been formed by attempts to change the motives and aspirations of persons, to create face-to-face relationships, and to call society back to simpler and presumably more meaningful and moral ways of living and doing.

The difficulty with all this is not its aim, which is to improve the quality and autonomy of human life, nor even its specific program, which includes some essential personalistic elements, but with its adequacy as the sole approach to social change, given the conditions of our urban-technical-industrial society. Personalism as the exclusive moral strategy misconceives the situation and thus misdirects the tactic, as Kenneth Underwood saw it. We live in a society marked by incredible and baffling complexity, of personal actors and impersonal structures, in which "problems are the cumulative effects of whole systems of action and actors."[48] Social problems can no longer be assigned simplistically to the actions of immoral individuals; they emerge, rather, out of a complex web of personal, organizational, and technical influence.

So the peculiar problem which faces the person--whether professional or any other--who seeks to be moral is precisely the difficulty of finding in that web the locus and the fulcrum for his own responsibility, partly because the complexity obscures it, and partly because a romantic-existential view of social action has taught him to look for it in the wrong place and has failed to provide the strategic guidance he needs to be moral in his new situation.

Underwood called professionals, and the institutions which produce them, to a new concern for social policy--with issues which "have to do with the intellectual, moral, and spiritual quality of personal and corporate decisions made in the major organizations and institutions of our society and affecting great numbers of people in the body politic."[49] Indeed, Kenneth Underwood wrote in a telling sentence, that social policy is the task "which most tests faith and compassion in our time; it directs the talk of serving the world toward questions of what corporate actions do to people and what produces them...."[50]

Professionals, in touch as they are with those things society needs to sustain the good life (health, order, learning, shelter, meaning, etc.), and participants as they are in professional organizations which are among the most powerful of corporate structures (A.M.A., A.B.A., N.E.A., etc.), are probably the key to the ability of our society to envision humane goals and to achieve them, as Kenneth Underwood saw it. If there is to be social change which takes its shape from a technical competence joined with humane values, professionals will have to learn "how to exercise [not merely individual but corporate] power informed by their knowledge."[51]

Without what Underwood called "education for intentional and corporate social action"--unless undergraduate and graduate institutions alike prepare professionals not only to be responsible and skilled practitioners but also responsible and skilled corporate actors--even the most concerned professional will find himself "chipping around the edges of a social boulder he cannot move."[52]

So if the institution of higher learning is to return to its old concern for cultivating in its members the civic self, it will also have to prepare them to live and act competently in a new civitas.

Finally, in addition to nurturing in the professional a critical intellect and a civic self, college and university ought to cultivate that professional as a teacher. William F. May describes this particularly with reference to medicine, but it has its direct analogies to other professions as well. Disease, says May, was once thought of as discrete and episodic, representing an extraordinary incursion into ordinary life. This view fed on the ignorance and encouraged the passivity of the patient; for once he fell ill, he was expected to transfer authority for his life over to the physician. We now know, instead, that disease is processive, as Horacio Fabrega of Michigan State

University terms it. Long before recognizable, overt symptoms appear, sophisticated monitoring devices can reveal how "the cardiovascular system may be preparing for catastrophe."[53] On this newer view, it is not submission to the authority of the physician, but collaboration with the physician, that is required.

> The physician must function as teacher as he shares information with his patient and engages the layperson more actively in his own health maintenance. The professional charged with primary care needs to be more than a technician. Words are to drugs as a preamble is to the law. They help to interpret what is going on in the whole process. Teaching, therefore, helps to heal the patient, to "make whole" the distracted and distressed subject.[54]

In May's view, this has direct implications for an education in the liberal arts and sciences, which presumably "cultivates the fundamental qualities of the teacher--a capacity for critical inquiry, a direct grasp of one's subject, a desire to share it, verbal facility, and sensitivity to one's audience."[55] Theoretically, an education which confers those qualities and skills should create professionals who are more than ordinarily competent pedagogically. Unfortunately for that result, says May, academicians treat teaching as a special profession, into which some of their graduates go while others do not. May understands that teaching is, of course, a special profession;

> but at the same time, it ought to be the aim and purpose of a liberal arts education to turn out good teachers whether the student in question goes into the teaching profession or not. How else will students be bearers and transmitters of their cultural heritage and fit practitioners and interpreters of their roles as professionals?[56]

If the connection between the professional's role as teacher and the moral-seriousness theme of this section of comment seems obscure, consider this: The doctor, or any other professional, who fails or refuses to share his special knowledge, and the responsibility for the "healing" use of that knowledge, with patient or client--who chooses, rather, to retain his monopoly on technical competence and thus to perpetuate the incompetence and the dependence of patient or client on himself as expert--commits a profoundly immoral act.

To teach, on the other hand, is--at its best--to commit a profoundly humanizing act. To teach is to confer on others an increasing measure of freedom and of control over their own destinies, which means increasing independence of the expert. To refuse to share one's special knowledge with others (as though that special knowledge were a private possession, rather than a gift conferred on the practitioner by the culture which produced it) is to conspire against their freedom and to confirm their powerlessness. Any effort to perpetuate the subjection of others to oneself is what Paul Tillich called it: demonic.[57] To view and to value professional practice humanistically is to understand it as an act, not of condescension, but of collaboration.

VI.

In this chapter, I have tried to offer some guidance for meeting what I called at the outset "the major educational and imaginal test--and the major social-policy test, as well--which liberal arts colleges are facing in the present decade": the test of our ability to fashion a curriculum which offers men and women humanistic preparation for the worlds of job and work. I have argued that such a curriculum is achievable for any college which is willing (1) to found curricular construction on a clear decision about what it takes for any of us, professionals and others alike, to live humanly and humanely in our kind of world; (2) in that light, to devise a set of curricular expectations--outcomes--which are patterned on what it takes, quite concretely, to be an effective professional when practice is broadened beyond technique to include essential human skills, without which professional competence is seriously compromised; and (3) to add, as the dimension of depth in this broadened pattern, an active concern for personal and professional responsibleness, without

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which professional technique easily becomes a loose cannon.

These claims can reasonably be made for such a curriculum:

1. Without diminishing relevance to job, its primary aim will be to help men and women find work.

2. It will be useful without being less liberal. It will require for its accomplishment the full variety of disciplinary competences which are customarily gathered in a liberal arts program: arts and humanities ("No one should have power over others who had not been exposed to Shakespeare's explorations of human tragedy," said Princeton's J. Douglas Brown[58]), natural sciences, and social sciences. At the same time, its ends cannot be achieved if those disciplines insist on perpetuating standard courses, as if they were somehow written into the natural law, and on teaching merely for subject-matter mastery, as they so commonly do. Teaching will have to be for the achievement of designated competences in and through subject-matter; and the conclusion reached by Harvard's task force on general education is likely to be the conclusion reached by any faculty which examines its present course offerings in light of the needs identified here: "In some cases we were able to identify courses that seemed appropriate; in many more instances we found courses that could be adapted....But we concluded that these would have to be supplemented by some entirely new offerings."[59] And the competences and skills toward which teachers intend to assist their students will be different from the intellectual, operational, personal, and social skills ordinarily promised by a liberal education only in the degree of their specification, and in the more careful design of courses individually and collectively to achieve them.

For many liberal arts disciplines, the inconvenience of such adaptation and change will be the price of survival, a price scarcely too high to pay, since the result will be to make those disciplines more useful to, more valued by, those who study to practice them.

3. It will offer both specificity and versatility, as any good liberal arts educa-

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tion ought to do, in sharp contrast to the "single-outcome training" which presently masquerades as liberal learning in some places. That is, while it will have immediate relevance to individual professions, it is equally applicable to all of the major professions; and professional practice itself apart, it offers the context for an informed citizenship which must live critically and constructively in a world which is dominated by the professions. Perhaps most important of all, because the model is built on a core of essential human competences, which for that very reason are also the competences needed by the humane professions, it has a universal applicability to the life-careers of men and women, quite apart from their job-careers.

The direct relevance of the model to the needs of medical practice should be clear from extended discussion at a number of points throughout the preceding sections of this chapter. Additional support for the job-related versatility claimed for this model is found in its relevance to the managerial occupations as seen, for example, in the ten working-roles common to all managers identified by Henry Mintzberg of McGill University in The Nature of Managerial Work. There are, says Mintzberg, three interpersonal roles (figurehead, leader, and liaison), three informational roles (monitor, disseminator, and liaison), and four decisional roles (entrepreneur, disturbance handler, resource allocator, and negotiator).[60]

Similar support comes from the results of the Bell System's Management Progress Study, whose research isolated these seven characteristics essential to managerial career-advancement as it actually occurs within the Bell System:[61]

Administrative Skills. A high potential manager plans and organizes his work effectively, makes decisions willingly, and makes high quality decisions.

Interpersonal Skills. A high potential manager makes a forceful and likable impression on others, has good oral presentation skills, leads others to perform, and modifies his behavior when necessary to reach a goal.

Intellectual Ability. A high potential manager learns readily and has a wide range of interests.

Stability of Performance. A high potential manager maintains effective work performance under uncertain or unstructured conditions and in the face of stress.

Work Motivation. A high potential manager finds satisfaction from work more important than those from other areas of life and wants to do a good job for its own sake.

Career Orientation. A high potential manager wants to advance significantly more rapidly than his peers, is *not* as concerned as others about having a secure job, and is *unwilling* to delay rewards too long.

Dependence on Others. A high potential manager is *not* greatly concerned with gaining approval from superiors or peers and is *unwilling* to change life goals in accordance with reality opportunities.

As Douglas Heath pointed out in his study of Haverford alumni, many of these characteristics *may* actually be grown by students in a college with a traditionally-organized liberal arts curriculum, but that growth occurs *in spite of the fact that the curriculum is organized, and the teaching is designed, to produce something else*. The same thing can be said of conventionally-organized professional programs, for example in business and public administration: students in those programs *may* mature along many of the dimensions identified by Mintzberg and the Bell study, but not because their courses, heavily weighted with specialized subject-matter and directed exclusively toward subject-matter mastery, actually envisioned or intended them.

The point is (1) that most, though not necessarily all, of the characteristics identified by Mintzberg and the Bell study are not occupation-specific but are, rather, characteristics which are essential to full human effectiveness, job or no job; (2) that these humanly-liberating and empowering characteristics are precisely the ends for which liberal arts colleges exist, according to our formal statements of purpose and our public relations, but, ironically, are not the ends for which many liberal arts colleges are instructionally organized; and (3) that if we would predispose not only the professional but the full human effectiveness of our graduates (believing, as I have tried to show, that far from being antithetical, the two are fully compatible), then we would do well to organize ourselves with that aim very explicitly in view, rather than leaving it to purely adventitous circumstance.

It is my contention that the kind of curriculum for which this present chapter offers suggestions and materials, as well as the curricular models offered in Chapters Two and Three, and the instructional and organizational proposals contained in Chapters Six and Seven, give promise of predisposing precisely such an explicit outcome, promise of restoring the integrity--the essential humanism and holism--of our educational enterprises.

4. The specificity of the competences such a program can yield should make the graduate unusually attractive to prospective employers, both for initial job-entry and for subsequent advancement and job-change. And for those going directly into graduate professional schools, such an undergraduate program will be a highly useful complement to those professional programs which themselves address the need for integrated humanistic understandings, skills, and values, and an absolutely indispensable supplement to those programs which ignore that need.

It cannot be said too emphatically--I have already noted it more than once in this volume--that if this is to happen, there will be critical need for a redesigned transcript which, in addition to showing courses, hours, and grade-points accumulated, can offer a useful translation of the undergraduate experience in terms of those competences a graduate has actually demonstrated, and which will be relevant to job-placement as well as to other post-baccalaureate considerations.

VII.

In summary, this chapter is really about two complementary propositions, implied at a number of points in the argument, and in this conclusion requiring explicit state-

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ment.

One proposition is that pre-professional and professional programs in the undergraduate college are impoverished when they fail to employ fully the varied intellectual and cultural, personal and practical, resources a liberal arts college offers. In an editorial significantly entitled "How to Make People Smaller Than They Are," Norman Cousins has written,

> The doctor who knows only disease is at a disadvantage alongside the doctor who knows at least as much about people as he does about pathological organisms. The lawyer who argues in court from a narrow legal base is no match for the lawyer who can connect legal precedents to historical experience and who employs wide-ranging intellectual resources. The business executive whose competence in general management is bolstered by an artistic ability to deal with people is of prime value to his company. For the technologist, the engineering of consent can be just as important as the engineering of moving parts. In all these respects, the liberal arts have much to offer.[62]

The other proposition is the full complement of the first. It is that the liberal arts disciplines gathered in a college are similarly impoverished when they deprive themselves of attention to work as an integrating, animating, motivating center, or when they fail to respect its proper place among them.

Here I will give Arthur Chickering the last word:

> We should not underestimate the importance of integrating professional and vocational preparation and liberal studies. If it is true that love and work are the basic ingredients for a meaningful existence, then that is what we are attempting. The liberal arts can expand the capacity to love life, to experience it more richly, to continually increase one's range of satisfying activities. Effective professional and vocational studies that not only prepare us for productive work but also help us grow in scope and capacity offer the other essential.

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But one in the absence of the other leaves us crippled, hopping along with one leg, negotiating tough terrain with difficulty, feeling less than we ought to be, and getting less from our living than we know we should.[63]

NOTES

1 Willard Wirtz, "Education for What?" in Dyckman W. Vermilye, ed., Relating Work and Education (Jossey-Bass, 1977), p. 269.

2 Howard R. Bowen, in an article, "Manpower Management and Higher Education," Educational Record (Winter, 1973), as excerpted by the Study Commission on Undergraduate Education and the Education of Teachers (University of Nebraska, December, 1977), p. 5.

3 Alburey Castell, "The Colleges and the Liberal Professions."

4 Frederick Rudolph, Curriculum: A History of the American Undergraduate Course of Study Since 1636 (Jossey-Bass, 1977), p. 28.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 180.

6 John Rhoads, cited in Andrew Hacker, "The Shame of Professional Schools," Harper's Magazine (October, 1981), p. 24.

7 Paul Sanazaro, in Kenneth Underwood *et al.*, "Trends and Issues in Medical Education," Christian Scholar (Winter, 1967), p. 361.

8 George T. Harrell, *ibid.*, p. 362.

9 Kenneth Underwood, The Church, the University, and Social Policy (Wesleyan University Press, 1969), p. 425.

10 Evan Patishall, in Kenneth Underwood *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 386.

11 George T. Harrell, *ibid.*, pp. 358-359.

12 Kenneth Underwood, *op. cit.*, p. 439.

13 Thomas J. Stevenin, executive director, Farmland Training Center, Farmland Industries, Inc., in a privately circulated paper on "Liberal Education as Preparation for Careers in Business: An Affirmative View."

14 Stuart Rosenthal, quoted in a United Press International story by Charles S. Taylor, "'People skills' trip up executives," printed in the Kalamazoo (Michigan) Gazette.

15 Andrew Hacker, op. cit., p. 27.

16 Ibid., p. 28.

17 Thomas F. Green, "Ironies and Paradoxes," in Dyckman W. Vermilye, ed., op. cit., p. 43. In fairness to Green, it should be acknowledged that he probably would not approve of the application given in this chapter to his view of work, or of the view of common learning offered in Chapter Four. Green disparages interdisciplinary approaches to learning, and makes a sharp distinction between theoretical reason, which he holds to be the business of a college, and practical reason, which he holds not to be the business of a college. See pages 39-42 of the work cited here. On these points, we are simply in apparrent disagreement.

18 Arthur G. Wirth, "The Philosophical Split," in Dyckman W. Vermilye, ed., op. cit., p. 13.

19 For a more complete statement of this point of view, see Lloyd J. Averill, The Problem of Being Human (Judson Press, 1974), especially Chapter 10, "The Inexpugnably Human," from which this paragraph is largely taken.

20 Viktor Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning (Washington Square Press, 1963), p. 172.

21 Thomas F. Green, in Dyckman W. Vermilye, ed., op. cit., p. 44.

22 Ibid., p. 42.

23 Walker Percy, The Moviegoer (Noonday Press, 1960), p. 9.

24 Ibid., p. 44.

25 Thomas F. Green, in Dyckman W. Vermilye, ed., op. cit., p. 44.

26 Walker Percy, op. cit., p. 13.

27 Gail Sheehy, Passages: Predictable Crises of Adult Life (Bantam Books, 1977).

28 Thomas F. Green, in Dyckman W. Vermilye, ed., op. cit., pp. 44-45.

29 Edgar F. Friedenberg, The Vanishing Adolescent (Beacon Press, 1960), p. 17.

30 Douglas Heath, "Academic Predictors of Adult Maturity and Competence," *Journal of Higher Education* (November/December, 1977), p. 629.

31 Verne Stadtman, cited in Earl F. Cheit, *The Useful Arts and the Liberal Professions* (McGraw-Hill, 1975), p. ln.

32 For other discussions of the professions, see an early and influential article by Abraham Flexner, "Is Social Work a Profession?" in *Proceedings of the National Conference on Charities and Corrections* (Hildmann Printing Co., 1915), pp. 575-590; an article by Howard F. Becker on "The Nature of the Professions"; Ch. 2, "From Old Arts to New Professions," in Earl F. Cheit's 1975 book, cited immediately above; and H. Bradley Sagan, "The Professions: A Neglected Model for Undergraduate Education," *Liberal Education* (December, 1973).

33 Samuel Banks, in Kenneth Underwood *et al*., *op. cit*., p. 385.

34 Evan Patishall, *ibid*., pp. 385-386.

35 Paul Sanazaro, *ibid*., pp. 349-350.

36 *Ibid*., p. 354.

37 *Ibid*., p. 355.

38 William F. May, "Code, Covenant, Contract, or Philanthropy," *Hastings Center Report 5* (December, 1975), pp. 31-32.

39 Seymour Wishman, "A Lawyer's Guilty Secrets," *Newsweek* (November 9, 1981), p. 25.

40 William F. May, *Notes on the Ethics of Doctors and Lawyers* (The Poynter Center, Indiana University, 1977), p. 6.

41 *Ibid*., p. 25.

42 *Ibid*., p. 26.

43 *Ibid*., p. 27.

44 *Ibid*., p. 28.

45 *Ibid*., p. 30.

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46 Ibid., p. 31.

47 Ibid., p. 32.

48 Kenneth Underwood, op. cit., p. 25.

49 Ibid., p. 91.

50 Ibid., p. 93.

51 Ibid., p. 420.

52 Ibid., p. 448.

53 William F. May, Notes on the Ethics of Doctors and Lawyers, p.20.

54 Ibid., p. 21.

55 Ibid., p. 21.

56 Ibid., p. 21.

57 Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era (University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. xxi, 118, et passim.

58 J. Douglas Brown, cited in Duncan Norton-Taylor, "The Private World of the Class of '66," Fortune (February, 1966), p. 172.

59 "Harvard's Report on the 'Core Curriculum,'" The Chronicle of Higher Education (March 8, 1978), p. 16.

60 Henry Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work (Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 96-99.

61 D. W. Bray, et al., The Formative Years in Business: A Long-Term Study of Managerial Lives (Wiley, 1974), pp. 78-79.

62 Norman Cousins, "How to Make People Smaller Than They Are," Saturday Review (December, 1978), p. 15.

63 Arthur Chickering, "Vocations and the Liberal Arts," in Dyckman W. Vermilye, ed., op. cit., p. 139.

PART FOUR

Strategies

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Chapter Six

Approaches to Humanistic Teaching

I.

It was the first day of the fall semester, and I was the college's new academic dean. I have arrived at my office before eight o'clock, ready to receive there the life and death issues of the academy which would be brought, by teacher and student alike, for my adjudication.

I was scarcely a moment too soon, for at two minutes past eight my door was flung open, and in strode a member of the Philosophy and Religion Department, bearing his outrage in empty hands. He had just entered his Old Testament classroom to begin the semester's work and had discovered that the chalk trays were empty! Not a single slender cylinder anywhere to be found.

Incredulous, he had sought out the second-floor maintenance man, just having a first coffee of the day in his comfortably-appointed second-floor closet. In tones of prophetic doom, the biblical scholar demanded an account of the missing chalk. The custodian, after 40 years in that particular academic Sinai, was not ruffled by prophetic pretense. "Simple," he said. "There's a new policy this year. No more chalk in the chalk trays. Professors have to carry it from class to class in their pockets."

So the unbelieving pedagogue cam straight to me. "What sort of callous, penny-wise-pound-foolish administrative idiocy is this?" he demanded to know. "Are the faculty to be dared to teach well this year, distracted by administrative tasks like carrying chalk in their pockets, or deprived entirely of the fragile white scepters of their scholarly authority? Are they to be forced to write on dusty boards with tongue-moistened finger?"

He was distraught, and I sought to soothe him in my best decanal manner. I assured him that I shared his distress, that I understood his need, and that

I would take action at once against this mischievous, not to say monstrous, assault on academic integrity.

So I went first to the Business Manager and asked whether the policy, enunciated by the custodian, had originated with him. "First I've heard of it," he said. Then on to the President to see if the rule were his fiat. "Silliest thing I ever heard of!" he assured me.

In the end, it turned out that the new policy had been promulgated by the second-floor maintenance man. Tired of being chalk-boy to the faculty, he had determined to make things easier for himself this year. By nine o'clock, there was chalk in all the trays.

This event, which I call The Great Chalk CRisis, was real. It is only slightly embellished in the retelling, and it was a watershed in my academic career. For from it I came vividly to see that the besetting peril of every teacher and administrator is that he shall be nibbled to death by terrible trivialities.

Indeed, dreadful and daily as that peril is, the situation for many of us is even worse. Not long ago Stephen Bailey, then Vice President of the American Council on Education, wrote that

> Colleges and universities tend to be incubators of anxiety for most professionals who work in and for them. "Sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought" is more than a Shakespearean aphorism. It is an endemic academic tendency that, unless constantly fought and dispersed, casts a dark mist upon the groves of academe. This mist is, I am sure, unevenly spread over particular institutions, departments, and areas of the country. But with new tensions created by tight budgets, internal governance struggles, and affirmative-action mandates, the mist of the moment

is all but ubiquitous. 1

As he wrote those lines, he said, faces of academic colleagues came rushing into memoried view: a mid-career scientist, publicly out-pointed by a junior member of his department, sensing that the world had passed him by; a young literary humanist, gradually turned nihilist, "who ended up in his garage with a monoxide hose in his mouth."; a middle-aged college president, dead of a heart attack brought on by faculty and student harrassment; a slightly tipsy political scientist, commenting during a performance of Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf, that most of the audience thought the play sheer fantasy,"but you and I know better, don't we?"; 45-year olds, weary with the repetition of undergraduate teaching, with neither opportunity or will to be updated, "sinking slowly into a permanent torpor relieved only by the bottle and somebody else's wife"; and new teachers, whose imaginations had been caught by a multidisciplinary problem, advised by cynical colleagues to stick to the departmental system. 2

This is a melancholy litany, and I should be inclined to apologize for reciting it, were it not for the fact that it strikes me--almost in the literal sense of having physical impact--as undeniably authentic. I have experienced these tragic subversions at work in the colleges and universities which have touched my life. I have seen them in the arbirtrariness of administrators which masks a sense of panic in the presence of lonely vulnerability; in the arrogance of teachers which barely disguises their boredom, caught as many of them are in what Morris Keeton and Conrad Hilberry called "their one-track careers"; 3 and in the diffidence of students which is the mark of their alienation--not, now, a political alienation so much as a sense that they are regularly asked to conform themselves to alien and abstract institutional shapes which bear little relation to their own dispositions and aspirations. And all of us--administrators, teachers, and students, alike--constantly

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struggle with the problem of maintaining a competence to match the demands with which we are daily confronted.

There was a time, said Stephen Bailey, when many of these problems could be mitigated for a teacher or administrator simply by moving to another job on another campus, but that now such opportunities for "psychic relief" are much harder to find.

> Instead faculty will be tenured-in for longer periods of time; fewer young people will join the staffs and provide the ginger of newness; administrators will see their leadership capabilities frittered away in endless negotiations with anxious and often preemptive faculty committees, union bargainers, trustees, task forces, student caucuses, and state budgeteers; timidity will spread a dull gray Linus blanket of tradition over every aspect of college life...4

It is almost as if Max Weber's prophetic utterance of two generations ago is, at last, about to catch up with us. "No one knows," Weber wrote,

> who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of compulsive self-importance. For of the last stage of this cultural development it might truly be said: "specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart, this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved."5

I have three reasons for invoking such conditions in this **penultimate chapter:** One is simple conviction that little by way of accuracy or curative efficacy can be expected from a diagnosis which is arrived at by looking the other way; and nothing except a deeper morbidity can result from pretending

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that an illness is not real.

Second, and more important, is a realization that these "gut" issues so absorb the attention and energy of teachers and administrators these days, that there may be very little attention and energy left over even to consider the kinds of issues raised earlier in this volume, let alone to do anything substantial about them.

Third, and more important still, is my conviction that the "gut" issues have solutions--not easy answers, to be sure, and perhaps not even convenient ones, but solutions all the same--and that we ought to get on with the job at once, so that having been freed from our current self-preoccupation and self-pity, we can attend once more to the integrity of teaching and learning. In what follows, I want first to describe, and then make constructive response to, the malaise which seems commonly to afflict undergraduate teaching; and, in a later section, to suggest what opportunities for the reshaping of administration may lie in the present organizational crisis.

II.

I want to begin with a classroom incident reported some time ago by Michael Novak. The Professor of Philosophy asked his introductory class how many believed in God. No one responded. The Professor then proceeded to sketch out Anselm's proof of God's existence. Having finished, he invited the class to suggest flaws in the Anselmian argument. Again, no one responded. Then obviously, he told them, some of you must now believe in God. How many? Still no one responded. In commenting on the incident later, the Professor shrugged, "What can you do when thinking doesn't seem to make any difference?"[6]

That will be a poignant question for many a teacher, and it may expose the disspiriting anachronism of her daily experience, of her daily discouragement. She may think of herself as an intellectual, not in a pretentious or

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arrogant sense, but an intellectual at least as one who believes, with John Maynard Keynes, that "the power of visted interests is vastly exaggerated when compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas"7; as one who values that encroachment and intends, precisely through teaching, to aid and abet it. Yet she may find her classroom largely occupied with persons--"student" may be too large a dignity to confer upon them--who appear to care nothing about ideas. They may, indeed, engage in classroom argument, redolent with impulse but essentially innocent of thought. Such minimal academic caring as in evidence may be devoted to vague and vagrant speculation in term papers, in a last-minute cramming of facts for examinations, and in fervent plea-bargaining with her in that critical space between her calculation of their grades for the term and her reporting of them for the Registrar's indelible mark.

Perhaps the disabilities displayed by those who sit in classrooms these days are even more basic. More than disinterest in ideas, they have to do with a lack of preparation for college-level work: not merely the absence of what were once considered minimal skills in reading, writing, and computation, but an inability to organize; even more often an inability to synthesize; and more regularly still, an inability to engage in serious play with ideas, or even to comprehend what such serious play might involve. So, if a teacher takes account of where these young men and women are who have come to her for tuition, she may find herself going more and more slowly, expecting less and less of them by way of performance, compromising her own intellectual standards in the process and thus falling into a double contempt--for them, and for herself.

All of which means that these days a teacher may spend most of her classroom hours with men and women who lack the skills, and who are indifferent at best or contemptuous at worst toward the values, which comprise for that teacher a vocation.

Or perhaps a teacher is not an intellectual. In my experience, relatively few college teachers are. Many a teacher has come to teaching because he discovered as an undergraduate that he had a particular skill or set of skills from which he received recognition and, as a consequence, from which he derived important satisfaction. Quantitative skill, it may have been, inductive or deductive skills; organizational or manipulative skills; mental skill; test-wise skill--exhibited singly or in combination in the course of mastering a particular undergraduate discipline. This recognition and satisfaction led him to graduate school, and if the recognition and satisfaction were confirmed there, as likely as not they eventuated for him in a career in teaching. There is not much else they could lead to, for basically he has taken his pleasure in being a student--a more and more sophisticated one, to be sure, but a student all the same.

And for a time, in that first or even second teaching appointment following graduate school, being a reasonably sophisticated student may be enough. He may try to follow the injunction and example of his graduate school mentors by putting mind and hand to an occasional piece of research, since he has been taught that research is the mark of the real professional, the avenue to continued recognition, and perhaps even to distinction, among his disciplinary peers. The difficulty is often that, whereas in graduate school what he wrote commanded at least the attention of his course instructor, now nobody seems to care that he exists, particularly not the editors of journals in his field. And gradually he comes to the realization that his work is not, after all, very original--originality was not one of the things graduate school trained him for--or very substantial as intellectual importance is measured.

It may be then that he comes to the kind of conclusion Kingsley Amis gives to Jim Dixon, the luckless anti-hero of a novel which Amis ironically entitled

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Lucky Jim. Dixon is a junior history don in a third-rate English college, who is being pressed by his Chairman to submit for publication an article on some research he had done into the economic influence of 15th century shipbuilding. When the chairman asks to be reminded of the article's title, Dixon feels almost ashamed to recite it. "It was a perfect title [he thought to himself], in that it crystallized the article's niggling mindlessness, its funereal parade of yawn-enforcing facts, the pseudo-light it threw on non-problems." Publication, the history Chairman presses, is the only way to find out what the article's worth; Dixon himself can't be sure of that until it is published, the Chairman insists. But Dixon thinks, on the contrary, that he knows well enough what it is worth from several points of view. "From one of these, the thing's worth could be expressed in one short hyphenated indecency; from another, it was worth the amount of frenzied, fact-grubbing and fanatical boredom that had gone into it; from yet another, it was worthy of its aim, the removal of the 'bad impression' he'd so far made in the College and in his Department."8

So, the dream of recognition on which the teacher has fed for so long having come to an end--available neither from his students, who are never generous with priase, nor from professional colleagues, who appear either unaware or unimpressed, perhaps because they are similarly self-absorbed--he may come at last to wonder whether, as a teacher, he is engaged in a useful form of adult activity.

Perhaps for some the issue is not so much that they lack professional recognition and satisfaction as it is their failure to experience in the college itself anything approaching genuine human interaction. Perhaps there is little real sense of colleagueship, of common cause and shared commitment, of mutual caring, with the result that there is simultaneity--and that sometimes with great intensity--but no intimacy. When I was an academic dean, a faculty

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colleague wrote me a note about our faculty meetings: "We sit on a late workday evening. We are, as a faculty of a small college, a group which rarely meets even in substantial fraction of the whole, let alone as a total body. And we are psychologically (and intellectually) strangers to one another." That will do as a description of academic alienation until something more compelling comes along. He was quite right about it, and the cost was enormous in randomness and hostility, in disappointment and cynicism, and in that impoverishment of the spirit which left us all lesser persons that we might have been.

All of us--teachers and administrators--might find the tolerance we need for being together if we understood, better than we customarily do, the peculiar source of pressure under which many live and work. Oddly enough, one of the pressing human problems faced increasingly these days in the smaller colleges is the flip side of one of their notable historic strengths. Flexibility and adaptability have been the distinctive mark of the smaller undergraduate institution in America, the result of the fact that they have most often been staffed by intelligent versatile generalists. Larger and more diversified institutions may have, in the Department of English, a specialist who deals exclusively with the Victorian period (or perhaps more specially still, with the Victorian novel), but the typical Professor of English in a smaller institution finds himself teaching across a broad spectrum of courses, perhaps ranging from the 17th century into the contemporary period, and touching most of the main literary genres.

Much of the same thing is true in administration. Larger institutions may have individual administrators who deal quite separately with accounting, and financial aid, and the investment of endowment funds, and supervision of maintenance and housekeeping personnel; but in the smaller schools, the Business Manager may find himself having to deal with all or most of those areas, out of his own resources, in the course of a single working day.

There are some distinct advantages to this traditional characteristic of the smaller institution. From a human point of view, the generalist himself experiences a certain exhilaration--a heightened morale--from the stimulation of varied responsibilities and the challenge of untried tasks. Moreover, intelligent, versatile generalists have accounted in large measure for the durability of America's smaller institutions, since such persons are able to shift with relative speed and ease into whatever professional roles may be demanded by the shifting nature of the college's fortunes and needs.

At least that is true when times are reasonably favorable and demands are of manageable size, and there is some margin of tolerance for the occasional imprecision which may be the cost of spreading even an intelligent generalist over several areas. But when, as now, times are not favorable and staff reductions force both teachers and administrators into areas for which they have neither minimal preparation nor disposition, and when even a minor margin of ineffectiveness in teaching or management can be complicating if not actually disastrous in its effect on enrollments or resources, traditional virtue of professional self-identity and loss of confidence, in strained relations with students and with colleagues, to say nothing of the burden we carry back into relationships with spouses and children.

And there is one final element in this ecology of discontent, before I turn the process to its hopeful face. If colleges are too often incubators of disappointment and cynicism these days, perhaps that is because even intelligent, versatile generalists typically experience themselves in restricted roles of limited significance in an institution whose corporate identity is scarcely more impressive than their own. The student is there "to get a degree"; the teacher is rehearsing routine subject-matter; the administrator sees himself as little more than functionary; and as a collective presence, the college displays a disspiriting nondescriptness. The melancholy comment of the mathematician in a distinguished private college, in his report as chairman of its self-study, speaks the wistfulness which many experience: "Surely something can be done about this situation in which we have many excellent and successful parts but in which the whole is somehow listless and disappointing."

III.

What, then, is to be done to turn the college once more into a hopeful place which stretches the capacities and lifts the spirits of those who live and work in it? I am entirely persuaded that there are some things we can do, though they will not be done easily. Neither will they eliminate anxiety entirely from among us, not should we even wish for that to happen. Change and growth inevitably generate anxiety, and that in itself can be a good thing, so long as we determine that it shall be a creative anxiety; for that is one of the chief ingredients in all significant human achievement. These are some of the things we can do to begin the recovery of hope among us:

First, when classroom experience leads us to the conclusion that "thinking doesn't seem to make any difference," there is something we can do about it. Consider the evidence that classroom contact alone may not be sufficient to increase the regard of our students for careful intellectual work. A longitudinal study of students at eight diverse institutions reached what I consider to be a striking conclusion; that frequent personal, out-of-class interaction with faculty members appears to result in "an increased commitment to intellectual concerns" on the part of such students. This is what the study said:

> ...on a scale of Intellectual Disposition, as measured by the Omnibus Personality Inventory..., students whose intellectual orientations as freshmen were quite moderate, but who increased significantly on this

> dimension by their senior year, reported more frequent out-of-class interaction with faculty than a matched group of students who did not increase in their intellectual disposition over the four years.9

Nor was this influence merely on intellectual disposition:

> High-interacting students also perceived more than other students that they had made more progress in a variety of specific academic skills....They felt, for example, that they had increased their knowledge both of specifics, such as terminology or trends, and of universals and abstractions in their major fields. They also felt that they were better able to comprehend or interpret, to evaluate methods and materials, and to apply abstractions or principles to a particular situation. These academic skills are, of course, the stock-in-trade of faculty and among the chief wares which they offer to students. Not surprisingly, course-related or intellectual issues were among the most frequent kinds of out-of-class discussions reported by both faculty and students.10

Not surprisingly, high student-faculty interaction also correlated with a student's ability "to name a teacher who had made a major contribution to his educational or personal development."

> High-interacting students...significantly more often than others named a faculty member as having "influenced their choice of major" and were more likely to say that one of the reasons for their choice of major was that "faculty encouraged them."11

And in these days when increased student retention is of major concern to almost every college and university, it is worth noting that "high-interacting students expressed significantly greater satisfaction than low-interacting students with their total college experience and with virtually all aspects of it...."12

This means, so it seems to me, that every teacher faces a fundamental choice between accepting the intellectual disappointment of the classroom, on the one hand, and accepting the inconvenience which may result from a willingness to create those environments for students, outside of the classroom as well as within it, in which thinking begins to make a difference. If our common complaint about the intellectual indisposition of our students is only intended to make unfavorable comparison between ourselves and them, then perhaps we have our reward in such satisfaction as we may squeeze out of invidious self-congratulation. If, on the other hand, it is not so much a complaint as an expression of caring disappointment, there is something we can do about it. Henry Nouwen writes about returning to Notre Dame, where he had taught for a number of years, and of meeting again an older and experienced professor who had spent most of his life in that place. "And while we strolled over the beautiful campus, he said with a certain melancholy in his voice, "You know,...my whole life I have been complaining that my work was constantly interrupted, until I discovered that my interruptions were my work."13

Second, if we are frustrated in our teaching by the modest preparation students bring with them into our classrooms from the secondary school, there is something we can do about it. I recall vividly my own shock, as a visiting scholar at a small college, at finding students in my classes whose verbal scores on the SAT hovered in the low 400s, whereas I had been accustomed to teaching students whose entering mean verbal score was above 600. My initial reaction to limitations of their verbal skills was close to despair; but having concluded that the satisfaction of self-pity was likely to be short-lived, I decided to try an experiment. What I wanted my students to do was to play a serious intellectual game, to learn how to bring two previously unrelated

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sets of ideas into imaginative interaction in order to see what the result might be. Since they had obviously no experience at playing such a game, practice seemed clearly indicated, as it is with any new skill, intellectual or otherwise. So I devised a series of tests of their ability to engage in such synthetic activity, but at increasing levels of expectation. They would not be as good on it on the first test as on the second, and the third ought to be better still. An essential part of the scheme was my own careful, and where useful extended, written comment on each of these tests, in order to help them monitor and modify their own practice against my expectations for them.

What I learned from this experiment was very heartening, and it has made a substantial difference to my teaching ever since: most of those students actually grew--some of them grew dramatically--in their ability to play the game. They were not inherently inept, as I was first inclined to believe; they were, rather, unpracticed. Given the presence of a new and clear demand for intellectual behavior, given an opportunity to practice it at successive levels of expectation, and given careful information from me along the way about how well they were performing, they grew. I can't begin to describe what satisfaction there was for them in growth--and for me. Nor can I begin to describe how that experience has changed, not my standards, but my respect for students of modest preparation, believing as I do that if I create the proper conditions, most of them can learn to do things neither they nor I believed could be done. And I cannot begin to describe, either, how that respect has made my teaching both more human and more humane.

Third, if we are bored with course-content and with the routine response it wins from students, with efforts to keep reasonably conversant with what is going on in the discipline, and with obligatory but inconsequential research, there is something we can do about it. For one thing, we can break out of the

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self-preoccupation which yields these disappointments by shifting our own attention in the classroom from teaching to learning; that is, by being less concerned with covering subject-matter content as an end in itself, which tends to focus on the role of the teacher, and more concerned about subject-matter as both vehicle and occasion for provoking growth in students along clearly identified dimensions--informational, intellectual, and applied. That will mean that the courses we teach must be designed by first identifying the very specific skills and competences we will expect students to achieve, and then by putting subject-matter and the teaching role in the service of that achievement. For many of us, that will represent a fundamental shift. It will take time for reflection and practice,and we will not be comfortable with the change at once. But the promise in persistence is very high. Pleasure in seeing students grow, and recognition of our own part in that growth, can be of the chief satisfactions of teaching. Larry L. Rose, who has made this shift in his own view of teaching, writes that if we could be

> liberated to turn our teaching of...subject-matter to its larger purposes, we could be renewed in our enthusiasm for our calling. We could get a great kick out of suddenly becoming important to the real lives of our students, out of turning the subject-matter specialization with which we have become bored into a meaningful learning experience for students who will use it, not for professional, but for human purposes.14

It is, in any event, not so much the facts of a subject in themselves at which we ought to be aiming in our teaching, as it is our estimate of the significances which accrue in and emerge out of the factual welter. It will do me little good, as a student, to be able to recite with chronological accuracy the succession of the monarchies in Britain and France if, in the process, I have learned nothing about the career of power. It will trivialize the study of genetics

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if I master the DNA code but come away unawed by its incredible workmanship and mysterious potency. It will be de-humanizing if, in the study of psychology and sociology, I learn in detail what manipulations can be achieved by social engineering, without at the same time being given any sense of what ought not be done because of the fragility of the human species. And it will be an artistic distortion if I master the techniques of a medium for privatistic purposes, and fail to learn from the master painter of "Guernica," that the true artist is "a social creature, always wide-awake in the face of heart-rending bitter or sweet events of the world and wholly fashioned himself according to their image."

So, in our teaching we ought deliberately and regularly and provocatively to be uncovering the deeper and broader significances--social, political, moral, religious--of the subjects we teach, and inviting our students to experience those significances for themselves. And as teachers, we ought to be exploring and expanding and, equally important, acting upon those significances in our own personal and professional lives. The vocation of research and publication is not for everyone, nor should it be; but the task of doing the discipline, as I insisted at some length in Chapter Three--of working out its implications and applications, in our own lives and in the larger life which is accesssible to our reach--ought to be the humanistic task of every scholar. To do otherwise is to ignore a source for the continual reinvogoration and renewal of our own teaching.

Nor would we have to look very far afield to discover where our applied intelligence is desperately and consequentially needed. The college itself has a wide variety of needs for specialized expertness--which it seldom gets because it cannot afford it-- for which members of its own faculty ought in principle to be qualified, but which they, in their turn, customarily neglect or ignore. For example:

A college has philosophical and anthropological needs, in the sense that it cannot function effectively apart from a clear and clearing grasp of its human and humane character and purpose as a college. Academic humanists ought to have specialized insights to contribute to that collective self-understanding.

A college is a social entity which regularly acts out complex interpersonal and organizational problems--where caste and class, individuals and collectives, freedom and order, nature and nurture, human productiveness and cost-effectiveness, all exist in problematic relation. Social scientists ought to have specialized insights which could help to make those relationships not only manageable but constructive.

As a visual and plastic environment, a college sets important aesthetic problems, and it represents, moreover, a virtual laboratory in which to experiment with the relationship between the arts and specific life and work settings, with the promise of transforming art from something merely precious (protected, detached, compartmentalized) into something lived. Teachers of the fine arts ought to have something substantial to contribute to the aesthetic transformation of the campus.

A college is a complex ecological system, with a need to keep its biological, physical, and social parts in healthy balance. Natural scientists ought to help us maintain that balance.

And since all of these components of a college actually exist in living interaction, the possibilities for teachers of an intellectually integrated disposition--utilizing the resources of several disciplines in fresh combination--are virtually unlimited.

The needs described above, which are common to every college, cannot be met only or even primarily by conducting standard obejctive research which yields quantifiable descriptive data, useful as that may be. More important is the need for ideas: efforts on the part of teacher-scholars in the college, first to use their specialized training to help determine what important questions ought to be asked in the problem areas, and then to dare to propose fresh, imaginative, creative, openly speculative answers to those questions without regard

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to their empirical validation. I can think of few things which have a greater likelihood of transforming routine activities in the college into genuine excitement at being together, and of investing each of us with a sense of worth and significance, because what we know, and what we are able to do with what we know, matters to that community which is the locus of our effort in a larger sense, perhaps, than ever before.

Fourth, if what teachers experience in the midst of students and colleagues is loneliness, even alienation--if the campus seems to be a place where there is proximity but no meaningful relationships--there is something we can do about it. And the first thing to do is to recognize the truth that effective relationship--any kind of effective relationship, including the transaction which goes by the name of teaching--is built on vulnerability. If that is bad news, it is nevertheless the best that I or anyone else can do.

A decade ago John C. Moore, then an Assistant Professor of History at Hofstra University, made a proposal in an article entitled "The Unexamined Life of the Professor" which I want to endorse:

> At the beginning of each semester, when the professor posts his office hours, let him post his credo as well. He should precede it, of course, with the *caveat*, "subject to change without notice," but he should then formulate, as best he can, the guiding principles of his life and his fundamentals beliefs about the world around him. Some credos would be terse: "I think; therefore, I am," or "$E=mc^2$." Others would run on into full-scale *Apologiae* or Confessions. In any case, the benefits would be invaluable. The halls of university buildings would become infinitely more interesting....If nothing else, the student might be reassured to discover that the confident, critical mind, so adept at finding cracks and leaks in the intellectual foundations of others,

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fumbles along like everyone else when it tries to build its own. Moreover,...the professor would profit enormously from the effort of formulating his credo and from the chastening but enlightening experience of having it subjected to the criticism of others.

The point is that, in a situation where nothing can be changed except by the power of vulnerability, somebody has to take a risk. And I am not entitled to complain about "proximity without intimacy" unless I am also willing to be the one who risks. Nerve for such vulnerability may come from the awareness that, if I dare to risk it, I will find my own selfhood enlarging precisely by what my colleagues and my students are able to give it. The more I shrink from such open encounter, the less adequate I shall be for it--and for most of the other things I try to do--and the more alienated I am likely to become. The more I give myself to such open encounter, the more likely it is that I shall be enabled to grow--even at my advanced age!--a larger self which will make me a more effective teacher of the liberal arts and sciences precisely because I am becoming a more competent human being, and a more competent human being precisely because I am becoming a more effective teacher of the liberal arts and sciences.

Fifth, when the demand for performance outruns the present competence of teachers and administrators, there is something we can do about it. These are days in which change has virtually become a way of life for the American college, but professionals should not be expected to adapt to change, or to produce the new skills required by change, simply on demand. Nor should it be assumed that the responsibility for adaptation, and for changing or increasing competences, is properly borne by the individual professional alone. That responsibility must be shared, with the college making it quite clear what resources it is prepared to provide in assisting teachers and administrators to meet the new de-

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mands it places upon them. Especially in these days of straitened budgets, when staff reductions place a larger burden on the professional effectiveness and morale of fewer people, a minimum of 1/2 of one percent of the educational and general budget should be allocated for professional development as an investment in continuing quality: for updating information and skills, for training in newer instructional and managerial methods, for short-term study and for visitation to other campuses, for modest but stimulating grants to support the reshaping of course designs or of organizational units, for scholarly productiveness, and for whatever imagination commends.

But not all forms of professional development cost money. Indeed, funds spent on its behalf are unlikely to have much synergistic effect unless there is, on the campus, a pervasive climate which supports and encourages the growth of professionals in a number of dimensions. For example, earlier in this chapter I observed that, in my experience, relatively few undergraduate teachers qualify as intellectuals; but intellectual growth, surely desirable for teachers no less than for students, can be encouraged by example and opportunity. So we need to find ways to expose the intellectual commitments which already exist among teachers and administrators, and to hope for a contagion. That can be done, for example, through the creation of forums--formal and informal, more inclusive and less inclusive--in which teachers can be heard by colleagues on issues which matter intensely to them, and in which colleagues of differing persausions can air their differences for constructive effect. As an academic dean, I concluded that about half of the time spent in monthly faculty meetings dealt with dispensable trivia; and therefore, with full support of my faculty colleagues, I instituted a faculty forum in alternate months, in which some of the important substantive issues facing the college could be addressed, both by its own members and occasionally by distinguished visitors.

One of the things which frustrates genuine liberal learning is the fact that many teachers are not liberally-educated persons themselves. Inadequate as role-models for students, they may also be indifferent or hostile to an achievement in students which they do not possess themsleves. If the teacher is not a liberally educated person when he arrives on the campus, he can still become one as long as channels are open for serious intellectual and cultural exchange with colleagues in other disciplines. It is, indeed, one of the chief advantages of the smaller institution, that scholarly conversation is seldom intradepartmental but crosses disciplinary lines with relative ease. Deliberate provision of opportunities for colleagues to teach each other is an essential strategy in the survival of effective liberal learning.

Professionals need organized opportunities to talk about their work. Simply getting teachers to talk with one another about teaching has been found to be among the most effective means for its improvement. A continuing seminar on issues in higher education, perhaps taught by the academic dean, will help to mitigate that intense preoccupation with local problems which regularly blocks our awareness of the successes and failures of persons elsewhere who perform similar tasks and face similar demands. And careful consideration needs to be given to the needs of the college for the immediate future, in order to examine the possibility of more congenial, more stimulating, more productive shifts in individual professional responsibilities for persons who are blocked or bored.

Each of these can help to create a climate which supports serious professional development. Many cost little or nothing, but they provide the recognition, the stimulation, and the morale out of which significant growth can occur.

And the most important beneficiaries of all this will be out students. "I don't know enough to say how to turn on the light of enthusiasm in students by direct action," Stephen Bailey has written.

My guess is that we do them our greatest honor and benefit by consciously improving the quality of the institutions they attend: the quality of life of chancellors and presidents, of provosts and deans, of department

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heads and professors; the quality of academic standards and professional requirements. If we can do this, the great enterprises we represent will continue to flourish even during periods of financial retrenchment.[15]

Finally, if as a collective presence the college fails to inspire and excite--if it does not give us purposes to participate in which are big enough, and commanding enough, to draw together our individual purposes and competences and invest them with a larger significance--there is something we can do about it. Some apparently paradoxical words Morris Keetong wrote a decade ago strike me as valid, still, today--both in spite of the struggle for survival liberal education will face in the decade ahead, and because of it. Said Keeton, "Safety for colleges in the future lies in greater risks--not thoughtless gambling, but deliberate chancing of socially important and hitherto unmet responsibilities." So, for example,

> ...Earlham College decided that its vision of a world community implied a commitment to non-Western studies for undergraduates, a commitment generally regarded as expensive and disruptive of good educational practice. Yet Earlham took the risk....Today it challenges the provincialism and nationalism of its students with one of the most sophisticated programs of foreign study available.
>
> ...Oberlin fueled its early zeal with feminist, antislavery, and evangelical missionary concerns. Monteith at Wayne State combined commitment to a special approach to liberal education with concern for the children of laborers and immigrants in the inner city of Detroit.

Again and again, said Keeton at the conclusion of his two-year study of the future of the liberal arts colleges, "the vitality of a college can be traced to a critical risk, often a distinctive moral commitment."

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That, in essence, is what this chapter--indeed, this entire book--is about. In the largest terms, it is an invitation to individual teachers and to teaching institutions to risk their renewal on thoroughgoing humanistic terms. It is, in fact--chapter and book alike--a kind of check-list for significant educational risk-taking, powered by a moral commitment to keep human life human by every means a college possesses. And it is offered in the hope that it may assist and encourage educators who are disenchanted with pedestrian vision, or none at all, and with educational nondescriptness or dis-integration, to "break with our myths and our imitative habits and hazard those ventures in purpose" which can create among us a new vitality.[16]

It was St. Augustine who wrote,

> Delight is the only possible source of action; nothing else can move the will. Therefore, a man can act only if he can mobilize his feelings, only if he is affected by an object of delight.

I believe that, with new caring for what happens to our students, outside of the classroom as well as within it; with renewed experience of the significances which are resident within our disciplines, into which it is our teaching task to invite those students, and with a willingness to practice those significances ourselves; and with a willingness to be vulnerable to our colleagues, and to dare the vulnerability of our institutions, believing that in the end growth toward integrity, whether for individuals or for institutions, always depends on vulnerability--with all of this, teaching can once again become "an object of delight" to us.

NOTES

1 Stephen K. Bailey, "Helping Professors (and Therefore Students) to Grow," *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (May 28, 1974), p. 24.

2 *Ibid.*

3 Morris Keeton and Conrad Hilberry, *Struggle and Promise: A Future for Colleges* (McGraw-Hill, 1969), p. 1.

4 Stephen K. Bailey, *op. cit., loc. cit.*

5 Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Scriber, 1958), p. 182.

6 Michael Novak, "God in the Colleges," *Harper's Magazine* (October, 1961), p. 173.

7 John Maynard Keynes quoted in Robert Heilbroner, *The Worldly Philosophers* (Simon & Schuster, 1953), pp. 4-5.

8 Kingsley Amis, *Lucky Jim* (Penguin Books, 1961), pp. 14-15.

9 Lynn Wood and Robert C. Wilson, "Teachers with Impact," *The Research Reporter* (Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley, Vol. VII, Number 2, 1972), p. 2. Emphasis added.

10 *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 3.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 3.

13 Henri J. M. Nouwen, *Reaching Out: Three Movements of the Spiritual Life* (Doubleday, 1975), p. 36.

14 Larry L. Rose, "Teaching for Liberal Learning," privately distributed in mimeographed form.

15 Stephen K. Bailey, *op. cit., loc. cit.*

16 Morris Keeton, "Choosing College Purposes," *Antioch Notes* (Antioch College, November, 1967).

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Chapter Seven

CREATING A CLIMATE FOR CHANGE

I.

In his provocative case for Inventing the Future, Denis Gabor has written,

> [The] future cannot be predicted, but futures can be invented....The first step of the technological or social inventor is to visualize by an act of imagination a thing or state of things which does not yet exist....He can then start rationally arguing backward from the invention and forward from the means at his disposal until a way is found from one to the other.[1]

Too many colleges, these days, are seeking to insure their survival by efforts, more or less sophisticated, to predict what conditions in the wider society are likely to constrain higher education within the next decade or so, in order the better to conform themselves as early and as accurately as possible to that prediction. In many places, the technical means for that early and accurate conformism is marketing, a new "in" activity for colleges, whose purpose commonly is to find out exactly what the public wants, in order to supply it as quickly as possible. If they succeed in that eager adaptation, then American colleges will become, much more than in the past, a mere mass-market reflection, with a cost in uniformity, in vulgarity, and in repressed creativity, which is surely too high to pay. There is something almost obscene in the image of the liberal arts college as panderer.

But success, in all likelihood, will not be the worst of it; for Denis Gabor is right, that the future cannot be predicted. Even as a retrospective discipline, history is an inexact science. Prophecy is more perilous still, for it simply cannot take account of the surprising turns and the unexpected emergents which mark the human course through time. Surely a college, whose historical sense is presumably more acute than any other social institution, ought also to be more wary of prophecy; more willing, instead, to contribute to the surprising turns and unexpected emergents our human course may take, rather than being content merely to guess at them.

Rather than trying to predict the future, colleges ought to be mounting aggressive efforts to invent a future. This will mean accepting Morris Keeton's challenge, cited at the end of the preceding chapter, to take a "critical risk" by the "chancing of socially important and hiterto unmet responsibilities."[2] If we dare to take this approach, marketing will still be an important--indeed, I believe an essential--technical tool for sharpening the interpretation of who we are and what we have to offer, and for finding those publics which can value that offering, whether or not it had previously occurred to them that it was either desirable or available. That is a quite different, and equally legitimate, way of marketing, often utilized with great success in the business world. I did not know that I wanted a pocket calculator, scarcely thicker than a credit card, before it was invented and offered, with a persuasive interpretation of all of the good things it would be able to do for me.

So the focus of our efforts ought to be, not on prediction but on invention; on initiating and sustaining a process of creative and inventive change within the college which can ensure us of significance, confident that that will be both the strongest (the most absorbing and enspiriting) and the best (the most educationally honorable and socially responsible), and therefore the most promising, route to our survival in the threatening times which are before us.

II.

What are the conditions within a college which are essential to a process of creative and inventive change?

Students of organizational behavior are not all agreed on the answer to that question. For the sake of clarity and contrast (even at the risk of some oversimpli-

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fication), we can say that two opposing views emerge out of the liturature, one of which may be termed structural-prescriptive, and the other personal-attitudinal.

The former, urged by those who view organizational management as a science, contends that when alterations are made in the anatomy of an organization--in the ways in which the roles of its individual members are officially defined, and in their formal role-interactions with each other and with the total organizational complex--alteration in the behavior of the organization's members will follow in the direction intended by the structural changes.

In contrast, the latter holds that change can occur only when attention is first given to the values and meanings which are implicit in the desired new state of things, and to the personal competences and interpersonal skills which would be required to achieve them; to the chances for psychological success which that new state of things promises to the organization's members, and to the extent of match between their own personal goals and the proposed new organizational goals.

Implicit in these approaches is a contrast between emphasis on leadership understood in terms of a formal authority-structure, on the one hand; and, on the other, on decision-making which takes account of the informal as well as the formal centers of organizational influence.

It is reasonable to suppose that these two are seldom to be found in their pure forms, and that most arrangements for organizational change employ elements of both, differing in the degree of emphasis which is placed on structural or personal considerations in the mix. Anyone who has read the foregoing pages with reasonable attentiveness will not be surprised that the change-model to be offered in this chapter will combine elements of both, but with a stronger emphasis on the personal than on the structural. So, for example, the primary message of this volume has to do with our need, in the colleges, for an elevating, energizing, and guiding vision of what we are about as educators. At the same time, believing that vision is powerless until it is incarnated--fleshed out, given concreteness

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and invested with sanction--I have urged the re-formation of the graduation requirements, whose authoritatively-defined expectations I believe to be one of the most influential structural components within the life of any college. While calling for substantial participation by informal centers of leadership, of opinion- and decision-making, I will also be advocating a strong role for formal presidential leadership in the change process.

Here are the essential ingredients in effective change-making,[3] offered first in simple outline so that the reader will be able to see the process in its totality:

1. Visionary leadership.
2. Administrative initiatives to authorize and energize change.
3. A clear statement of institutional mission.
4. An enlarged "sense of the possible" among the institution's members
5. Arrangements for information dissemination throughout the institution, throughout the process, and for broad participation both in initial change explorations and in formulating final recommendations.
6. Anticipation of systemic implications.
7. Adoption of changes provisionally, subject to monitoring and modification.
8. Assistance to teachers and administrators in the development of new skills required for effective implementation of the new arrangements.
9. A reward system to encourage effective implementation.
10. Careful interpretation of the new arrangements in subsequent faculty and administrative recruitment.
11. On-going, long-term evaluation to test the continuing faithfulness and effectiveness of the new arrangements in relation to the agreed-upon mission of the college.

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Following are elaborations of the above model:

1. Visionary leadership. "The first step of the technical or social inventor," said Denis Gabor in the passage cited at the opening of this chapter, "is to visualize by an act of the imagination a thing or state of things which does not yet exist."

In any social institution, the resources necessary for creative and inventive change can be gathered and energized only in the articulated presence of the better, the larger, the more complete that is not but might be. Institutional inertia, and the drag created by familiarity and convenience of established ways, can be overcome only when momentum, generated by a new sense of that possible which is also the palpably more desirable, overpowers them. An ancient divine, Thomas Chalmers, told us quite simply, in the title of his famous sermon, that what is required for any kind of significant human transformation is "the expulsive power of a new affection."

I have been arguing in these pages, that a clear educational vision will be needed to give the liberal arts college the direction and momentum it will require, both for its own educational integrity and for its effective survival (which is a very different thing from mere endurance or persistence) in the difficult decades which are ahead. And the generation of such a vision is precisely the obligation of leadership.

Indeed, the first requirement for the leadership of any corporate enterprise, from the presidency of the United States on down, is the articulation of vision. I strongly suspect that one reason for the mystique which surrounded the administration of John Kennedy, and for the peculiar hold Kennedy laid upon many Americans, was the ability he and his advisers had to produce a rhetoric of national purpose. No president since Kennedy has possessed that power, which may explain in significant part why there has been a precipitous decline in the prestige of the presidential office and in the efficacy of presidential leadership. Each of Kennedy's successors seems to have lacked a clear vision which was peculiarly his own, or the power of articulation, or both. And the result has been confusion about the direction of our national life, a decline in national self-confidence, and an increase in political conflict and social disruption.

Vision is only rarely a collective achievement. Most often its source is individual. But any vision which is capable of mobilizing an institution--of winning the consent of its diverse constituents--can only be generated by that individual who can take the most comprehensive view, in whom all of the interests of the institution are assured some measure of respectful attention. That puts responsibility for leadership, and for that vision which is the primary exercise of leadership, squarely up to the chief executive officer, not merely for statutory reasons but for sociological ones: it is only by means of such leadership that human institutions can be made to work creatively.

The articulation of clear, coherent vision is of critical importance to educational institutions, partly because they are full of centrifugal forces and are in constant danger of fragmentation. Where (as is common particularly in these days, with professional mobility severely reduced, and many faculty members not where they would prefer to be) a teacher's loyalty is given, first, to his academic discipline, with commitment to the type of institution in which he is teaching (say, a liberal arts college) secondary at best, and to the specific institution (Alphabeta College, for example) a poor third, fragmentation is a way of life. If, under such conditions, a college is to find any integrity--any influence which can draw fragmentation into some semblance of wholeness--that influence is most likely to come from an institutional leadership which is able to offer a more humanly expansive, and hence more significant, set of possibilities for teaching than any single discipline by itself can promise; a vision which does not negate the discipline, but rather transmutes it by investment in an enterprise of more far-reaching social and even historical importance.

I am inclined to think that periods of vitality in a college can frequently be traced to the presence of visionary leadership, to a president with power to conceive the character and possibilities of the institution in compelling terms, and thereby to generate in it a sense of wholeness and significance, of direction and movement. And I am similarly inclined to the view that periods of uninspired and uninspiring activity, periods when nothing seems to come together or to move measurably, most frequently occur when institutions have managers (at best) rather than leaders. My own informal observation of a large number of campuses over a period of years has led me to expect that, whenever I find an unusual amount of faculty suspicion of a president, I am also likely to find an administrator whose educational rhetoric is banal, or careless, or clouded. The general assumptions academics make about their presidents is that, if they are bright enough to hold that office, they are also bright enough to think, and hence to speak, clearly--that is, comprehendingly and comprehensively--about institutional purposes. If they do not, in fact, speak thus clearly, they must be up to something!

It does not matter, in my experience, whether or not clear and compelling rhetoric expresses a view which all can support, so long as it conveys a view whose integrity and thoughtfulness and importance none can ignore. I find that I am helped toward my own clarity and purpose and momentum by views which arouse my respect, even if in the end I must respectfully decline to agree with them.

I do not want, in these remarks, to diminish in any way the importance of effective organization and of organizational management. They supply the structure which can translate vision into working reality. I do want to distinguish between organization and vision, between management and leadership, and to invite careful attention to their separate requirements. Neither do I want to deny the full seriousness of fiscal or enrollment problems which colleges face these days; but my own estimate is that, while important, they are of secondary importance. Our real test in these times will be whether or not we can produce, in each threatened institution, that strong, clarifying, and comprehensive sense of educational purpose which can help us, without yielding either to opportunism or to desperation, to determine why one thing ought to be done rather than another. That is what leadership is about!

For some administrators, work at a comprehensive vision for their institutions is no more than a matter of ordering time for more thoughtfulness and construction. For others--most particularly presidents who are not of visionary temperament but who must nevertheless see that there is generated a sufficient vision for institutional direction and integrity--the problem is more difficult. I have two suggestions to make. One is that such a president will need to be sure that he has a provost or dean who sees more clearly and thinks more carefully than he does, and that he also has the personal and professional strength necessary to let that dean be his tutor. The other is that such a president need not be an original thinker, if he is at least an intelligent cribber. There are no copyrighted ideas in higher education; everything is in the public domain. No president ought to have the slightest hesitation in shamelessly borrowing for his institutions the best vision the times provide.

2. Administrative initiatives to authorize and energize change. The critical need for presidential leadership in, and for active presidential influence on, the change process is further attested by two other essential conditions: one is a warrant for change, which springs from the power to legitimize it and to put institutional sanctions and resources behind it; and the other is an institutional climate of confidence, which can reduce the threat of change and free its members to work on behalf of change.

A warrant for change--not the specification of its details, which is better left to other constituencies within the college, but an authorization for its need and a

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setting of its direction--is not a call for the arbitrary exercise of executive power. It is, rather, a recognition that change does not come naturally or readily to any social institution, even one whose members prefer to think of themselves as unusually rational and thoughtful men and women. Change is rarely the result of popular collective impulse, even in the face of approaching peril. There is, rather, a natural resistance to any substantive alteration in the settled way of institutional life. Someone who has his or her own relatively independent source of motivation and freedom for movement, and whose influence touches all of the institution's working parts, must give it a push. But it must be a principled push in a principled direction; hence the prior need for a clear, compelling, principled, and articulated vision, without which any warrant is likely to be arbitrary, and its direction random or even desperate. Clearly, then, the push must be presidential.

The presidential warrant must contain at least three things, in addition to authorization of a change process, if it is to be effective: (a) it must define the scope of that process, clearly designating those areas of institutional life which are to be the subjects for re-examination, so that efficiency can be served by a reasonably precise focus; (b) it must set the time constraints to be imposed upon the process, and especially the due-date for final recommendations, so that work can be organized for timely conclusiveness; and (c) it must review the decision-making procedures through which those recommendations will pass, so that everyone will understand in advance the extent of his own opportunity and responsibility. Only with this kind of *a priori* clarity and definition can members of the institution be freed from their normal disposition to bicker indefinitely over procedural details, thus permitting them to give full and timely attention to reaching those substantive conclusions which the presidential warrant invites but leaves properly unspecified.

And when it comes to a climate of confidence within which change can be entertained, accommodated, and supported, the key again is presidential. In my experience, the

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single most important factor in determining the esprit of an institution is its chief executive officer. If the college is an unhappy and defensive place, that condition is commonly traceable to the formal and informal communication of presidential attitudes which indicate unhappiness and defensiveness. If a college is a suspicious and apprehensive place, that is commonly traceable to a presidential style which is secretive or unpredictable. If a college is a frightened place, that is commonly traceable to a sense that the president lacks sufficient grasp, that things are out of control at the top, and that, in occupying the presidential office, he seems to have risen to the level of his incompetence, as the Peter Principle would put it. Added to such a situation, change--unsettling under the best of conditions--is simply intolable.

If, on the other hand, a college is a confident place where morale is high, and where there is an experience of promising momentum, that condition is also commonly traceable to the direct communication of presidential attitudes and actions which indicate that his or her own morale is high, that colleagues in the college enjoy presidential confidence if not always presidential agreement, and that he or she has a firm, reasonably clear, and openly articulated sense of institutional direction. In that very different situation, change--even when it is unsettling--can be welcomed as further evidence that the college is moving aggressively and decisively to meet its challenges.

Morale can have a powerful double-effect: on the one hand, it can enhance and even expand the possibilities of a limited situation; on the other, it can reduce and waste and destroy even the limited possibilities a situation offers. The task of the academic administrator, especially of the president but also of the academic dean--a task far more important than crisp and efficient management--it to be a purveyor of hope to the college. That means trying to find ways to say Yes as often as the educational and fiscal integrity of the college can permit it. It means a determination to reduce bureaucratic complications which waste time and exhaust patience, so that people can get on with what is important in their personal and professional lives. It means a willingness to take the time to listen carefully, to respond promptly and consistently and even-handedly, and so far as possible to eliminate personality predilections from that listening and responding. It means offering encouragement for professional venturing, help and not merely rebuke in the presence of failure, and commendation and recognition for work well done. And it means constant awareness by president and dean that professionals are, in the first instance, persons whose dreams and discouragements and lives are larger than the college.

If, as I believe, presidential influence on the morale of the institution is primary, it is by no means solitary. The ablest president, even one assisted by the ablest academic dean, cannot conjure up a creative institutional climate simply out of administrative effort. I have known many faculty members, in a number of institutions, who seemed to have a personal, psychological investment in maintaining an institutional atmosphere of frustration and failure, and who defied the efforts of conscientious administrators to make it otherwise. The Chairman of the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities was surely right when he said recently, "The best managerial plan won't work unless the spirit is there." And the spirit that must be there is esprit de corps, a collective spirit. If each teacher and administrator is to experience the college as a worthy and desirable place to be, that is likely to happen only as each contributes to the collective sense of well-being on which all can draw for support.

So teachers and other administrators will need to be persuaded--and who better to attempt that persuasion than the president--that the survivability of the college in the days immediately ahead will depend on the willingness of its members to mount their attacks on the common difficulties which beset them, rather than on each other, as institutional extremity will tempt them to do. They cannot afford invidiousness; they must work out a common destiny. They cannot afford the pettiness, the academic animus, which seem ironically and unhappily endemic to college life; they will need, instead, a tolerance for persons to match the pretense they make at a tolerance for

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ideas. They cannot afford to be impatient with each other too quickly; none knows the full extent of the other's burden.

They cannot afford such behavior, they will need to be persuaded, because it will divide their strength, it will draw energy away from constructive imagination, it will compromise their competence, and it will rob them of the resiliency for change which effective survival will require.

3. A clear statement of institutional mission.* In some places, it will seem to teachers and administrators that they have engaged in "mission-talk" *ad infinitum* in recent years, to say nothing of *ad nauseum*. "Mission Madness Strikes our Colleges"[4] was the title of a recent article in a prominent educational periodical, with its author calling for a moratorium on mission-talk. I think he was precisely wrong. The problem is not so much with the process as with the product; with the fact that, in the end, the mission statements which we have produced don't matter, for at least three reasons:

For one thing, they are customarily couched in the kind of generality which virtually defies translation into operational terms, with the result that they seldom provide any specific guidance for decision-making. Under such circumstance, it

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*It may be useful, before proceeding, to clarify the relationship between the articulation of vision, called for above, and the statement of institutional mission, to be treated here. While closely related, they are quite distinct, and both are essential to the creation of a constructive climate for change. The mission statement is a consensus document, the formal codification of the most substantial educational purposes for a college which can be agreed to by its teachers, administrators, and trustees, and hence the product of compromise, however elevated. In contrast, because vision has its locus in the life and work of a significant person within the college, rather than in the pages of a printed document, it is dynamic, proactive and responsive, taking fresh forms of expression on important occasions in the life of the college, constantly seeking to enspirit what has been codified, and to lure codified compromise to higher levels.

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is not surprising that, once crafted, they are cordially ignored. Moreover, we have often striven for missional uniqueness or distinctiveness, when it would have been enough had we merely managed to be distinct. So much of higher education is in the public domain, that uniqueness is hard to come by; and so much of higher education is both diffused and confused, that clarity alone would be unique. Finally, we have too often sought to craft a statement which no one, in or out of the college, could possibly resist. As the author of that recent article remarked, "In the end, vague and vapid goals able to attract a consensus are preferable to precise aims that force choices and provoke disagreements."[5] And it is no wonder, of course, that such goals come to nothing.

The author of the "mission madness" article proposed that, instead of seeking new goals which can shape future actions, we ought rather to "infer, create, and discover" goals from our present actions.[6] I, for one, can see no virtue or practical benefit from further institutionalizing the contrasts and competition, the conflict and contradictoriness, and withal the sectarian loyalties, which are to be inferred from our present actions.

No one should be in any doubt, that the process of fashioning a clear statement of institutional missien will, indeed, be a controversial and sometimes agonizing one. We will be tempted to terminate it before it gets beyond the obligatory first-stage, the adversarial airing of individual agendas; before it has time to identify the issues and options, and before the human and educational possibilities it opens up have a chance to generate a constituency and a momentum which can finally permit the process to rise above the production of inocuous and unhelpful generalities. In the end, of course not everyone will be able to agree with it. But knowing that in advance should not be allowed to deflect the process, any more than we permit expectation of dissent to keep us from deciding issues ranging from campus parking regulations to graduation requirements. And the beneficiaries of success will be those who cannot agree, as well

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as those who can.

Social institutions have greater need of clarity and specificity than of unanimity. So in a college, we need a clear statement of institutional mission because we need a model for our aspiration; because, in the large, our educational arrangements will lack coherence and cohesion without a principled, originating and guiding source and center; because, in the small, we need principles of discrimination to help us in deciding why one thing ought to be done rather than another; because, corporately, the kind of morale which gets things done correlates positively with an institutional image which is both vivid and worthy; and because, individually, we need standards against which to define and test ourselves, and shared purposes to which to hold ourselves.

A mission statement might include the following elements:

a. the primary values--educational, social, perhaps religious--which animate the college and which constitute its basic character;

b. the intended educational outcomes of the college, in the light of those values;

c. the relative roles and responsibilities of teachers, administrators, and trustees, in the service of those values and outcomes;

d. the rights and responsibilities of students, in the light of those values and outcomes;

e. the specific publics to be served by the college; and

f. the relationship of the college to its wider cultural setting.

Drawing upon the example of Japanese management, many of the country's most prestigious corporations (among them Hewlett-Packard, Rockwell International, Dayton-Hudson, Intel, and Eli Lilly) have developed statements of corporate mission or philosophy. A leading management scholar suggests that such a corporate philsophy must include "(1) the objectives of the organization, (2) the operating procedures of the

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organization, and (3) the constraints placed on the organization by its social and economic environment. It thus specifies not only ends, but also means."[7]

However shaped, and in spite of its acknowledged difficulties, a clear statement of institutional mission is achievable, for more complex institutions as well as for more single-minded ones. In a recent study of planned change accomplished at the University of Akron, Wichita State University, and Furman University, its editor commented:

> All three institutions initiated their change programs by developing mission statements. These statements resulted from lengthy and substantive debates among all constituents of the institutions and were sufficiently specific to leave no doubt about the nature of the schools, the particular clientele to be served, the kind of needs to be met, and, by implication, the needs to be left unmet or left to other institutions.

And, drawing the moral from the experience of these three, the editor concluded: "Without this kind of agreement on the nature and mission of an institution, there is no basis for a program of planned change."[8]

4. An enlarged "sense of the possible" among the institution's members. In an assessment cited in the opening chapter of this volume, Morris Keeton and Conrad Hilberry declared "the typical private liberal arts college of the twentieth-century" to be "obsolete," and noted as one of the marks of its obsolescence what they called its "sovereign isolation."[9] Isolation is sometimes imposed by geography; but more and more these days, the isolation of a college has nothing at all to do with its location. It has rather to do with a self-preoccupation which results from a kind of seige mentality in the presence of the formidable forces which seem to be arrayed against the college. And an even more important kind of isolation and self-preoccupation--one which is not the result of recent crisis--results from a simple lack of awareness of what is going on in the educational world beyond the home campus.

Educational researcher Warren Bryan Martin wrote about that unawareness in his

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study of conformity and change in higher education. In response to questionnaire research conducted by Martin and his colleagues at Berkeley, teachers and administrators in the institutions studied indicated strong interest in innovation and institutional change. But, reported Martin,

> What is alarming is that neither faculty nor administrators in any great number had knowledge of specific innovations, nor were they thinking about an appropriate strategy for change....They had no sense of the possible, no substantive acquaintance with changes being attempted elsewhere....
>
> Our study supports the case made against faculty that they more than administrators are inhibitors of innovation, especially in the area of curriculum. ...Because faculty are unaware of what might be done, they cling to the familiar.[10]

And that, especially in the decade of more stringent demands on our adaptivness which is ahead, will be a perilous tenacity.

Intelligent change depends on an enlarging sense of the possible, among teachers and administrators alike, and there are many ways to bring about the enlargement.

a. One of the most obious is by inviting to the campus persons of broad experience, who can report on the most promising experiments and replicable achievements in general education, in innovative teaching methods, in curricular design, in integrating liberal learning with career preparation, in campus governance; indeed, in the whole spectrum of issues which a college ought constantly to be re-examining for its own continued effectiveness. A series of such meetings on the campus annually has the potential of reaching a wide audience with incremental effect, and of adding the encouragement and endorsement of recognized educational experts to the change process which is going on there.

b. Since second-handedness is never an adequate substitute for sight, this series of visiting experts ought to be supplemented by visits from home-campus teachers and administrators to those places where promising experiments are under way, in order to

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bring back information on how the innovations where chosen and mounted, how they appear to be faring, and what their applicability might be to the home-campus needs and concerns. Systematically organized, regular arrangements for such visitation can become an important step in developing a college's own complement of resident quasi-experts.

c. It is common practice for colleges to encourage members of its faculty to attend annual national meetings of such professional organizations as the Modern Language Association and the American Psychological Association, often adding financial support to that encouragement. Less often are faculty members encouraged, or provided with support, to attend the annual national meetings of the American Association for Higher Education, or the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges, or the Association of American Colleges, where pressing institution-wide problems and possibilities comprise the agenda. Still, administrators feel entitled to complain that teachers seem unable to unwilling to break out of discipline-centered preoccupations in order to address the wider issues with which a college must grapple.

One of the most imaginative exploitations of the opportunity offered by a meeting of the American Association for Higher Education was made by Huron College, a small institution in South Dakota. Fully half of its faculty were sent to AAHE's meeting in Chicago. During most of the conference day, they fanned out individually on a pre-arranged pattern to take in everything that meeting had to offer which appeared relevant to Huron's needs; individually they talked with speakers and with participants from other institutions. And every afternoon they convened as a total campus group to talk with two or three recognized experts who had been sought out in the conference corridors earlier in the day and asked if they would be willing to give an hour or two of their conference time for such conversation. Since the AAHE meeting is the most comprehensive annual gathering of educational influence and experience in the country, Huron College was thus able to recruit for its own purposes, and at no cost

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except that of the conference itself, a range of consultative talent which would have cost thousands of dollars to bring to the campus, and which would have had less effect for that cost because unaccompanied, on the campus, by the other encounters and experiences made possible by the AAHE meeting.

It is not necessary to send half of the faculty to such gatherings in order to reap a similar result. Legitimate exploitation could be made by a faculty committee on educational policy, or a campus-wide planning body, with access to resources, and with an efficiency in time and in cost, which are possible by no other means with which I am acquainted.

d. The academic dean, or an interested faculty member, or a group of interested teachers, might conduct a continuing faculty seminar on higher education issues, with each session devoted to a systematic review of the issues resident in, and the options available for dealing with, one of the major matters currently preoccupying colleges across the country. Not everyone will want to participate in such a seminar, to be sure; college teachers do not always aspire to be educators in the larger significance of that term. But the increasing increment of awareness and sophistication which such a seminar generates can have palpable influence on faculty decision-making beyond even its limited participation, because those who do participate will become more practiced in thinking educationally and thus more likely to wield effective influence than colleagues who are less practiced in such matters.

And if such a seminar can be supplemented by providing key persons (perhaps department or division chairs, and chairs of standing faculty committees), whether or not seminar participants, with subscriptions to The Chronicle of Higher Education or Change Magazine, it is likely to be money well spent in support of an enlarging awareness of the possible.

e. Arrangements which provide a college with broad and regular interaction with other collegiate institutions--not only others like itself, but those unlike it and from whom it ought to be prepared to learn--is the most vivid, available, and relatively inexpensive way to mitigate that ignorance and lack of contact with a larger educational world which often stand athwart the change-process on the campus. Since research shows that institutional change is most likely to occur as a result of outside influence, membership in an academic consortium can offer frequent contacts which demonstrate how others are doing things, and can generate both friendly influence and friendly competition on behalf of change.

Specifically: (1) A consortium can organize its own mini-AAHE-type conferences on major policy issues confronting its members, thereby helping teachers and administrators to make thoughtful and timely decisions. (2) Since exhortation is never sufficient, a consortium with a diverse institutional membership can perform a change-agent function by making alternative operational models available--alternative ways of coming at curriculum development, or program evaluation, or student retention. (3) Members of the consortium's professional staff can serve, on invitation, as change-agents in their role as in-house consultants on a variety of issues, functioning uniquely as inside-outsiders who can bring fresh perspective and broad experience to bear upon problems a member college itself has identified. Consortium staff members will also know their "clients" better than commercial consultants, and will be there to assist those "clients" with the management of change in a continuing way, once the specific consultative task has been completed. (4) Since one of the barriers to change is the lack of direct contact those who must make the changes have with people in other places who are doing things in other ways, the consortium can exert continuing influence simply by providing occasions for men and women from its member campuses to come together with some regularity to talk about their work, or to observe the work of others at first hand. (5) Finally, a college in a decremental situation may be understandably reluctant to effect needed consolidation in programs and staff to match its means, since such consolidation appears to compromise the integrity and scope of what it can offer to students, thus weakening the quality and attractiveness of the

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college. Fearing those consequences, the result may be fatal inaction, or at best inadequate action. Resiliency needed to make needed adjustments, with a minimum of disruption to the educational program, can result from membership in an academic consotrium, whose members are located geographically in such a way that formal arrangements for the sharing of resources can supplement resident strengths, and thus help measurably in maintaining educational integrity, quality, and a broad range of learning options for students. That this is a realistic expectation is supported by the testimony of a college president, who said, "Our college recruits nationwide. This year 22 new students said that a prime factor in choosing our school was its ties to other regional colleges, allowing us to offer a comprehensive educational opportunity."[11] And when one considers what 22 additional students can mean in tuition income, the benefit of this kind of cooperation becomes palpable. Resource sharing among regional institutions thus can provide not only the resiliency needed for adaptation to changing conditions, but can add as well to the attractiveness and competitiveness of the consortium's member colleges at a time when any competitive edge is a cause for rejoicing.

5. Arrangements for information dissemination throughout the institution, throughout the process, and for broad participation both in initial change-explorations and in formulating final recommendations.

The prospect of change is threatening and anxiety-producing even under the best of circumstances, and never more threatening and anxious than when the process of arriving at recommendations for change is conducted entirely out of the sight and hearing of those who are not directly involved in it. Nothing will predispose hostility to those recommendations once they are reported out, and resistance to the changes once they are adopted, more than a failure to keep colleagues informed about issues being addressed and progress being made, whether that failure be the result of delib-

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erate policy or of simple neglect.

Several common-sense provisions can help to avoid that kind of unhappy and unproductive result: (1) Be sure that everyone in the institution knows what the calendar of the process is, and issue a progress report as each deadline occurs. (2) Permit the presence of non-participating observers in sessions of working groups as often as that will not directly inhibit the work, and post the times, places, and agendas of those open meetings so that interested persons can attend when issues of special concern to them are to be addressed. (3) In order to prevent the spread of inaccurate information and rumor, ask members of working groups to be attentive to what non-participating colleagues are saying about the process, and to report to a designated person--the chair or the executive secretary of the planning body--any issues which may need public clarification. Also make it clear to non-participating colleagues that they are free at any time to ask the chair or the executive secretary for confirmation or disconfirmation of any item which may be circulating through the campus grape-vine.

Beyond the sharing of information, broad, direct participation by all of the constituencies which have a stake in the proposed changes is essential for a successful change-process, for a number of reasons: in order to ensure access to the widest possible pool of potentially useful ideas; in order to test the worthiness, resiliency, and strength of proposed innovations against the criticisms which openness will inevitably generate; as a matter of simple justice, because those who will be expected to live acceptingly with the consequences of change, once it is enacted, are more likely to make that transition and adaptation if they have been given an opportunity, along the way, to develop a sense of onwership of both the process and the product.

But it ought to be an informed participation. Little constructive consequence is likely to follow, either for change or for a decision not to alter present circumstances, from a process which is given over largely to a rehearsal of familiar pre-

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judices, parochialisms, and special pleadings. So, in the section preceding this one, suggestions have been offered for creating on the campus a climate of wider awareness which is able to recognize prejudice, parochialism, and special pleading for what they are, and is able to transcend them by an enlarging sense of the possible which can lure educational professionals into thoughtful reconstruction. It ought to be clearly expected that those who intend to participate in the process will have prepared themselves in some of the ways proposed in that preceding section.

6. Anticipate systemic implications. Even the smallest college is a complex social organism, and it is necessary to take organic considerations into account in determining the enabling or disabling influences which the organism is likely to exert on change, as well as the effects which change is likely to produce in the organism. Says Joseph Axelrod,

> Since the curricular-instructional process works as a system, we cannot change only one element in the system in any substantial way and expect the change to "take." There is a certain reciprocity between each element in the system and all of the other elements (although each has a certain autonomy, too), and before we can successfully reform one aspect of the process we must understand profoundly the connections between it and other elements in the system.[12]

Many a change in one supposedly isolated part of the system has had startlingly unexpected results in another because their mutual relations were not anticipated and appreciated when the original change was made. For example, some years ago a college enthusiastically initiated an extensive foreign-study program as an integral part of its curriculum, with virtually all students studying abroad during six months of the undergraduate career. At the home campus, students were not permitted to possess or consume alcoholic beverages in dormitories, or at official college functions on or off the campus, and visitation rights were restricted in the dormitories. What the college authorities failed to consider was, that in their overseas environment the

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students would be experiencing a freedom with respect both to alcohol use and to parietal arrangements which, with increasing numbers of students back on the home campus with overseas experience, would generate insistent and in the end irresistible demands for regulatory relaxation. If we have wine with our meals and no restrictions on intervisitation, in college-sponsored programs overseas, the students argued, why should we be expected to revert to more restricted behaviors when we return, presumably (by the college's own claim) more mature than when we left? The college's president, a strong advocate of both campus social regulation and of study abroad, found himself under unexpected and discomfiting pressure because he had failed to anticipate the mutually antithetical relationships of those two elements in the system.

Those who enter upon any process of institutional change, however ostensibly isolated or deliberately extensive it may be, must understand, in Joseph Axelrod's words, that

> they are becoming involved--to a greater or lesser extent--with a whole complex of things, with an entire galaxy of overlapping spheres, with the whole System. It is evident that the more they know about how the System "works," the more intelligent their reform will be--and the greater the chances will be for success.[13]

Indeed, Axelrod's comment can be expanded: the more of the system we include in our planning for change--the more comprehensive our program for change is--the greater the possibilies of its success, precisely because comprehensiveness carries with it a larger likelihood that attention will be given, not only to individual program components, but to their interrelations. In the study of planned change at Akron, Wichita, and Furman, the editor comments:

> The change programs at all three universities were comprehensive in nature. Effective programs of this sort cannot be piecemeal. There must be recognition that change in one area affects many other areas; therefore, a planned change

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> effort must involve all systems, all operations, and all personnel.[14]
>
> Colleges and universities that attempt to solve the problems of declining enrollments, inflation, shifts in the supply and demand in the labor market, and declining financial support by starting a continuing education program, dropping foreign language and installing a nursing program, or creating a development department--rather than by embarking on a total institutional program of planned change--may be setting the stage for more severe problems in the future.[15]

And consideration must be given, not only to the system which is the college, but also to what Joseph Axelrod calls "supersystems" which exist beyond the college, with which the college interacts, and which can exert a powerful modifying influence, both positively and negatively, on efforts at institutional change.[16] No college is immune to market influences, and no college can undertake changes in its educational program without carefully calculating their market implications. The undergraduate institution, which considered that its comprehensive new program entitled it to raise tuition and fees by a whopping 40 percent, and then experienced an utterly disastrous drop in enrollment, had simply not considered in advance that such an increase would price it out of its traditional market for students, and had made no effort to find a new market that could afford its new offerings.

There are at least two approaches to educational marketing. One is to find out what kinds of program the market will bear, and then to pander to it, regardless of what that may do to institutional integrity. The other approach is for a college to determine what _it_ wants to be, what _it_ wants to do and can manage the competence to do well (in other words, a clear statement of institutional mission), and then using the most effective marketing means available to locate the appropriate public for those intentions, and to interpret itself clearly, accurately, and persuasively to that public.

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The bias of this book is unambiguously in favor of the latter approach, and it is intended to describe a process by which such self-identification and mission can be achieved. What a marketing-research firm recently told a college client--"You must take a stand somewhere!"--could be said to many an undergraduate institution whose chief sin is its nondescriptness. Fearing to alientate any public, it had attracted none adequately. That a college is not currently seen by outsiders as taking a stand is a critically important datum in devising an external-relations strategy. Neither prospective students nor prospective donors are likely to take us seriously unless we make it quite clear to them where we stand, and we ought to get on with that job at once. Some will not like what they see. That's as it ought to be, and it will mean that we have done our clarifying work well. Others, to their delight and ours, will discover in us possibilities they never knew were there. I am fully persuaded that the risks of distinctness will pay dividends far in excess of the limited rewards of nondescriptness.

In any event, the question of the market for educational change and innovation must be taken into account. There is nothing more subversive of effective change than offering a program which attracts the wrong students, who can neither adapt themselves to it nor benefit from it; and there is nothing more fatal than offering a program which attracts virtually no one at all.

7. Adoption of changes provisionally, subject to monitoring and modification. There are two opposite dangers in proposing and implementing change arrangements: one is offering them as "carved in stone" in advance; the other is permitting modification too readily once the program has been initiated.

Every proposal for change is a risky abstraction. However conscientiously designed, with elements carefully checked out in other places where they seem to have worked effectively, there is no guarantee in advance that it will work in this place. Teachers and administrators will therefore be properly reluctant to approve or sup-

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port any program which is not offered provisionally, with careful monitoring and opportunity for thoughtful modification. Nor should they approve. The most conscientious efforts will still miscalculate a fit here, or miss a systemic implication there, and provision should be made for such course-corrections from the start.

But there is danger, at the same time, that the initial unfamiliarity or inconvenience of a new arrangement will tempt some, early on, to charge that "it isn't working," and to propose substantive changes (usually back to the old ways of doing things) before the various new program elements have had a chance to create a new familiarity and to commend their new conveniences.

Changes which are *ad hoc* or *ad libitum* should be ruled out in advance. The fact that new arrangements are not written in stone need not mean that everything is "up for grabs" every day of the week. Name a review committee, and if possible add to its membership an outside consultant who has gone through the change process in his own institution; encourage teachers and administrators to bring to the committee their satisfactions as well as their dissatisfactions, to supplement the review initiatives which the committee itself will make; devise an announced calendar for review assessments, including the successes of the new arrangements, as well as its disappointments, and offer a public opportunity for discussion of the committee's reports; and set a date for formal consideration of proposed revisions, late enough to permit full acquaintance and familiarity, and early enough to keep obvious miscalculations from creating morale problems which may compromise areas in which the program is working as it was designed to work.

8. *Assistance to teachers and administrators in the development of new skills required for effective implementation of the new arrangements.* Programmatic change--change on paper--can be effective only where there is an actual corresponding change in the behaviors of those who are responsible for its implementation. For example, no design for general education which is topically organized and intellectual inte-

grated can succeed if it is taught by academic specialists who attempt to bend it back into standard disciplinary units with which they are already comfortable. No competency-based curriculum can be made to work unless teachers are willing to construct performance objectives for their courses to replace their customary reliance on the measurement of subject-matter mastery alone.

At the same time, teachers (who inevitably bear the brunt of curricular alteration) cannot change their behaviors simply on demand, they cannot develop new competences for which they have been given no guidance, and they cannot perform skills comfortably and with reinforcing satisfaction which they have been given no adequate opportunity to practice.

This means that any program of change must be preceded and, at least in its initial stages of implementation, accompanied by a systematic program of faculty development which identifies the new teaching skills required, provides an opportunity to learn those new skills, and thus to experience increasing confidence and satisfaction in their ability to meet the demands innovation presses upon them. Such a program is an institutional obligation, rather than something which can be expected of teachers as a part of their own obligation to continued professional growth. As an institutional obligation, proper attention must be given to considerations of released time or of added compensation, essential forms of recognition and reward which will pay substantial dividends in helping to create the faculty enthusiasm and support without which change will founder and eventually fail.

Conventional wisdom has it that faculty members are regularly unenthusiastic about, and often actually resist, formal institutional efforts at professional development, most particularly if proposed curricular change will entail such different behaviors as to require a program of virtual retraining. The conventional wisdom is undoubtedly accurate in those situations where teachers are expected to participate in developmental activities over and above their regular duties, and with little or no provision for such rewards as formal recognition, compensatory

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time and stipendiary consideration.

It is also undoubtedly accurate in those situations where proposed change occurs primarily out of disappoinment or desperation, and where there is scarcely more enthusiasm for, or expectation of, the new arrangements than there was for the old ones which disappointed. But the chief influence which can confound the conventional wisdom in a college is a new vision for education in that place, sufficient to capture the imagination, the enthusiasm, and the commitment of teachers and administrators, and to raise the entire enterprise to a new level of individual and corporate significance. Under that circumstance, there may in fact be no limit to the willingness of teachers, especially, to prepare themselves for competent participation.

An example of such a situation is to be found in St. John's College of Annapolis, Maryland, and Santa Fe, New Mexico. It was animated in its founding, and is still animated forty years later, by a rejection of the elective system in undergraduate education. Scott Buchanan, its first dean, described the typical American undergraduate as "wandering in a maze of scheduled 'offerings,' choosing those courses which were easiest or which were taught by men he liked, or which came at a convenient hour of the morning, or which seemed likely in some way to increase his chances of getting rich in later life."[17] In place of such a random elective system, St. John's initiated a prescribed Great Books curriculum, designed to immerse students in the wisdom which had accumulated from the Greeks onward under conditions of rigorous intellectual discipline. Mark Van Doren said of it that it was "the first serious effort in contemporary America to build a single and rational curriculum suited to the needs of minds which have work to do, and which some day should be unwilling to forgive any system of education that has required of them less discipline than this."[18]

In place of the disciplinary fracturing which is characteristic of undergraduate learning in most places, St. John's affirms the unity of human wisdom. Buchanan decried academic specialization: "We are willing, and shamefully relieved, to admit that each has his specialty, his so-called field, and the other fellow has

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his, and we are ready to let the common human enterprise go by default."[19] Dean William Darkey, a Buchanan successor, gave striking statement to St. John's commitment to intellectual unity when he wrote, "We should never permit ourselves to begin our inquiry by asking, 'How can we teach this better?' The question should always be, 'What is the relation of this part to the whole?'"[20]

The thread which runs throughout the learning experience at St. John's is a concern for virtue, both intellectual and moral. Buchanan had declared that the purpose of St. John's was "preparing people to be misfits," to resist the pressure to conform themselves to the world as it is.[21] Gerald Grant and David Riesman, in their very useful study of St. John's from which this descriptive material is drawn, note that education there is nonpolitical, in the sense that it does not offer "a prescription for organizing society." It is, nevertheless, "a mandate for living life as it should be lived....The St. John's curriculum confronts the student with the classically important dilemmas and seeks to create a dialogue about them in class and out...."[22] Ten years into this new experiment, Scott Buchanan wrote to Robert Hutchins, "I am still taking the moral and spiritual revolution seriously as in fact the only thing in the world worth living for. Fortunately it is the sort of thing that can restore our functions and redeem our lives and characters if we give ourselves to it."[23]

On the face of it, the implications for teaching in this vision are staggering, in that they move directly against the prevailing academic current. Tutors, as they are called at St. John's (there are no distinguishing academic ranks), are expected to teach across the whole of the curriculum, from classical languages to laboratory science and mathematics, regardless of their own previous specializations. According to Grant and Riesman, "Every tutor who comes to St. John's makes a radical decision to abandon his or her discipline and to become an apprentice in an uncompromising program."[24] Tutors are expected to give up the standard pedagogical posture of classroom authority and take on instead the Socratic task of questioning analysis

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and elicited response. Tutors are also expected to participate in a disciplined learning program of their own (i.e., professional development), including weekly "archon groups" designed to assist with teaching method and content; the pairing of a new teacher with a senior tutor for individual guidance; and visitation in classes taught by other tutors, both as preparation for teaching those classes at a later time and as a means of learning about other teaching styles.[25]

The lesson in this seems clear: teachers are prepared to endure a disciplined change of habits, and are ready to welcome a change in the style of their professional lives, given a surpassing educational vision which adds significance to the teacher as well as to the student. Grant and Riesman found that, in spite of complaints,

> each of these tutors finds that the inflexible structure makes possible a focus on teaching and intellectual growth that outweighs the disadvantages: "It's the last place where one can have a long-term sabbatical in the great tradition," one remarked. "I have been paid a generally comfortable salary to read the Great Books in an order that makes sense." And the Great Books do nourish and renew. For the best people, some of them on a second fifteen-year cycle of teaching The Program, there seems to be none of the dwarfing of the imagination that often occurs in insulated places.[26]

My point is not to advocate a Great Books curriculum, but rather to suggest that experienced difficulties in persuading teachers to change have as much to do with the feeble purposes to which we have tried to call them as it has with any constitutional indisposition on the part of the teachers themselves.

9. A reward system to encourage effective implementation. The most important rewards a new set of educational arrangements can offer are to add significance to the professional and personal lives of those who participate in them (as I have been urging above); and to add to the viability and strength, the quality and integrity, of the college itself, thus predisposing its success in a difficult time. But that does not

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diminish the importance of other tangible rewards, which will be necessary partly to give just recognition to those who apply themselves conscientiously to new tasks, and partly in order to demonstrate the full corporate seriousness with which the college views the changes.

It must be made clear to teachers and administrators, that those who apply themselves to the tasks which have been identified as essential to successful change--to new teaching approaches, perhaps, or new course designs; to advising, or to student development, or whatever--will receive recognition, and that those who fail thus to apply themselves will not. Such performance factors should be taken into account in consideration for salary increase, promotion, appointment to tenure, appointment to positions of formal faculty and administrative leadership, leaves, released time, grants to individuals, and support for other individual professional activities. In addition, there may be value in establishing special annual awards to recognize excellence in teaching, or in advising, or in other identifiable tasks on which the success of the new arrangements depends.

10. Careful interpretation of the new arrangements in subsequent faculty and administrative recruitment. The recruitment of new teachers and administrators will play an important role, both in initiating change and in maintaining its integrity once it has been instituted. I have already noted research findings which indicate that the leverage for institutional change regularly results from outside influence; and the infusion of new persons is one of the influences which can open up an otherwise closed shop.

At the same time, once major changes have been put into effect, it is essential that new recruits to faculty and administrative offices are quite clear about what the new program is, what its expectations of them will be, and whether or not they are likely to find those expectations congenial. Not long ago, a college which had undergone major program alteration found itself, as a consequence, in a greatly improved enrollment and fiscal situation a couple of years later. Since this new prosperity permitted it to appoint a proportionately large number of new staff members, administrators and department chairs decided that, given the fact of a "buyer's" market, they would only accept prospects from the most prestigious graduate schools. They did. Unfortunately, when interviewing those select candidates, no one thought to ask them whether or not they understood the new curricular arrangements and could work comfortably and constructively within them; and the candidates themselves, eager for appointment in a tight market, were not about to raise the issue before the fact. It was only after the appointments were made and the new teachers had been on the campus for a few weeks that the chagrined discovery was made: the college had appointed a dozen new faculty members with eminent degrees and an aversion to the college's new educational program!

11. On-going, long-term evaluation to test the continuing faithfulness and effectiveness of the new arrangements in relation to the agreed-upon mission of the college. We have already discussed the need for formative evaluation, in-course monitoring and modification which may be necessary in the short run to take account of miscalculated details in the original design. Plans should also be made from the very beginning for summative evaluation, to assess what is happening in the relationship between the new program and the larger educational objectives for which it was designed.

John Van Maanen, who teaches organizational studies at M.I.T., points out usefully, that program design, program implementation, and program evaluation are not separate, but are intimately interrelated:

> Decisions made during the design phase of program development are crucial factors in determining the potential worth of any evaluative effort--for the manner in which a program was formulated may be a particularly important content area, deserving the attention of the evaluator. Hence, evaluation is something more than just a segment of activities falling between the

> implementation and decision-making periods of a program's history.
>
> ...Evaluation, from a mechanical perspective, involves planning, implementing and deciding as well as the more familiar assessing process.[27]

Van Maanen also cautions about what can properly be expected of summative assessment. Its aim, he says, is to provide

> the tools and ideas necessary to conduct more than the narrow "it works/it doesn't work" variety of evaluation. In fact, seldom can one be absolutely certain a change was brought about by a specific program. The most important issue in many programs is not simply "does it work?" but rather "what happened?" Evaluation is viewed, therefore, as beginning with a rough conception of what is going on and concluding with a set of grounded recommendations. [The objective of the evaluator] is to help decision-makers develop the best damn program possible.[28]

III.

In order to make these suggestions as concrete as possible, I want now to offer an actual case-study of the change process which permitted an undergraduate liberal arts college to fashion a comprehensive departure from its traditional arrangements, to win overwhelming support for it within a 12-month period, and as a consequence to enter upon a new period of educational vitality, enrollment increase, and fiscal strength. While this case-study does not illustrate all of the elements in the change model offered above, it does embody most of them.

There was little to distinguish Dakins College from many other private colleges in its region, and indeed throughout the country. It was coeducational, with about 800 students and an aspiration to reach 1,200 by the end of the decade. It had a favorable student-faculty ratio (16:1) and a reasonably well-prepared faculty, 41% of whom held the doctorate. Its educational program for a decade or more had consisted of standard courses and traditional departmental majors, with its liberal educational purposes displayed in a rather rigid set of core requirements--standard, sometimes specifically designated courses distributed over nine areas of the curriculum and accounting for nearly half of each student's total undergraduate program. Over recent years, rising costs in education had gradually forced the college to price itself out of its local and regional market for students and, despite a continuing commitment to serve the needs of regional young people, survival required the college to cultivate a broader regional, and even to aspire to a national, constituency.

At the fall pre-college Faculty Conference in Year One, the President of Dakins College announced to the college community that the time had come to face some very basic questions: What does it mean for the college to identify itself as a liberal arts college? Does the present program measure up to what we say about ourselves? Is it relevant to the needs of our student constituency? Does it match the challenges and opportunities of the decade which is before us? In order to confront those questions in a direct and expeditious manner, the President announced the formation of a Self-Study Committee, to begin work as soon as proper organization would permit. He further specified:

1. that the Committee should be broadly representative of the College's immediate constituencies, including faculty, administration, students, alumni, trustees, and local community;
2. that a member of the faculty would be chosen to chair the committee, that another member of the faculty would be given released time to serve as its Executive Secretary, and that these two, with the Dean of the Faculty, would comprise its Steering Committee;
3. that the scope of the Committee's inquiry was to be comprehensive, in recognition of the organic nature of the college, including academic program, calendar, governance, and student-life arrangements;

4. that, in order to ensure an opportunity for broad participation in the Study, and to provide the Committee with the widest possible base of information and opinion, the Committee's work should begin with a series of open hearings, to be conducted throughout the fall semester; and
5. that the Committee would be expected to provide him with a set of recommendations for action not later than the end of academic Year One, at which time he would determine which of the recommendations might appropriately be considered for administrative consideration, which for faculty and student body consideration, and which for trustees.

The President announced that he would not be a direct participant in the process until such time as he received the Committee's report.

Open hearings began in mid-September, and were originally scheduled to run until the Christmas break, with an open invitation to all of the college's immediate constituencies to present statements on any aspect of the life of the college of particular concern to them, addressing both those things which, in their view, ought to be changed, and those things which were of such value that they ought not be changed. It was made clear that those who appeared before the Committee were not to be placed in an adversary position; that the Committee would feel free to ask questions for information and clarification, but that they would not be subject to critical cross-examination. Each person who appeared was asked to provide the Committee with a written transcript or summary of his statement, and following each session copies were distributed to Committee members for inclusion in a growing volume of testimony. All **members** of the College community were invited to attend the session as auditors in order to keep informed about the issues and ideas under consideration, and although attendance by auditors fluctuated, there were always a number of such persons present.

For the first two months, the hearings were conducted weekly, and at the beginning testimony was solicited in order to be sure that good use would be made of the available hearing time. As the process developed, however, more and more persons came forward voluntarily. Members of the hearing body took it as their responsibility to listen to what was being said around the campus between meetings, and to urge persons heard expressing private opinions, especially if they were negative, to come before the group and place those views on the record for Committee consideration, in order to be sure that all views were heard openly and so that no one would be able to say, later, that he had had no opportunity to influence the process. As the fall semester wore on, more persons requested time to appear than single weekly sessions could accommodate, so the Committee began to meet twice weekly, and extended the hearings for six weeks following return from the Christmas break.

In mid-February the open phase of the process was completed, and the Committee took its by now hefty volume of testimony and met in closed session to determine what to make of it all. After a series of such meetings, several major topics were identified for more intensive study, including academic calendar, academic program, the organization of instruction, grading and testing, governance, student residential arrangements, and financial management and development. A sub-committee was then appointed for each such topic, including two or three Self-Study Committee members, one of whom served as chair, and including as well several other teachers, administrators, and students chosen because of special interest or competence in relation to a specific topic. The sub-committees met for approximately a month, during which time several members of the Self-Study Committee traveled to other campuses to observe at first hand experiments or established programs of relevance to and promise for several of the sub-topics under consideration. At the conclusion of the sub-committee phase, recommendations were brought back to the Self-Study Committee, which once again went into a series of closed sessions to determine what it would do with the recommendations, and what kind of coherent and cohesive set of proposals for action it might make to the college's President.

Throughout the whole of this process, beginning before the Self-Study Committee had been formed and continuing through the months of its deliberation, the President and the Dean of the Faculty (who was new to the college in Year I and had been brought in specifically to give leadership to the change process) sought to enunciate a vision for change at Dakins College. This articulation occurred formally and informally, in organized meetings and in informal discussion and debate, in the Self-Study Committee and in the larger environment of the college. In summary form, its theme was this:

> Change is essential to an educational institution in the 1970s, for one thing, because "the future is not what it used to be," as Paul Valery wryly observed. Any education which will be useful to the futures of its students, to say nothing of their varying present conditions, had better come to terms with the fact that the world is moving.
>
> Change is important, not necessarily because the movement will be away from bad old methods toward good new ones (though surely some improvement of that kind can be hoped for), but because, when teachers and administrators have done approximately the same things in approximately the same ways for a period of time, they begin to lose their own attention. And having lost their own attention, it is unlikely that they will succeed in capturing much of their students' attention. So change is necessary simply as a means of recapturing our own attention, of making us conscious of what we are doing and why we are doing it. Change inevitably generates anxiety, and a creative anxiety is one of the chief ingredients in all significant human achievement.
>
> Most important of all, change is essential in order to guard against those institutional rigidities which force the human into alien shapes and thus diminish humanhood. If we welcome in this college students of differing aspirations and dispositions, of differing enthusiasms and readinesses, as in-

deed we do, then we have an obligation to be sure that individual distinctiveness is given both respect and room to grow. There must be alternative futures within the college in order to help students toward alternative futures beyond the college. We want to be sure, in our educational program, that humanity is enlarged, not diminished; that men and women are permitted to seek their own integrity, rather than being forced to submit to an alien aim; that they are responsible, not merely conformist; that their differences are cause for delight, not inconveniences to be penalized or rubbed out.

So the key to the educational changes we ought to be making is flexibility--room for the human in its varying sizes and shapes, predispositions and aspirations, in what it has already achieved and in what it still dreams of achieving. Nothing is more needed if human life is to be fully human and society humane.

In the second week of May, the Self-Study Committee submitted its recommendations to the President of the college, and within five days he transmitted the document to the entire college community, commending it for careful study. The full report was printed in a six-page, newspaper-size, newsprint edition for this wide distribution. It contained a letter of transmittal from the Committee's chairman to the President, and the President's letter commending the document to the college community for study. Part One of the recommendations gave a statement of the "definition, aims and objectives, and imperatives of liberal learning" (i.e., educational vision translated into institutional mission) which had guided the Committee's deliberations and informed their recommendations; Part Two detailed proposals recommended for adoption; and Part Three contained "commentaries" intended to anticipate questions and objections and to speak to them in advance.

In transmitting this document for study, the President made clear his own view (a) that the comprehensive program recommended was "imaginative and innovative without being reckless," and that it represented "the kind of advance which we must make over our present program;" (b) that the recommendations promised "to give us that vital edge on student recruitment without which this college will not survive," and that the Committee's proposed combination of "flexibility without shapelessness" would be strongly attractive to prospective students and their parents; and (c) that the proposed new program was likely to command the interest and support both of old friends of the college and of a widening new constituency. He announced that two "information sessions" would be conducted by the Committee in the two weeks prior to graduation for clarification of the proposals, and warned that "it is too early for full-scale debate or forced decisions." Members of the faculty were asked to study the report over the summer, and the President announced that those sections requiring faculty action would comprise the agenda of a two-day pre-college meeting to be held at an off-campus location in the first week of September. Recommendations to be accomplished by administrative decision and action would be referred immediately to the appropriate administrative officers, and those requiring trustee attention would be considered at the Board's regular October meeting.

Year Two began with the two-day September faculty meeting, at which officers of student government were also present. The first day was reserved for open discussion and debate of the Self-Study Committee's proposals, without the pressure of decision-making; on the second day, the faculty was to convene in formal business session for official action on proposals. In preparation for this meeting, the Steering Commitee had invited three widely known and highly regarded educators (a teacher, an administrator, and an executive from a major foundation) to serve as consultants, in order to bring external perspective to bear on the Self-Study recommendations and to serve as resources especially for the first day's discussion and debate. A copy of the recommendations was sent in advance to each of the three, but their assessment was not solicited, the Steering Committee preferring to take its chances on a completely open and unbiased report to the faculty by the consultants.

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The first day began with that assessment, each consultant speaking in turn, and their response to the recommendations was overwhelmingly positive. Open discussion followed, both in plenary sessions and in smaller groups with consultants moving among them as resource persons. At the end of the afternoon, the President announced the procedure for formal action on the following day. The Self-Study recommendations were divided into five coherent sections for manageability, and a separate vote was to be taken on each. Since a full day's discussion and debate had already occurred and individual views were becoming quite clear, the President requested that any proposed amendments to the recommendations be considered carefully overnight and submitted in writing at appropriate points in the following day's business meeting.

Next morning, the business session proceeded systematically as announced, with each of the five sections of the report taken up in order. The consultants were present again but participated in the discussion only when questions were directed to them. Members of the faculty were given four options for voting on each section of the report: Yes, meaning overwhelming agreement; Yes but, meaning substantial agreement, but with minor reservations; No, meaning overwhelming disagreement; and No but, meaning substantial disagreement, but with minor reservations. In the case of qualified responses, there was room on the ballot to specify the voter's reservations, and assurance was given that the Self-Study Committee would examine all of the reserved ballots, and if they were found to cluster significantly on specific features, this would be reported back and proposals for modification of those features would be entertained. In the meantime, all Yes and Yes but votes, and all No and No but votes, would be combined.

As the ballots were counted on each of the five sections, they were found to be overwhelmingly unqualified Yes votes, with no consensus among the few reservations recorded.

Two weeks later, the President discharged the Self-Study Commitee "with praise and warm thanks" on behalf of the entire college community. He then announced the formation of a Coordinating Committee, "responsible directly to me, to oversee the completeness, coherence, and faithfulness of the final product in which we shall all be participating." He emphasized that this coordinating body would not make policy decisions for the faculty or for administrative officers, but would (a) develop and monitor a comprehensive set of deadlines for decision-making; (b) maintain a running inventory of those decisions in order to insure against the loss of any vital strand; (c) study recommendations from administrators and from faculty committees before submission for approval, to be sure that each decision articulated with the growing body of decisions, that no part was lost in translation, and that all decisions were consonant with the spirit of the faculty's action in adopting the new program; and (d) report to him regularly concerning the progress and the proper working of these arrangements. Membership on the Coordinating Committee provided for some continuity with the now-discharged Self-Study Committee, but also reached out to include others who had not been regular members of that body.

At the October meeting of the Board of Trustees, unanimous action was taken to ratify the new program adopted by the faculty, including the new governance arrangements, and the year of implementation was officially under way.

Two foundation grants provided support for a major component of implementation, namely, assistance to faculty in developing the approaches to curriculum and teaching which the new arrangements would require for their full integrity and effectiveness. This two-year program, utilizing highly experienced educational specialists from across the country as consultants, included the following elements:

1. A workshop for instructors in the new Integrated Core sequence, held for three weeks in August prior to Year Three which inaugurated the new program. The Core sequence was to be issue-and-value oriented, interdisciplinary, and

team-taught, and the workshop was to provide preparation in both subject-matter and teaching techniques.

2. A series of two-day pre-college faculty workshops, to be held in September immediately prior to the opening of the college year, on the following subjects: (a) Student Advising, (b) Affective Learning, (c) Academic Evaluation, and (d) Community Living.

   Since the college believed that the re-training of teachers was one of the most critical continuing needs of liberal arts colleges everywhere, it invited each of the other three institutional members of its regional consortium to send a member of its teaching staff to participate in the workshops described in the two paragraphs immediately above.

3. A series of follow-up seminars and workshops scheduled throughout Year Three, including (a) a weekly seminar on teaching roles, with the assistance of a consulting psychiatrist, (b) a weekly seminar for instructors in the Integrated Core sequence, held throughout the fall semester, (c) follow-up workshops for all faculty on Academic Evaluation, Student Advising, and Community Living, and (d) three workshops on Innovative Teaching.
4. In Year Four, the second full year of the new educational program, the plan was to duplicate the essential features of the previous year's professional development sequence, including another summer workshop for Core instructors, followed by faculty workshops on the same themes, or new ones if experience showed their need.

In summary, these were the objectives the program of professional development was designed to serve:

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1. intellectual, considering alternate forms of inquiry to the conventional, discrete disciplinary approaches, and assisting faculty members in broadening their own intellectual perspectives beyond the area of academic specialization;
2. curricular, designing specific courses which depart from traditional content and format, including a set of interdisciplinary, issue-value core courses;
3. instructional, introducing new teaching roles, including team-teaching, and new teaching styles, including those directed toward affective learning;
4. practical, providing direct, concrete assistance to teachers in meeting new demands in academic advising and academic evaluation;
5. broadly educational, overcoming the college's natural geographic isolation from the mainstream of American higher education by bringing to the campus persons of broad experience and high reputation; and
6. institutional, creating among teachers and adminstrators an institutional esprit in the presence of new demands and new opportunities, stimulating imaginations, and creating a sense of adventure while building the self-confidence needed for the effective implementation of the new educational program.

As a final step in the change process described in this case study, Oakins College arranged for formal internal and external evaluation beginning in Year Five, the third full year of the new educational program, to measure its impacts, and to be sure that any modifications in the original design would be made thoughtfully and with outside perspective, rather than impulsively out of early frustration with new and still uncomfortable demands.

VIII.

Sometimes comprehensive institutional change, of the sort envisioned in the preceding sections of this chapter, is simply impossible. There may be neither the will nor the opportunity to engage in the task of holistic reconstruction. That does not mean, however, that individuals within the college are powerless to effect the kind of educational vision projected in these chapters. Change may be accomplished more modestly, but nevertheless usefully, in those areas of the life of the college on which I may exercise, as an individual teacher or administrators, more direct and telling influence.

1. The individual teacher can adapt her or his own teaching--course design and objectives, course content, teaching methods and styles, and the total learning environment of the course--to more holistic and humanistic ends. It is possible, if we are motivated to accept the inconvenience of doing it, to determine at the outset of a course something useful about the aspirations and readinesses of the students who are in the course, and to make some reasonable adaptation of the course syllabus to those actual human locations, while at the same time making provision over the period of the course to draw those human locations from where they began to higher levels of aspiration and readiness. It is possible to choose the content of each course in terms of what it will contribute to students' capacities for effective action--intellectual, operational, aesthetic--as I suggested in the model offered in Chapter Three; to create a classroom environment which takes moral and personal learning seriously, as I urged in Chapter Four; to treat subject matter in terms of its larger significances, as I proposed in Chapter Six, and to propose ways in which all of us--students and teacher alike--can participate in those significances; to relate these course outcomes to that larger integrated repertoire of things, acquired throughout the undergraduate experience, which a person must be competent to do in order to be a responsible self; and to make ourselves available for these purposes

beyond classroom hours, in order to assure significant teacher-student interaction which can deepen and confirm these outcomes, as I also urged in Chapter Nine.

By extension, these same things can be done within a curricular program area (the model in Chapter Three could easily become the outline for an integrated general education program), or within an interdisciplinary concentration, or within a standard academic division or department, since in each case the consensus and the resources needed for such adaptation may be manageable, even when the persuasion and resources required for larger institutional alteration are insufficient. The Department of Sociology in one liberal arts college, working with an earlier form of the model I proposed in Chapter Three, designed the following requirements for a major in Sociology:

> A major in Sociology shall be able to:
>
> a. understand self and others;
>
> b. function effectively in social situations;
>
> c. identify points of potential societal development;
>
> d. explore the social structural complexities of a societal issue;
>
> e. demonstrate mastery of a theoretical perspective in sociology; and
>
> f. learn independently in the discipline.
>
> Therefore, in addition to the general education requirements, majors in Sociology must complete the following:
>
> a. Develop, with a faculty sponsor, a sociological autobiography (evaluation by faculty sponsor).
>
> b. Identify and actively attempt to develop some societal potential (evaluation by Sociology faculty).
>
> c. Design and successfully complete at least two independent studies in Sociology (evaluation by faculty sponsors).
>
> d. Design and successfully complete a project which will demonstrate

mastery of a theoretical perspective in Sociology (evaluation by Sociology faculty).

e. Team-teach a course in Sociology (evaluation by faculty member responsible for the course.

2. A locus for change, and effective influence on behalf of change beyond that immediate locus, can be generated by the creation of new organizational entities. In a major state university a few years ago, each college within the university maintained exclusive control over the educational programs of its students and did not permit registration across college lines. Into that setting there was inserted a new undergraduate college, empowered by the central university authority to draw its teachers from throughout the university, and to permit its students to register in other university colleges, all in the interest of a more eclectic but nevertheless integrated undergraduate experience which was able to draw on the perspectives of teachers and of diverse disciplines throughout the university. The result of this provocateur in their midst was that, within a very few years, other colleges within the university, unable to withstand the example of the new college and the urgings of their own faculty members who had, at one time or another, taught in it, found themselves opening increasingly to cross-registration and scholarly interaction.

In a smaller liberal arts college, there was a desire--against the resistance of some of the more traditional members of the faculty, many of whom were department chairmen--to encourage teachers to offer individual courses of their own design for the general education of students, courses which did not fit under standard departmental rubrics and which therefore had no established home in the curriculum. In order to accomplish this objective, a new curricular division (initially called the Division of Elective Affinities) was added to the established five (humanities, fine arts, natural sciences, social sciences, and professional studies). Teachers desiring to offer a non-traditional course had membership, both in one of the established divisions and in Elective Affinities, and the Elective Affinities chairman was authorized to recruit such persons actively. The deliberate purpose of adding the new curricular division was to permit changes which could not be managed if the entire apparatus of the curriculum were tackled at once, and to spread the effects of change and the practice of course innovation beyond the new division to the established five, both by example and by the influence of those teachers who held membership in both divisions.

3. Change may be achieved, somewhat more largely but still significantly short of comprehensive alteration, by a partial reconstruction of the curriculum through the addition of a distinctive and innovative degree track which students may elect, and which runs parallel to the more traditional tracks to a degree. This strategy permits substantial experimentation without running the very considerable risks which are always involved in total institutional renovation, and permits a reasonably painless readjustment if the experiment should fail, either for lack of educational imagination and resource or an inadequate student market.

One liberal arts college devised three such degree tracks, offering its students a choice of (a) a Diversified Program, in which approximately 60% of the course requirements was prescribed, and in which the general education requirement was spread (diversified) over standard courses in the several academic divisions of the college; (b) an Integrated Program which designated specific areas though not specific courses in which the student was expected to do approximately 30% of his work, and in which the general education requirement was met in a series of value-and-issue oriented, topically and intellectually integrated, courses; and (c) a Contract Program, which was almost entirely designed by the student with the advice and consent of three faculty sponsors. The first of these tracks was, clearly, the most traditional, and the addition of the other two made it possible to offer students a clear choice without substantial institutional risk and with limited, though clearly significant, alteration.

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IV.

What seems to me to be most important, in approaching institutional change, is that we not settle for too little in advance. It is easy, in our proposals, to be deflected by the problem of means before we have adequately focussed our vision of ends, to be intimidated by those who want to ask prematurely and insistently, "But how can that be done?" without having faced seriously the prior question, "Is it desirable?" It is the latter question on which we must try, with all of the powers at our command, to concentrate first attention. For I am persuaded that, if we permit ourselves to be restricted before the fact by the apparent insufficiency of the means at our disposal, we will continue to be undistinguished in our achievement. But if we can project a worthy vision of ends, and if we can win concentrated attention for that vision, the vision itself can create a motivation and momentum that will call forth means which were not there before the fact, and which would have eluded us if we had sought them directly.

My conclusion to the proposals for a humanistic curriculum contained in these seven chapters must be in the striking words of Warren Bryan Martin. I do not know on what occasion he first spoke them; I only know that they seem to me to be the right words for our own time and place.

These are the words: "Let those who must, despair; let those who will, begin again."

I believe that the future of American higher education will belong to those colleges which determine now to "begin again." That will take courage, of course; and more than courage, it will take imagination; and perhaps more than those two, it will take a willingness to suspend our enervating despair, or our confidence in conventional wisdom, long enough to see if there may yet be a better way.

NOTES

1 Denis Gabor, Inventing the Future

2 Morris Keeton, "Choosing College Purposes," Antioch Notes (Antioch College, November, 1967).

3 For other models, as well as case studies, of planned change, see G. Melvin Hipps, ed., Effective Planned Change Strategies, New Directions for Institutional Research No. 33 (Jossey-Bass, 1982).

4 Richard Chait, "Mission Madness Strikes Our Colleges," The Chronicle of Higher Education (July 16, 1979), p. 36.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 William G. Ouchi, Theory Z: How American Business Can Meet the Japanese Challenge (Avon, 1982), p. 113.

8 G. Melvin Hipps, op. cit., pp. 118-119.

9 Morris Keeton and Conrad Hilberry, Struggle and Promise: A Future for Colleges (McGraw-Hill, 1969), p. 1.

10 Warren Bryan Martin, Conformity: Standards and Change in Higher Education (Jossey-Bass, 1969), p. 232. Emphasis added.

11 From a letter to the author from John Lottes, president of the Kansas City Art Institute, concerning the influence of its membership in the Kansas City Regional Council for Higher Education, 1977.

12 Joseph Axelrod, "Curricular Change: A Model for Analysis," The Research Reporter, Vol. III, No. 3, 1968 (Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley), p. 1.

13 Ibid., p. 4.

14 G. Melvin Hipps, op. cit., p. 119.

15 Ibid., p. 120.

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16 Joseph Axelrod, op. cit., p. 3.

17 Scott Buchanan, cited in Gerald Grant and David Riesman, The Perpetual Dream: Reform and Experiment in the American College (University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 46.

18 Mark Van Doren, cited ibid., p. 50.

19 Scott Buchanan, cited ibid., p. 44.

20 William Darkey, cited ibid., p. 44.

21 Scott Buchanan, cited ibid., p. 42.

22 Gerald Grant and David Riesman, ibid., p. 68.

23 Scott Buchanan, cited ibid., p. 56.

24 Gerald Grant and David Riesman, ibid., p. 68.

25 Ibid., p. 67.

26 Ibid., p. 70.

27 John Van Maanen, The Process of Program Evaluation (The Gransmanship Center News, January/February, 1979), p. 37.

28 Ibid., p. 30.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Statements about Educational Purpose

Gabriel A. Almond: "...universities have lost their capacities to orient their students to a world which increasingly insists on being viewed whole with all of its interdependencies and moral dilemmas....The specialized, reductionist university may well have had its day. It was a part of, and helped to produce, this world of extraordinary capabilities and terrifying prospects. Only if the basic assumptions of this cultural epoch were to continue to hold true--that man's destructive and manipulative capacities could be contained, and that material resources and amenities were indefinitely available at acceptable cost--could this kind of university survive....The disarticulated curricular structure will have to be rearranged and ordered and given the connective tissue which can only be supplied by the synthesizing, codifying, speculative, and evaluative disciplines. The curriculum will have to provide leads as to the kinds of men we need to be if we are to behave well and know a virtuous course from a wicked one." ["Some Reflections on the Crisis of the University Curriculum," Daedalus (Fall, 1974), p. 187. Almond was Professor of Political Science at Stanford University.]

Association of American Colleges/Council of Graduate Schools: "In the opinion of the conference participants the fundamental purpose of liberal education is to help men and women, through a knowledge and an understanding of both themselves and their world, acquire the judgment and power they need for maximum human fulfillment both as individuals and as contributors to the welfare of others and to the strength and harmony of a free society. This definition, which suggests that the real test of a liberal arts college is the quality of the human product it graduates, has important

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implications which must be considered by the liberal arts colleges." [*Preparing the College Professor for Liberal Arts Teaching*, the report of a 1965 conference sponsored by the Association of American Colleges and the Council of Graduate Schools.]

Stephen K. Bailey: "...existing courses and course requirements should be reviewed not only in terms of their academic history and the demands of current academic politics, but also in terms of the utility to the future lives of students: to their life cycle, to their work, to their capacity to cope, to their free-self, and to the discharge of their civic obligations....What is needed is an increased attention by the faculty to the guidance of students as students try to put together courses of studies that can truly enhance the quality of their future lives....Liberal learning at its best is not designed to relieve life of its pain and uncertainty. It is designed to help people have creative engagements with adversity, to discover and draw upon the wellsprings of existential joy, and to recognize our common plight and our need for one another." ["Needed Changes in Liberal Education," *Educational Record* (Summer, 1977), p. 257. Bailey, former American Council on Education vice-president, is Professor of Education and Social Policy at Harvard.]

Robert N. Bellah: "Traditionally, education was involved in the formation of a new person ideally more perceptive than when he began, one more aware of the whole of existence, including its tragic dimension, and more responsive as a human being. Such education involved not only cognitive skills but a discipline of body, of feeling, of imagination, as well as of mind. Its aim was to eventuate in a morally and religiously transformed person....If that description has any validity, it will be apparent how sharp the contrast is with the kind of education typical of the contemporary, secular university." ["The New Religious Consciousness," *Daedalus* (Fall, 1974), pp. 111-112.

Bellah is Ford Professor of Sociology and Comparative Studies in the University of California, Berkeley.]

Wayne Booth: "The question of what it is to be a man, of what it is to be fully human, is the question at the heart of liberal education." [The Knowledge Most Worth Having (University of Chicago Press, 1967). Booth is Pullman Distinguished Service Professor of English in the University of Chicago.]

Maurice Bowra: The aim of liberal education is a "fully educated man fit to take part in a civilized society and at the same time to be a reasonably complete human being in his own right." ["The Idea of a Liberal Arts College," Liberal Education (May, 1964), p. 187. Sir Maurice was Warden of Wadham College, Oxford.]

Kingman Brewster: "There are at least three 'senses' which are enhanced by a liberal education: a sense of place...no person, institution, group, or nation can escape the roots and evolution which give them cultural identity and distinctive meaning....Sensitivity to comparabilities and contrasts in time and space is an important product of a liberal education. The sense of self...an awareness of where you are, where you have been, and where you are going....A sense of judgment...critical judgment...what you like; action judgment...what will work; moral judgment...what is proper....The development and refinement of all these 'senses' are objectives of a liberal education." [Report of the President, 1975-76 (Yale University). Brewster was then President of Yale.]

Martin Buber: "Education worthy of the name is essentially education of character. For the genuine educator does not merely consider individual functions of his pupil, as one intending to teach him only to know or to be capable of certain definite things; but his concern is always the person as a whole, both in the actuality in which he lives before you now and in his possibil-

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ities, what he can become....Only in his whole being, in all his spontaneity can the educator truly affect the whole being of his pupil. For educating characters you do not need a moral genius, but you do need a man who is wholly alive and able to communicate himself directly to his fellow beings. His aliveness streams out to them and affects them most strongly and purely when he has no thought of affecting them." [Between Man and Man, pp. 132, 134 (Fontana Library, 1964). Buber was a distinguished philosopher whose most famous work is I and Thou.]

William Cory: 'You go to a great school, not for knowledge so much as for arts and habits; for the habit of attention, for the art of expression, for the art of assuming at a moment's notice a new intellectual posture, for the art of entering quickly into another person's thoughts, for the habit of submitting to censure and refutation, for the art of indicating assent or dissent in graduated terms, for the habit of regarding minute points of accuracy, for the habit of working out what is possible in a given time, for taste, for discrimination, for mental courage and mental soberness. Above all, you go to a great school for self-knowledge." (Cory was Master of Eton College in the mid-nineteenth century. In citing these words, George Stern of Syracuse University wrote, "Cory's words sound contemporary, but they would have seemed so to Socrates as well. Although he wrote them in the 1860s, the education for which he speaks has been coterminous with Western civilization." [From Current Issues in Higher Education 1964, American Association for Higher Education.]

Patricia Cross: "The function of education is to provide alternative pathways to personal development and self-fulfillment....In the final analysis, enabling people to learn--however, whenever, and whatever they have a need or desire to learn--is the aim of all education." [Beyond the Open Door

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(Jossey-Bass, 197 .) Cross is Senior Research Psychologist with the Educational Testing Service and Research Educator at the Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley.]

David Daiches: In the university since the Renaissance, "two generally unspoken but powerful motives have been at work. The first is the transmission of what might be called the High Culture of civilization from one generation to another. The other is the development of the individual's critical faculties so as to render him incapable of being satisfied with the catchwords and cliches which surround the discussion of any subject in popular discourse and make him seek knowledge based on independent inquiry and analysis. These two aims--to hand down a tradition and to encourage independent thought--are on the face of it incompatible. But the universities have long been committed to both, and it is in the tension between the two that the true life of a modern university has come to reside." ["The Modern Concept of a University," privately circulated typescript. Daiches is Professor of Literature in the University of Sussex.]

John Sloan Dickey: The American liberal arts college, whether church-related or not, has had "a unique mission in the duality of its historic purpose: to see men made whole in both competence and conscience." ["Conscience and the Undergraduate," *Atlantic* (April, 1955). Dickey was President of Dartmouth College.]

Gerald F. Else: "So far as American higher education is concerned, I see three large things wrong..: 1. Increasing uncertainty about the essential purpose of higher education--namely, to train our students to make better moral and political choices. 2. Increasing emphasis on passive study of abstractions, with corresponding neglect of arts (= skills) and affective and sensuous elements. 3. Increasing monolingualism = ethnocentrism = American Hybris."

["Some Ill-Tempered Reflections on the Present State of Higher Education in the United States," Daedalus (Fall, 1974), p. 138). Else was Professor of Greek and Latin, and Director of the Center for Coordination of Ancient and Modern Studies, in the University of Michigan.]

Whitney Griswold: The liberal arts "are not a body of revealed truth or logical absolutes or a quantum of knowledge. They are studies designed to develop to capacity the intellectual and spiritual powers of the individual. Their aim is to make the most of a man, in order that he may make the most of his calling, his cultural opportunities, and his responsibilities as a citizen. Such was the meaning of the liberal arts in Plato's time, and such it is today." [In the University Tradition, Yale University Press, 1958. Griswold was President of Yale University.

Douglas Heath: "The proper goal of a liberal education is, I believe, to further the maturing of its students, particularly of their values and intellects." ["What the Enduring Effects of Higher Education Tell Us About a Liberal Education," Journal of Higher Education, March-April, 1976. Heath is Professor of Psychology at Haverford College.]

Theodore Hesburgh: "Liberal education should enable a person to humanize everything that he or she touches in life, which is to say that one is enabled... to evaluate what one is or does" and to "value consciously relationships that might otherwise be banal or meaningless." [Hesburgh is President of the University of Notre Dame.]

Sidney Hook: "By a liberal arts education I mean an education whose curriculum has been designed to help students develop those powers and resources--intellectual, emotional, cultural--that will enable them to acquire in a greater or lesser measure: (1) a perspective on the events of their time with which to meet the challenges of present and future experience; (2) a constellation of values or a set of meanings or a calling or a developing center around which to organize their lives; (3) the knowledge, ideals, and techniques necessary for them adequately to perform their duties as free citizens of a free society; (4) a cultivated sensibility and inner landscape so that they can live a rich and significant personal life in a continuous process of self-education." [From an address to the National Association of Student Personnel Administrators, 1969. Hook was Professor of Philosophy at New York University.]

Robert Maynard Hutchins: "I have always thought that the basic requirement for the formation of a political community is a common liberal education, an education that is appropriate to a community of free men. This has nothing to do with vocational training or with what is now called career education, whatever that may mean. The liberal arts are the arts of communication and the arts of using the mind. They are the arts indispensable to further learning, for they are the arts of reading, writing, speaking, listening, and figuring. They have a timeless quality, for they are indispensable no matter what happens in any state of the world. They are, in fact, the arts of becoming human." ["On Political Maturity," Change (November, 1974). Hutchins was sometime President of the University of Chicago, and of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.]

Jerome Kagan: "The university's task is to provide the young adult with the opportunity and incentive to question his existing beliefs and with the knowledge and skills that enable him to synthesize a more coherent view of his relation to nature and his past." [Kagan is Professor of Psychology at Harvard University.]

Carl Kaysen: "The liberally educated man or woman who is the ideal college graduate should have a well-developed capacity and taste for critical thought, especially in relation to the problem of value....He should also command what might be called the techniques and habits of learning so that he is able to continue his educational process in a self-motivated and self-directed way. And, finally, he should master some defined body of knowledge: 'the common culture of society.'" [Kaysen, an economist, is Director of the Institute for Advanced Studies.]

Lewis Mayhew: "Education, including higher education, is a social institution designed to enculturate people into the society and to acquaint them with the constantly expanding number of things they must know in order to cope with that society. It operates on the basis of tradition, partly because so little is really known about how people learn and develop and partly because traditional ways of doing things have not proven unsuccessful....Colleges and universities are at their best when they develop skills and abilities resting on the uses of words, numbers, and abstract concepts. Institutions organized to emphasize other things, such as the joys of gardening, the cultivation of spiritual serenity, or therapeutic self-expression, are not institutions of higher education, even though they may be quite laudable institutions that improve the human condition....Within the system of higher education in the United States, there should be constant experimentation with methods of instruction, learning, and operations. Most of these experiments should be expected to fail or prove inconclusive, for the practices and processes of higher education change slowly. Out of the welter of experimentation and attempted innovation may come a synthesis of new developments that can change the face of higher education." [Core Mission Is to Prepare Young for Adult Society," The Times Higher Education Supplement (The Times of London, March 3, 1978), p. 1. Mayhew is Professor of Education in Stanford University.]

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Richard P. McKeon: "...ours is an age of concreteness. The liberal arts are the universal skills required to do particular tasks. They are disciplines both in the sense of methods of inquiry and in the sense of acquaintance with subjects. The disciplines as methods relate the disciplines as subjects. They are liberal arts in that they liberate man and equip him to be active in four respects--with respect to other men, with respect to the world about him, with respect to the achievements of men, and with respect to his own potentialities and actions." ["Future of Liberal Arts," in G. K. Smith, ed., Twenty-Five Years: 1945-1970 (Jossey-Bass, 1970), p. 182. McKeon was a Distinguished Professor in the Department of Philosophy and of Classical Languages and Literature in the University of Chicago.]

Schubert Ogden: "...the primary objective of education at all levels must be to develop in the student the capacity to ask the question 'What is the case?' as broadly and deeply as possible and, together with this, to orient him in more general ways in which it can be asked and answered. In other words, the primary objective of all education at whatever level, is general intellectual culture, in the sense of developing the student's capacity to understand and to keep on in his own personal search for understanding--specifically, by means of science and philosophy in their wider and more traditional sense." ["Theological Reflections on Higher Education" (mimeographed, 1974). Ogden is Professor and Director of Graduate Studies in Religion, Southern Methodist University.]

José Ortega y Gasset: "...the organization of higher education, the construction of the university, must be based upon the student, and not upon the professor or upon knowledge. The university must be the projection of the student to the scale of an institution. And his two dimensions are, first, what he is--a being of limited learning capacity--and second, what he needs to know in

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order to live his life." [Mission of the University (Norton, 1966), p. 53. Ortega was a noted Spanish philosopher, editor, and parliamentarian.]

Jean Piaget: "The principle goal of education is to create men who are capable of doing new things, not simply of repeating what other generations have done--men who are creative, inventive, discoverers. The second goal of education is to form minds which can be critical, can verify, and not accept everything they are offered." [Piaget was a distinguished French psychologist.]

John Ruskin: "...the entire object of true education is to make people not merely do the right things, but enjoy the right things--not merely industrious, but to love industry--not merely learned, but to love knowledge--not merely pure, but to love purity--not merely just, but to hunger and thirst after justice." [Ruskin was a nineteenth-century English reformer and literary figure.]

Nevitt Sanford: "Liberal education has as its aim the fullest possible development of the individual personality. The limits of human potentiality are unknown, and there is no generally agreed way of describing the fully developed individual; but it seems that one may set forth the essence of much psychological theory and include the explicit aim of many educators by saying that the highly developed personality is characterized chiefly by complexity and wholeness." [In Robert L. Sutherland et al., editors, Personality Factors on the College Campus (Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, University of Texas, 1962), p. 3. Sanford was founder and Scientific Director of The Wright Institute, Berkeley, California.]

E. F. Schumacher: "Education can help us only if it produces 'whole men.' The truly educated man is not a man who knows a bit of everything, not even the man who knows all the details of all subjects (if such a thing were possible): the 'whole man,' in fact, may have little detailed knowledge of facts and theories, he may treasure the Encyclopaedia Britannica because 'she knows and he needn't." but he will be truly in touch with the centre. He will not be in doubt about his basic convictions, about his view on the meaning and purpose of his life. He may not be able to explain these matters in words, but the conduct of his life will show a certain sureness of touch which stems from his inner clarity." [Small Is Beautiful (Perennial Library, Harper and Row, 1975), p. 95. Schumacher was chief economist and head of planning for the British Coal Board.]

Edward Joseph Shoben: "...the liberal arts are not subjects in the curriculum. Rather, they are personal qualities--the attributes of men that enlarge their capacity for uncoerced choice." [AGB Reports (Association of Governing Boards, November-December, 1967), p. 5. Shoben is a psychologist who has been at the American Council on Education, SUNY-Buffalo, Evergreen State, and the University of Pittsburgh.]

B.F. Skinner: "The principal function of education is to transmit the culture--to enable new members of a group to profit from what others have already learned. It follows that the principal task of the student is to learn what others already know." ["Designing Higher Education," Daedalus (Fall, 1974), p. 196. Skinner is Edgar Pierce Professor of Psychology in Harvard University.]

Gerhard Spiegler: "The aim of the liberal arts education is to make men more fully human. The whole man is to be educated and human wholeness is the end of liberal education. The health of man is to be achieved by deepening the humanity of man. The liberally educated man is the healthy man....The curriculum of a liberal arts college is a complex value judgment. The liberal arts college, if it is to inculcate values must

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itself embrace values; it must commit itself." ["Theology as a Discipline in the University," (mimeographed). Formerly Provost of Haverford College, Spiegler teaches religious studies at Temple University.]

David B. Truman: "The liberal arts...include those subjects that can most readily be taught to as to produce an understanding of the modes of thought, the grounds of knowledge, and their interrelations--established and to be discovered. The range of these subjects is not unlimited, but if the process at which they aim is to succeed, none can stand alone. Their promise is collective. It is their bearing upon one another that lends them their liberal quality....The heart of the problem... is in the structure, or nonstructure, of the curriculum. If the promise of the liberal arts is collective, then its realization assumes a structure, a system of priorities, collaboratively designed and, equally important, collaboratively operated...What we label a curriculum too often can be called a structure only by courtesy. It is more likely to resemble a kaleidoscope whose positions changes as it passes from one student to another. Whether a particular piece is seen at all is largely a matter of chance. Since a consistent design is absent from the whole, moreover, and its assembly is less the result of collaboration than of log-rolling, each segment is dealt with in comparative isolation. A partial coherence may be imposed by the departments or the disciplines, but these are only slightly larger fragments and provide no adequate means of achieving the collective goals of the liberal arts." ["Relevance of Liberal Arts," in G.K. Smith, ed., Twenty-Five Years: 1945-70 (Jossey-Bass, 1970), pp. 249, 252. Truman was President of Mount Holyoke College.]

Kenneth Underwood: "The purpose of education...or better, the best test of its quality, is that it enhances the capacity of laymen to achieve just social policies." [The Church, the University, and Social Policy (Wesleyan University Press, 1969), p. 92. Underwood taught at Denison and Yale, and was Director of the Institute for Ethics and Politics at Wesleyan University.]

Mark Van Doren: "The aim of liberal education is one's own excellence, the perfection of one's own intellectual character. Liberal education makes the person competent; not merely to know or do, but also, and indeed chiefly, to be....The prime occupation of liberal education is with the skills of being." [Liberal Education (Beacon Press, 1959), p. 67. Van Doren was Professor of English at Columbia University.]

S. L. Washburn: "The highly adaptable, emotional, social creature we call man learns in the early years through emotionally rewarding interpersonal bonds, later through clearly visible, socially important objectives. In education, discipline is no substitute for internal motivation. In the young, play is the primary internal drive for learning, and the repetition which is necessary to master skills is guaranteed by play in all cultures not dominated by European educational traditions. Our system separates education from life and substitutes examinations for life. The classroom reduces the most intelligent, imaginative, exploratory primate to a bored robot, learning 'facts,' most of which form no part of a preparation for life....Everything we know about primate nature shows that the present form of the educational system is neither necessary nor efficient. Education should be for clearly defined goals and operated in accord with an understanding of human nature." ["Evolution and Education," Daedalus (Fall, 1974), p. 226. Washburn is Professor of Anthropology in the University of California, Berkeley.]

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Alfred North Whitehead: "Education is the guidance of the individual towards a comprehension of the art of life; and by the art of life I mean the most complete achievement of varied activity expressing the potentialities of that living creature in the face of its actual environment." [The Aims of Education (Free Press, 1967), p. 39. Whitehead, a major figure in twentieth-century philosophy and mathematics, was a professor at Harvard and wrote Process and Reality and Science and the Modern World.]

APPENDIX B

Liberal Learning: A Personal Definition

Lloyd J. Averill

To engage in a process of liberal learning is to undertake the practice of those human and humane competences which free men and women to live life rather than be lived by it, and to grow that integrity which draws varied competences together and makes life both single and singular.

The aims of liberal learning are these:

--to grapple with ideas at increasing levels of complexity and with increasing degrees of integration, independence, and creativity;

--to experience the satisfaction and self-confidence which come from the reasonably mastery of some field of study or style of inquiry;

--to experience learning both as the art of detachment and the art of involvement, both as idea and as act;

--to enlarge the personal repertoire of styles--mental and moral, emotional and volitional, sensual and imaginative--for appropriate response to the varied demands life makes;

--to learn the kind of discrimination which complicates life by refusing to be content with simplicism or mere prejudice:

--to strive for reason without giving up a tolerance for ambiguity;

--to cultivate discipline without loss of spontaneity, and seriousness without losing a talent for play;

--to value science without demeaning mystery;

--to distinguish the truth of an idea from its popularity, and the worth of a person from the number of his detractors;

--to hold one's absolutes provisionally;

--to improve decision-making skills in an environment which offers a

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real range of personal and academic alternatives, limits liability for any single decision or performance, minimizes irreversibility, and makes guidance readily accessible;

--to experience the tension between tenacity and compromise which all living together requires;

--to discover how to cope with unfamiliar life-settings, both intellectual and cultural;

--to achieve increasing clarity of moral and religious conviction; and

--to arrive at increasing clarity of vocation, in order to help determine what the world will make of itself.

APPENDIX C

Suggestions for Further Reading

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